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 Abstract 
This thesis investigates the processing of negative assertions. Psycholinguistic 
research shows that out-of-context negative sentences are more difficult to process 
than positive sentences. In the early stages of negation processing, the positive 
counterpart is often represented. Pragmatic research shows that negative sentences 
have richer pragmatic functions than positive sentences. These findings require a 
theory of negative sentence processing that can account for both the processing 
effects and pragmatic functions. Among current theories, a popular approach – 
rejection approach – attributes the processing effects to the processing of the 
linguistically coded meaning of negative sentences. They propose that negative 
sentences are represented as the rejection of their positive counterparts. They state 
that the representation of the positive counterpart is a mandatory first step of 
negation processing, and explain the processing cost in terms of the extra step of 
embedding.  
Arguing against current theories (especially rejection accounts), I propose the 
dynamic pragmatic account. In general, sentence processing – with or without 
explicit context- should not only involve processing the linguistically coded content, 
but also involve inferring pragmatically retrieved content such as how the sentence 
relates to the broader discourse. Specifically, when we interpret an assertion, we not 
only process the asserted meaning, but also the Question Under Discussion (QUD) 
addressed by this assertion, which can be retrieved and accommodated using 
linguistic and non-linguistic cues. Negation is a cue for retrieving the prominent 
QUD. Without contextual support or further cues, the most prominent QUD for a 
negative sentence ¬p is the positive question whether p. The projection of this 
positive QUD is due to the most frequent uses of negation, and is sensitive to other 
factors (e.g. frequency of the predicate and context) and other QUD cues (e.g. 
prosodic focus and cleft construction). I propose that the accommodation of a 
positive QUD contributes to the processing cost of negation, explains why the 
positive counterparts are often represented, and accounts for the pragmatic effects of 
negative sentences.  
  
The dynamic pragmatic account and competing theories are tested in three series of 
experiments in Chapters 3-5. In Chapter 3, I show that the representation of the 
positive counterpart is not a mandatory first step for negation processing. Rather it is 
likely due to QUD accommodation. When a negative sentence projects a negative 
prominent QUD (such as a cleft negative sentence “It is John who hasn’t ironed his 
shirt”), the positive counterpart is no longer represented.  In Chapter 4, I investigate 
the verification of negative sentences against pictures. Previous studies have reported 
inconsistent results where verifying true negative sentences can take less, equal 
amount or more time than verifying false negatives. I argue that two strategies can be 
used in the task: the default strategy and the truth-functional strategy. The default 
strategy is to infer and represent the situation that makes the sentence true and 
compare it with the evidence. In addition, the accommodation of the positive QUD 
may encourage the development of a truth-functional strategy, in which participants 
answer the positive QUD and then switch the truth index. I show that when negative 
sentences project positive QUDs, there is a training effect: the reaction time pattern 
of true and false negatives change over time, indicating a development of a task-
specific strategy; on the other hand, when negative sentences project negative QUDs, 
participants no longer develop the task-specific strategy. In Chapter 5, I investigate 
the time course of negative sentence processing in a visual world eye-tracking study. 
The results show that processing simple negative sentences is delayed compared to 
processing simple positives, but processing cleft negatives is no more delayed than 
processing cleft positives. Importantly, both QUD accommodation and the 
integration of the meaning of negation can happen incrementally. Overall, the 
findings speak against current models of negation processing (especially rejection 
accounts), and support the dynamic pragmatic account.  
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Introduction 
This thesis concerns the processing of negative utterances. Negation is a universal 
phenomenon in human languages. All natural languages have negation, yet it seems 
to be absent in all other animal communication systems (S Altmann, 1967).  We use 
negation frequently for a wide range of purposes, including rejection, denial and 
talking about non-existence. According to the Oxford English Corpus, “not” is the 
13
th
 most frequently used word in the English language. If we look at the combined 
frequency of “not” and “no”, negation is in the top 10 list. Negation enables us to 
entertain the truth value of a proposition, which is one of the central aspects of 
language use (Kant, 1787). Without negation, we would be without logic or even 
modern science.  
Research on negation presents two asymmetries: (1) the high frequency of negation 
in natural language and the reported processing difficulty and (2) the simple semantic 
function of negation and its rich pragmatic effects. The first asymmetry lies between 
the high frequency of negation and its reported requirement in processing effort. 
Frequency greatly influences processing effort. Research shows that frequent words 
are recognized faster, understood faster and acquired earlier (see discussion by Ellis, 
2002). Although we use negation frequently and rather effortlessly (at least 
according to our intuition), numerous psycholinguistic studies reported that negative 
sentences are more difficult to process than positive ones. Participants take longer to 
comprehend negative sentences, struggle to evaluate whether a negative sentence is 
true or false, to reason when negation is involved, or to remember information 
contained in a negative sentence. In addition to being difficult, negative sentences 
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seem to have a very close relationship with their positive counterparts. Many studies 
show that when we process a negative sentence, such as "the shop is not open", we 
often first process and represent its positive counterpart "the shop is open". These 
findings lead to my first set of questions:  
Question 1a: why are negative sentences difficult to process (at least in 
psycholinguistic experiments)? 
Question 1b: why is the representation of the positive counterpart often involved? 
The second asymmetry lies between the simple semantic meaning of negation and its 
rich pragmatic effects (Horn, 1989). In classical logic, negation is a one-place truth-
functional connective. If a proposition p is true, then the negation of p is false, and 
vice versa. By this analysis, propositions p and ¬p differ only in their truth values, 
and p and ¬¬p are semantically equivalent. However, in natural language use, a 
doubly negated sentence often doesn’t convey the same meaning as the sentence in 
positive form. For example, “I am not unhappy” seems to convey a different 
meaning from “I am happy”. Also, a negative sentence does not just communicate 
the opposite of a positive sentence. Consider this example. There are streets in 
London with many small hotels. When you walk along such a street, you will see 
many hotel signs. If among these houses, you see a sign which says “this is not a 
hotel”, what will you think? This sign seems superfluous. We don’t put up signs to 
say what the house is not, as the list would have to be infinitely long. Upon seeing 
this sign, you do not just understand that the house is not a hotel, you also infer that 
many people have asked if it was a hotel or have mistaken it as one. The sign is for 
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people with such a query or assumption. This pragmatic effect raises the second 
question:  
Question 2: how does negation allow us to infer such background information?  
This thesis investigates these two questions plus a further one: how are questions 1 
and 2 related?  
Here is a roadmap for the thesis: in Chapter 1, I review psycholinguistic findings and 
current theories on the processing of negative sentences. Many studies tested the 
processing of negative sentences without context and some tested negative sentences 
in discourse context. When negative sentences are processed without context, two 
main effects were found: (1) negation requires extra processing effort, and (2) in the 
early stages of negation processing, participants often represent the positive 
counterpart. When negative sentences are processed with a supporting context, both 
effects diminish: negative sentences are almost as easy to process as positive ones, 
and the positive counterpart is no longer represented. Current accounts of negation 
processing come from three perspectives: grammatical, rejection-based and 
contextual. The dominant rejection-based approach (e.g. Carpenter & Just, 1975; 
Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007) suggests that that negation is difficult because we 
must first process and represent the positive argument of negation and then reject it. 
Negative sentences take longer to process because of the extra step of embedding. 
However, no current account is consistent with all the empirical findings.  
In Chapter 2, I propose the dynamic pragmatic account of negation processing. 
Following the dynamic semantic and pragmatic approach to meaning, this account 
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views context as an integral part of sentence interpretation, whether or not an explicit 
context is provided. I first set up the scene by comparing language use to a game 
where participants interact according to rules to achieve goals. I discuss what context 
is and how it interacts with utterance interpretation. Against this scene, I introduce 
the idea of Question Under Discussion and its accommodation, which are the 
backbone of my account. The main idea is that negation triggers a contextual 
accommodation. I will survey linguistic examples and corpus findings and evaluate 
them against my account, and then make predictions regarding the online processing 
of negative sentences.  
Chapters 3 to 5 present three series of experiments testing current accounts of 
negation processing and the dynamic pragmatic account. Chapter 3 investigates 
whether the representation of the positive counterpart is a mandatory first step of 
negation processing, as suggested by rejection accounts. Chapter 4 discusses the 
effect of negation on truth value judgment. Studies (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & 
Chase, 1972; Wason, 1961) reported that negative sentences are harder to verify than 
positive ones. For example, when presented with an image of several dots in one 
colour, participants take longer to verify “the dots aren’t red” than “the dots are red”. 
In addition, negation often interacts with sentence truth value, and produces an 
interaction pattern in verification time: while true affirmatives (TA) are faster than 
false affirmatives (FA), the opposite (often) holds for the negatives, i.e. true 
negatives (TN) are harder than false negatives (FN). For example, it is easier to 
evaluate “the dots are red” against red dots (TA) than black dots (FA), whereas it is 
harder evaluate “the dots aren’t red” against black dots (TN) than red dots (FN). This 
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result has been viewed as evidence for the rejection based account of negation 
processing. I argue that the dynamic pragmatic account provides a better explanation 
of the results, and discuss a series of experiments that test competing accounts. 
Chapter 5 investigates the time-course of negation processing, specifically, when 
negation-triggered contextual effect take place and when the meaning of negation is 
incorporated. I present a visual world eye-tracking study which reveals how negation 
processing unfolds in real time and how it differs from the processing of positive 
sentences. Afterwards, I discuss the findings and present a few ideas for future 
research in Chapter 6, and then I summarize the main ideas in conclusions.  In the 
rest of the introduction, I define the scope of research for this thesis. 
Scope of research: negative assertions 
This thesis studies the processing of what is commonly referred to as “negative 
sentences”. What are negative sentences? Although the notion sounds transparent, 
the nature of sentential negation has been and still is a subject of debate. In natural 
language use, negation can have scope over different sizes of linguistic units, such as 
a word (e.g. “non-words”), a phrase (e.g. “my friend lives not too far away”) or a 
clause /sentence (e.g. “the dress isn’t new”). Sentential negation operates over a wide 
scope, but different scholars view the nature of wide-scope negation somewhat 
differently. According to Fregean logic, sentential negation is a truth value operator 
with scope over the whole proposition. For a sentence in the form “S is not P”, the 
scope of negation is “S is P”. This view is echoed by Klima (1964), who proposes 
that in the deep structure, negation is in the leftmost position and only moves to its 
usual sentence-medial surface position via syntactic transformations. He suggests 
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that only sentential negation can be used with “either”, “not-even”, affirmative tag 
questions and “neither” clauses. According to Klima, in the following examples, (a) 
sentences contain sentential negation; (b) sentences contain negative particles or 
morphemes, but not sentential negation.  
1a) John is quite sad, and Mary isn’t happy either. 
1b) John is quite sad, and Mary is unhappy *either. 
 
2a) Writers don’t accept suggestions, not even reasonable ones. 
2b) Writers disregard suggestions, *not even reasonable ones.  
 
3a) The Millers don’t live far from here, do they? 
3b) The Millers live not far from here, *do they?1 
 
4a) Stephen doesn’t like ginger, and neither does Sam. 
4b) Stephen dislikes ginger, and *neither does Sam.  
On the other hand, Horn (1989) defines sentential negation as “predicate denial”. He 
follows the Aristotelian tradition that negation is a mode of predication which denies 
that a predicate applies to the subject. So the sentence “Coke is not nutritious” denies 
that being nutritious applies to coke. Note that this is still a “wide-scope” use of 
negation, which is different from a narrower scope use, where negation is integrated 
into the predicate. The wide-scope use (5) allows negation to be contracted with 
auxiliaries, e.g. “don’t”, “isn’t” or “ain’t”, whereas narrow-scope use (6) doesn’t. 
                                                 
1 It can be argued that this sentence is not really ungrammatical but perhaps not natural.  
 20 
 
Here (5) has wide-scope negation, as the predicate P is denied of the subject S; (6) 
has narrow-scope negation, as the predicate not P is affirmed of the subject S. 
5) S is not P. / S isn’t P. 
6) S is (not-P).  
Sentential negation has been the subject of many psycholinguistic studies on 
negation. For most of them, negative sentences are viewed as propositions. The 
meaning of a sentence is compositionally determined by its constituents.  My object 
of study is similar in that I am interested in the sentential negation, roughly sentences 
in the form “S is not P”. However, I treat these tokens as utterances rather than 
propositions. I focus on how a hearer processes negative sentences produced by a 
speaker. This thesis assumes that psycholinguistic experiments reveal how language 
is processed in natural communication. Therefore, a better way to frame my scope of 
study would be “negative assertions”. According to Stalnaker (1978), an assertion 
“expresses a proposition” in a context. The content of an assertion depends on the 
context and in turn changes the context. My study investigates the processing of 
negative assertions - utterances which express negative propositions. I assume that 
whether a linguistic token is uttered by a speaker in natural settings or presented in 
an experiment without a speaker, we adopt the same processes to interpret the 
linguistic tokens. With the scope of research clarified, let’s move on to Chapter 1 
where I survey the key findings in negation processing. 
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Chapter 1 Negation processing – findings and accounts 
Research on the processing of negation centres on the asymmetry between 
affirmation and negation. (7) is an example of a negative sentence and (8) is its 
positive counterpart. Here negation scope over the embedded positive sentence “the 
door is open”, which I will call the “positive argument” or the “positive counterpart”2 
of the negative sentence.   
7) The door is not open. > Not (the door is open). 
8) The door is open. 
Psychologically, negative sentences are found to be more difficult to process than 
positive sentences. What’s more, the positive argument of a negative sentence seems 
to be playing an important role in negation processing. Many studies report that 
participants seem to first process the positive argument. In this chapter, I first survey 
key findings in negation processing in 1.1, and then review current theories of 
negation processing in 1.2. 
1.1 Findings in negation processing 
 Negation processing: the extra effort 1.1.1
Negation research first received significant attention in psychology in the 1960s and 
1970s. A main research question was why negative sentences often take longer to 
process than positives. Compared to "the door is open", the sentence "the door is not 
                                                 
2 The phrases “positive counterpart” and “positive argument” are used interchangeably as they 
refer to the same positive proposition.  
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open" is one word longer. An extra word (which takes roughly 40ms to read) does 
not fully account for the extra time it takes to process a negative sentence compared 
to their positive counterparts, where the difference is roughly between 100ms to 
300ms. Negation-related difficulty has been found in different paradigms such as 
sentence completion, sentence verification and logical reasoning. In these studies, 
negative items are associated with longer response times and higher error rates 
compared to their positive counterparts. The difficulty of negation observed in 
behavioral studies was confirmed in ERP and fMRI studies. In addition, drawing 
inferences is more difficult if the information is presented in negative form than in 
positive form, even if the two were equally informative (Hovland & Weiss, 1953). 
Also the memory of negated information is worse than that of positive material. 
1.1.1.1 Sentence completion and verification 
Paul Wason was an important figure in the psycholinguistic study of negation. He 
conducted a series of experiments studying negation in the 1950s and 1960s using 
sentence verification and sentence completion.  For example, in his 1961 study, 
participants were asked to complete sentences such as (9) to (11) to make them true 
or false, or to verify sentences in this form. In both tasks, negative items induced 
higher error rates and longer response times than positive items. 
9) ... is an even number. 
10) ... is not an event number. 
11) ... is an odd number. 
12) ... is not an odd number. 
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A similar effect has been found in several other sentence verification studies. These 
studies either involve verifying positive and negative sentences against world 
knowledge (e.g. Mckinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008; Wales & Grieve, 1969; Wason, 
1961), such as "an elephant is not a mammal", or verifying sentences against pictures 
(e.g. Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Gough, 1965; Trabasso & 
Rollins, 1971), such as the sentence "the dots are not red" against red or black dots. 
In these studies, negative sentences have longer response times and higher error rates 
than positive sentences.  
A neuroimaging study by Carpenter and colleagues (Carpenter, Just, Keller, Eddy, & 
Thulborn, 1999) found that in a sentence-picture verification task, negative sentences 
induce increased activation in areas of the brain that are responsible for language 
comprehension (left posterior temporal gyrus) and for visuo-spacial processing (left 
and right parietal regions) compared to positive sentences. This result was taken to 
show that negative sentences require more effort to process. ERP studies have also 
found that evaluating the truth value of negative sentences require more time and 
cognitive effort than positive counterparts (Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & 
Perry, 1983; Herbert & Kübler, 2011; Reichle, Carpenter, & Just, 2000).  
1.1.1.2 Negation in logical reasoning 
Negation not only makes sentence verification difficult, it also makes logical 
reasoning harder, evidenced by longer reaction times and biases in responses. A 
famous negation related reasoning bias is the “matching bias”, discovered by Evans 
and colleagues (Evans, 1972; Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1996; see Evans, 1998 for a 
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review). In a task where participants have to evaluate a conditional rule “if the letter 
is a G then the number is a 4” against letter-number pairs, they tend to look for cases 
that match either or both components of the conditional. Pairs such as “D3” would 
make the rule true, but participants tend to treat these pairs as irrelevant to the rule 
(Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969). This effect is called the “matching bias” because 
participants tend to look for cases that have been mentioned in the rule, even if it is 
negated. A similar effect is found in the “Wason selection task” (Wason & Johnson-
Laird, 1972). Evans (1998) suggests that “matching bias” can be explained by 
interpretation heuristics related to the function of negation. He called this the “not-
heuristic”. In natural language, a constituent is relevant even when negated. The 
function of negation is to “deny presuppositions rather than to assert new 
information” (Evans, 1998:58). For example, “I didn’t go for a walk” denies the 
presupposition that you went for a walk. What you did do is irrelevant. According to 
this theory, when participants read a negative construction they do not automatically 
construct the complement set, rather, the positive argument remains the focus of 
attention. In a matching task, participants were given cards lying on a table with a 
letter on one side and a number on the other, as well as a rule regarding the letter and 
the number. They need to decide which cards to turn over to check if they fit the rule. 
When given a statement like “if the letter is p then the number is 7”, participants do 
not think about the set of “non-7” or “non-p”, which is why they only focus on cases 
containing 7 or “p”, and fail to recognize that a card with the number 5 on one side 
needs to be checked (that it shouldn’t have the letter “p” on the other side). Oaksford 
and colleagues (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992; Oaksford & Moussakowski, 2004) 
argue against Evan’s  “not-heuristic” account, and suggest that negation 
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automatically triggers comprehenders to construct a contrast set.  However, 
constructing the contrast-set is difficult because it normally contains a large number 
of possible states of affairs.  
Prado and Noveck (2006) tested these two accounts using the conditional rule task. 
Participants verified four types of sentences about letters and shapes in “if…then…” 
constructions against visual stimuli. The four types of sentences were affirmative 
antecedent, affirmative consequent (AA): if p then q; AN: if p then not q; NA: if not 
p then q; and NN: if not p then not q. AN sentences such as" if there is an H then 
there is not a square" were the critical items. The visual stimuli were letters presented 
in geometric shapes (e.g. an H inside a circle). The “Not-heuristic” account (Evans, 
1972, 1998) would predict that rejecting an AN sentence is easier than affirming one, 
as in the former case, both items in the visual stimuli would have been mentioned in 
the sentence. On the other hand, the automatic contrast-set account (Oaksford & 
Moussakowski, 2004) would predict the opposite. They found that the rejection of 
AN items was easier than confirmation. This suggests that sentences like "if there is 
an H then there is not a square" only primed elements that were mentioned, even if 
they were negated. In other words, reading “not a square” does not prime shapes 
other than square. Their results support the “not-heuristic” view: negation does not 
automatically prime a search for the alternatives.  
1.1.1.3 Memory of negated material 
Negation has been shown to have an impact on memory. A study by Cornish and 
Wason (1970) found that people remember positive sentences more accurately than 
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negative ones. What's more, participants are more likely to misremember a negative 
sentence to have appeared in a positive form, than to misremember a positive senesce 
to have appeared in the negative form. Many errors with negative sentences involved 
"rephrasing" the content in a positive form.  
Howard (1975) studied the effect of negation on memory search. Participants were 
shown a set of letters. In the plus condition, participants had to decide whether the 
probe was a member of the set, i.e. answering “yes” when the probe was a member 
and “no” otherwise. In the minus condition, participants had to decide if the probe 
was not a member (reversed answers to plus condition). They found that 
performance in the minus condition was worse than the plus condition in both 
reaction time and accuracy. Howard attributed this difference to the difficulty of 
representing information in the negative form.  
1.1.1.4 Acquisition of (truth functional) negation 
Given the difficulty in processing negative sentences among adults, it will not be 
surprising that children experience some difficulty acquiring negation. Although 
young children often start using negation in one-word stage, they don’t master all the 
main uses of negation until much later (Pea, 1980). Bloom (1970) proposed that 
children acquire three categories of negation in sequence: nonexistence, rejection and 
denial. The three categories can be illustrated with the following examples. 
Nonexistence is used when a child expects a referent in context, but cannot see the 
referent. An example of such use is no pocket (in mommy’s shirt). Rejection is used 
when the referent is present in context, but the child is rejecting or opposing it. An 
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example of such use is “no dirty soap”, meaning “I don’t want dirty soap”. Denial is 
used to mean that a proposition is not true or a situation is not the case, such as 
saying “no truck” after an adult gave the child a car and said “there’s the truck”. 
However, this acquisition order is not seen in all children. Pea (1980) showed that 
many children first express rejection non-verbally, by shaking their head. He thus 
proposed a different development sequence: rejection (typically nonverbal) – 
disappearance –truth functional negation. 
However, what is universal is that denial, or the truth functional use of negation is 
the last of the three to appear, which happens at around 24 months. The late 
occurrence suggests that truth functional negation is cognitively complex. Pea (1980) 
proposed an explanation by comparing the mental representations of the three types 
of negation. Rejection involves expressing one’s negative attitude or emotion 
towards a present referent, thus it requires no explicit mental representation. 
Disappearance, such as uses like “gone” or “no more” when a referent has 
disappeared from sight, requires mental representation of the referent. Truth-
functional negation, however, requires abstract mental representation in a much 
higher level of complexity. Unlike disappearance negation, truth functional negation 
involves commenting on the abstract representation of complete propositions, the 
meaning of which is of a higher logical type than disappearance negation.    
 Negation and the representation of the positive counterpart 1.1.2
In addition to the difficulty of negation, another interesting and prevalent finding 
concerns the role of the positive counterpart in negation processing. Studies (e.g. 
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Dale & Duran, 2011; Fischler et al., 1983; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, 
Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007; Lüdtke, Friedrich, De Filippis, & Kaup, 
2008) found that in the early processing stage (approximately between 0ms to 800ms 
after the offset of the sentence stimuli), negation seem to be ignored and negative 
sentences seem to be processed as if they were positive.  
1.1.2.1 In probe recognition task 
Probe recognition tasks have been used to study the activation level of the 
representation of the positive counterpart. They found that shortly after reading a 
negative sentence, participants simulate the situation consistent with the positive 
argument. Concepts consistent with the positive counterpart are more active than 
concepts consistent with the negative sentence meaning. For example, shortly after 
reading “the door isn’t open”, participants are faster to respond to an image of an 
open door than a closed door.  
In a series of studies using visual probe recognition, Kaup and colleagues 
investigated the stages of representations during negative sentence processing. The 
paradigm is based on a study by Zwaan and colleagues (Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 
2002). In this study, participants were presented with sentences such as “the ranger 
saw an eagle in the sky/nest”, and then (250ms after the sentence) saw a picture 
depicting the noun mentioned in the verb phrase (eagle). The picture either matched 
or mismatched the implied shape (a flying eagle or a resting eagle). Participants 
indicated whether the object was mentioned in the sentence, which for experimental 
items was always “yes”. They found that participants took longer to respond to a 
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mismatching picture than a matching picture. They concluded that the results suggest 
that participants routinely infer the implied shapes of objects during sentence 
comprehension, and construct mental simulations. Kaup, Yaxley, et al. (2007) used 
this paradigm to investigate what representations are constructed when processing a 
negative sentence. Participants read sentences such as “there was no eagle in the 
sky”, and 250ms after they finish reading the sentence, saw a picture of the 
mentioned item (eagle) that either matched or mismatched the shape implied by the 
sentence. If participants infer the implied shape according to the negative sentence 
and construct a mental simulation, they should respond faster to a matching (resting 
eagle) than a mismatching (flying eagle) picture, just like with the positive sentences. 
However, the results showed that responses to a mismatching picture were faster, 
suggesting that participants simulate the situation of the positive counterpart when 
processing a negative sentence.  
Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke (2006) studied the processing of negative sentences with 
binary predicates, such as “the door was not open”. Participants read the sentences 
and after a delay saw a picture that either matched or mismatched the implied shape 
of the target item (a closed or open door), and named the object out loud. The delay 
was varied at either 750ms or 1500ms. They found that at 750ms delay, there was a 
match facilitation in response for positive but not negative sentences. At 1500ms 
delay, the match facilitation is not seen in positive sentences, but is present for 
negative sentences. Kaup and colleagues concluded from the results that in the early 
stage of negative sentence processing, comprehenders first simulate a situation 
consistent with the positive counterpart. This representation is subsequently rejected 
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and replaced with a representation consistent with the negative sentence meaning. 
They proposed the two-step simulation account of negation processing. I will review 
this account in more detail in section 1.2.2. 
Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) studied metaphor comprehension using word probe 
recognition. They used a lexical decision task after presenting sentences like "my 
brother is (not) a rock". The critical probe word was consistent with the metaphor's 
vehicle (e.g. strong). The delay offset varied at 150ms, 500ms, or 1000ms. They 
found that for positive metaphors, response times to vehicle-consistent words (e.g. 
strong) were facilitated at all delays. For negative metaphors, there was similar 
facilitation initially (at 150ms and 500ms delays). However at longer delay 
(1000ms), this facilitation was gone. They suggested participants initially represent 
the positive counterpart of the negated concept, and later suppress it.  
1.1.2.2 In sentence verification 
In sentence verification, studies found that negation not only makes sentence 
verification more difficult, it can also interact with sentence truth value: while it is 
easier to judge a true positive than a false positive, the opposite (often) holds for 
negative sentences. For example, in Clark and Chase (1972), sentences such as (13) 
to (16) were shown alongside a picture that makes the sentence true or false. 
13) The plus is above the star. (True Affirmative, abbrev as TA) 
14) The star is above the plus. (False Affirmative, FA) 
15) The star isn’t above the plus. (True Negative, TN) 
16) The plus isn’t above the star.(False Negative, FN)  
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Picture:  
Results from all sentence verification studies found that when verifying a positive 
sentence, the true ones are easier (TA<FA). With negative sentences, many studies 
(e.g. Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972) found that true negative 
sentences are harder than false ones, thus reporting a polarity by truth value 
interaction (TA<FA<FN<TN)
3
. This pattern is interpreted in terms of a strategy 
based on the truth-functional property of negation. When presented with a negative 
sentence, participants first represent and evaluate the truth value of its positive 
argument (the corresponding affirmative), and then reverse the truth-value. The 
argument of TN is FA, and the argument of FN is TA. Given that response latencies 
are shorter for TAs than for FAs, evaluating the argument is faster for FNs than for 
TNs. Assuming that the cost of reversing truth-value is constant, it explains why TNs 
have longer response latencies than FNs.  
Dale and Duran (2011, experiment 1) conducted a sentence-world knowledge 
verification study using mouse-tracking (‘Elephants are not small/large’). 
Participants were presented with the sentence word by word in the bottom centre of 
the screen, and then moved the mouse cursor from the bottom centre to either 
“TRUE” or “FALSE”, which were in the top left and right of the screen respectively. 
Mouse movement trajectory and speed were measured. They found that mouse 
                                                 
3 Some studies reported that truth and false negative sentences take equally long, yet others 
report that truth sentences take less time to judge, whether they are positive or negative. I will 
review the literature in more detail in chapter 4. 
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movements involve a higher number of directional flips between “True” and “False” 
when verifying a negative sentence than a positive sentence. The deviation of such 
flips is larger in negatives compared to positives. Also, there was a polarity by truth-
value interaction in the number of directional flips, i.e. there were less flips in TA 
than FA, and less flips in FN than TN. They suggested that participants first 
considered the truth-value of the affirmative counterpart when verifying negative 
sentences. A similar effect has been reported by Mckinstry et al. (2008). 
1.1.2.3 In ERP studies 
ERP studies (Fischler et al., 1983; Lüdtke et al., 2008) found that certain kinds of 
true negatives (e.g. A robin is not a tree) gave rise to greater N400 effects than 
corresponding false negatives (A robin is not a bird), while the corresponding false 
affirmatives (a robin is a tree) predictably gave rise to greater N400 effects relative to 
true affirmatives (a robin is a bird). Fischler et al. (1983) attributed this reversal of 
the normal N400 effect to the idea that participants first process the positive 
argument when processing a negative sentence. Thus, in the early stage when the 
N400 effect is found, a negative sentence “a robin is not a bird” involves processing 
“a robin is a bird”, thus triggering the same results as its positive counterpart.  
Lüdtke et al. (2008) presented participants with positive and negative sentences such 
as “in front of the tower there is a ghost/ there is no ghost”, and then a picture that is 
either consistent or inconsistent with the sentence meaning at either 250ms delay or 
1500ms delay. The N400 amplitude was measured time-locked to the picture. At 
250ms delay, they found no negation effect. That is, a picture of a ghost in front of a 
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tower is primed equally by a positive and a negative sentence, both eliciting a 
smaller N400 than the mismatching picture, suggesting that negation is not initially 
integrated. At 1500ms delay, pictures that are consistent with the sentence meaning 
are more primed, suggesting that negation is fully integrated at this point. They 
concluded that negation doesn’t supress the priming effect of word under its scope, 
and the early stage of negation processing involves processing the positive argument.  
1.1.2.4 When it does not happen 
While it seems that participants often represent the positive counterpart when 
processing negative sentences, some studies suggest that they do not always. In the 
ERP literature, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) showed that contextually felicitous 
True Negatives do not give rise to a greater N400 effect compared to either True 
Affirmatives or False Negatives. When participants read pragmatically licensed 
negative sentences, such as “With proper equipment, scuba-diving isn’t very 
safe/dangerous”, words that make the sentence false (safe) elicited bigger N400 than 
words that make the sentence true (dangerous). However, when participants read 
pragmatically unlicensed negative sentences, such as “Bulletproof vests aren’t very 
safe/dangerous”, words that make the sentence false (safe) elicited smaller N400 
than words that make the sentence true (dangerous). They suggest that there is no 
principled obstacle for participants to incorporate negation immediately. With 
appropriate context, participants do not have to first process the positive argument, 
and that the meaning of negation can be incorporated immediately. 
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Similarly, Dale & Duran (2011, Experiment 2 &3) showed that the more contextual 
support that the items have, the less the tendency to consider the positive counterpart. 
Using a mouse-tracking paradigm, participants read short passages such as 'You 
want to lift an elephant?' the mother said to her child, 'but elephants are not small”, 
and judged the sensibility of the adults’ statement. They found no polarity by truth 
value interaction, i.e. true statements elicited fewer flips along the answer axis than 
false statements regardless of the sentence polarity.  
In addition, fMRI studies (Tettamanti et al., 2008) show that while reading a positive 
sentence with action verbs (e.g. ‘grip’, ‘clasp’) activates the motor regions (left-
hemispheric action-representation system), negation modulates this activity. 
Specifically, negative sentences tend to show decreased activation relative to positive 
sentences (see also Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010). 
 Negated words are less accessible 1.1.3
Studies found that the concept and/or the linguistic form of the constituent in the 
scope of negation can be suppressed/ deactivated in the late processing stage (Hasson 
& Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Levine & Hagaman, 2008; MacDonald 
& Just, 1989). Studies in this area investigated two related but different questions:  
a. Whether the accessibility of a word is reduced when it is negated compared 
to when it is affirmed. For example, whether the accessibility of “cake” is 
reduced after reading “Jane didn’t bake cakes” compared to “Jane baked 
cakes”.  
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b. Whether the accessibility of the positive argument of negation is reduced 
compared to the concept consistent with the negative sentence. For 
example, whether “open” is less accessible than “closed” after reading “the 
door isn’t open”.  
Literature on these two topics sometimes refers to the suppression/ deactivation 
effect of negation as the general topic, which can be confusing.  I will review studies 
relevant to these two questions separately. 
Question (a): is a concept less accessible when it is negated than when it is affirmed? 
Studies by MacDonald & Just (1989) offers some support. In their paradigm, 
participants read sentences in a moving-window display, such as “Almost every 
weekend, Elizabeth bakes no bread but only cookies for the children”, and afterwards 
(five spaces later) saw the probe word, which was the negated noun (bread) or non-
negated noun (cookies). They either made a lexical decision on this probe, or named 
it out loud. Response times were longer when the probe was negated than when it 
was affirmed. In a follow-up experiment, participants named probes that are 
associated with negated or non-negated nouns (e.g. butter was an associated word to 
bread). In this case, although response times were numerically longer when the 
probes associated with negated than non-negated nouns, the difference did not reach 
significance. Put together, response times to negated nouns are reliably slower than 
response times to non-negated nouns, but responses to semantic associates to negated 
and non-negated nouns are not significantly different. They concluded that negation 
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reduces the accessibility of the linguistic form of words in its scope, but this effect 
may not spread to associates of negated words. 
Levine & Hagaman (2008) conducted a study with similar sentences, but 
investigated whether negated concepts can interfere with anaphor resolution. 
Previous studies (Garrod & Sanford, 1977) found that when a categorical anaphor 
(e.g. the bird) refers to a highly typical member of the category (e.g. robin), it is 
processed more quickly than if it refers to a less typical member (e.g. goose). Levine 
and Hagaman found that when reading passages such as “Justin bought a mango but 
not an apple / a kiwi. He ate the fruit”, reading time for the target sentence (“he ate 
the fruit”) was slower when the negated noun was highly typical (apple), than when 
it was less typical (kiwi). The results suggested that the negated concept was 
considered during anaphor resolution. A follow-up memory recall experiment using 
similar items found no difference in the memory of negated and non-negated nouns. 
They concluded that their results show no suppression of negated concepts.  
Kaup and colleagues investigated whether the absence or presence of a concept in 
the situational representation affects the accessibility of the concept. Their 2001 
study (Kaup, 2001) used a probe recognition task. Participants read sentences like 
“John was building the castle but not the church”, or “Sarah was burning the letters 
but not the photographs”. They were presented a probe word at the end of the 
sentence after a 2500ms delay.  They found that for both creation and destruction 
sentences, response times to the negated noun was significantly slower than non-
negated noun. In addition, the negation effect was larger for passages with 
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constructing activities than destroying activities. In a similar study (Kaup & Zwaan, 
2003), participants read sentences such as Sam was relieved that Laura was wearing 
her pink dress” (presence condition) or “Sam wished that Laura was not wearing her 
pink dress” (absence condition). The critical probe word is “pink”. The probe 
presentation delay was varied at 500ms and 1500ms. They found that at 500ms 
delay, response times were longer for negative than positive, and presence-absence 
had no effect. At 1500ms delay response times were longer if the concept was absent 
than if it was present. The effect of negation was much weaker. The results support 
the finding from McDonald and Just that at least the word’s linguistic form is less 
accessible if it is negated than affirmed. In addition, the authors suggested that how 
much negation reduces the accessibility of words under its scope is modulated by 
whether the concept is present or absent in the situational representation.  
Giora and colleagues (Giora & Balaban, 2005; Giora, Fein, Aschkenazi, & Alkabets-
zlozover, 2007; Giora, 2006) argue that negation does not necessarily suppress the 
core meaning of the concept under negation. In their 2005 study, participants read 
sentences such as “the instrument is/is not sharp”, and then made a lexical decision 
on a probe word that is related to the positive argument (e.g. piercing). At 100ms 
delay, response times to the probe word were comparable between positive and 
negative sentences. Their results suggest at a very short latency, the accessibility of 
words under negation and affirmation are comparable.  
Overall, studies investigating Question (a) seem to offer contradictory results. 
However if we consider the details of these studies, we can piece together the 
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findings in a coherent picture. McDonald and Just found that the linguistic form, 
rather than the conceptual representation of the negated word is less accessible, and 
this effect was found at least 1000 ms after the stimuli was first encountered
4
. In 
comparison, Giora & Balaban (2005) found no deactivation effect when the probe 
appeared 100ms after the stimuli, suggesting that the suppression effect takes some 
time (more than 100ms). This is also supported by studies by Kaup and colleagues. 
Levine and Hagaman found that negated concepts are considered during anaphor 
resolution. However, this result does not show that the negated concepts are as 
activated as the affirmed concepts, and thus doesn’t contradict the above mentioned 
results. They also found that in a post-hoc memory recall test, memory of negated 
words is not worse than non-negated words. This result suggests that either the 
suppression effect is short-lived, or that it does not affect memory of the negated 
concept, however this piece of evidence is at odds with findings suggesting memory 
of negated materials is worse than affirmed materials. Overall, these studies suggest 
that negation seems to reduce the accessibility of the linguistic form of words in its 
scope. This effect is not immediate and can be influenced by the presence or absence 
of concepts in situational representation. 
Question (b): Is the accessibility of the positive argument of negation reduced 
compared to the meaning consistent with the negative sentence? In the section 1.1.2, 
we saw that the positive argument of negation is often activated in the early stage of 
                                                 
4 This time span is my estimation. In their experiment, the probe appeared five spaces after the 
end of the coda sentence, and the gap between the negated noun and the probe word varied 
based on its location. Based on their reported reading times (around 350 per word), the gap is 
likely over 2000ms if the negated noun appeared early, or around 1000ms if the negated noun 
appeared late. 
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negation processing, suggesting that the answer to the question is “no” during the 
early processing stage. Is the accessibility of the positive argument reduced later? 
Most studies show that the representation of the positive argument is short-lived, and 
comprehenders switch to a representation consistent with the negative sentence 
meaning later on (as in Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup et al., 2006). These 
findings suggests that the answer to question (b) is “yes” in the late processing stage.  
However, Giora et al. (2007) argues that suppression of the positive argument 
following negation is not obligatory. Whether the positive argument or concepts 
consistent with it are suppressed is influenced by discourse considerations, such as 
whether the concept is the topic. Their 2007 study investigated the accessibility of 
negated concepts with coherent and incoherent oncoming discourses. Participants 
read sentences word by word, such as “the train to Boston was no rocket”, followed 
by a coherent sentence “the trip to the city was fast enough”, or an incoherent 
sentence “the old man in the film spoke fast”. Reading time of the target word “fast” 
is shorter in the coherent discourse condition compared to the incoherent condition. 
They concluded that the suppression of the concept related to the negated word 
(positive argument) is sensitive to discourse considerations. 
 Negation is not difficult with context 1.1.4
By now we have seen many different findings suggesting that negation is difficult. 
However, the vast majority of these studies tested negation processing without 
context. The relation between negation and context has been highlighted by many 
linguists and philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and Larry Horn. Many 
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psycholinguistics studies show that with appropriate contextual support, negative 
sentences are not difficult to process (such as Dale & Duran, 2011 experiment 3; 
Giora, 2006; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). 
Wason (1965) suggested that negation requires a context of “plausible denial” 
Negation is supported by a context in which a salient expectation can be denied. 
Specifically, he proposed two hypotheses: the exceptionality hypothesis and the ratio 
hypothesis. The exceptionality hypothesis says that when people describe the 
properties of an object, it is easier to deny that an exceptional item has a typical 
property (e.g. a whale is not a fish), then to deny that a typical item has an 
exceptional property (e.g. a trout doesn’t have lungs). The ratio hypothesis says that 
when there is a set of objects with different properties, it is easier to describe an 
object in the minority set to not have the property of the majority set than the other 
way round. For example, when presented with the items “apple, pear, orange and 
cabbage”, it is easier to complete the sentence “a cabbage is not (a fruit)” than to 
complete the sentence “an apple is not (a vegetable)”. 
Wason (1965) tested these two hypotheses using an array of eight blue or red circles, 
seven of which were in one colour and one in the other colour, and participants were 
divided into the “exceptionality” condition and the “ratio” condition, each testing 
their corresponding hypothesis. In the “exceptionality” group, the circles were 
numbered. Participants first described the array so that the array could be identified, 
e.g. “circle No. 4 is red and the rest are blue”, and then completed sentences in a 
similar form. The sentences were positive or negative, and either about the special 
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circle or one of the similar circles. For example “circle No. 4 is (not) …”. In the 
“ratio” group, the circles were not numbered. Participants first stated out loud the 
number of items in each colour, e.g. “seven circles are blue and one circle is red”. 
Then they were given positive or negative sentences to complete, e.g. “exactly one 
circle is (not)…” or “exactly seven circles are (not)…”.   
Wason predicted that in both conditions, the difference in sentence completion 
response times between negative and positive items would be smaller for the 
dissimilar circle than for similar circles. This prediction was confirmed in the 
“exceptionality” condition but not in the “ratio” condition. Wason attributed this 
difference to the description in the coding stage. When participants described the 
array in the “exceptionality” condition, the properties of the special circle is viewed 
against the similar circles. Therefore the two are reciprocally related. However in the 
“ratio” group, participants coded the array as two independent groups. Therefore the 
special item is not evaluated against the similar group. Wason’s results suggest that 
being a minority or having a unique property doesn’t reduce the processing cost of 
negation about the item. Rather, it depends on the accessibility of a positive 
representation of the corresponding majority set in the context.  
Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, & Johnson-Glenberg (1999) studied the effect of 
explicit context for negative sentence processing. They propose that a stand-alone 
negative sentences is often more ambiguous than the positive counterpart. Therefore 
negation is not very effective for introducing new information. The under-
informativeness is reflected in longer processing times. When negation is supported 
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by context, however, it can introduce new information by eliminating prior 
expectations or uncertainties. In this case, the processing time of a negative sentence 
should be comparable to that of a positive sentence. Their 1999 study tested this 
proposal. Participants read passages containing an introduction, a supporting or non-
supporting context, a continuation sentence, and a critical sentence that is either 
positive or negative.  
17)    Introduction: Marcy needed a new couch for her family room. 
Context: 
Supporting context: She wasn’t sure if a darkly coloured couch would 
look best or a lighter colour. 
Non-supporting context: She wasn’t sure what kind of material she 
wanted the couch to be made of. 
Continuation: She finally picked one out and had it delivered to her 
home. 
Critical sentence: 
Critical positive: The couch was black. It looked very nice in her family 
room. 
Critical negative: The couch wasn’t black. That probably would have 
been too dark.  
Reading times of the critical sentence “the couch was/wasn’t black” were measured. 
Results showed that with non-supporting context, negative sentences took 
significantly longer to read than positives. With supporting context, there was no 
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difference between negatives and positives. The results suggested that negative 
sentences need not be difficult to process when there is contextual support.  
Lüdtke & Kaup (2006) conducted a similar study. They proposed that contexts which 
reduce or eliminate negation cost should either explicitly mention the positive 
counterpart, or strongly imply a positive expectation. In the experiment, participants 
read passages containing a positive or negative sentence preceded by different 
context sentences. 
18) On her way to the pool, Danielle wondered … 
Context (a): Whether the water would be warm. 
Context (b): Whether the water would be warm or cold. 
Context (c): What the water would be like. 
The water was (not) warm.  
They found that reading times of the last sentence were in general longer if the 
sentence was negative. Within the negative condition, reading times were faster 
when the positive counterpart was explicitly mentioned, as in contexts (a) and (b), 
than when it was not mentioned, as in context (c). In a second experiment, they 
found that when participants read negative sentences in contexts that strongly imply 
a positive expectation, negation cost is completely eliminated.  
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1.2 Current Accounts 
We have seen that negative sentences tend to be more difficult to process than 
positive sentences. The effect was found in paradigms such as sentence completion, 
sentence verification, logical reasoning and memory recall. Truth functional negation 
is hard for children to acquire. Contextual support can greatly reduce or eliminate 
negation related processing costs. In addition to difficulty, experiments in negation 
processing often, but not always, involve the representation of the positive 
counterpart, and this effect was seen in a wide range of studies, including sentence 
verification, probe recognition and ERP studies. The representation of the positive 
counterpart occurs in the early stage of negation processing, and its activation is 
short-lived. Negation also seems to reduce the accessibility of the words in its scope. 
So how is negation processed? These effects might have more than one cause. 
However, based on the principle Occam’s razor, a theory that explains more findings 
is favoured over a theory that explains less. Most current theories on negation 
processing link the processing difficulty with negation with the representation of the 
positive counterpart, or with the contextual effects, or both. No theories make a 
direct connection between processing difficulty and the representation of the positive 
with the deactivation/suppression effect of negation convincingly. Given the focus of 
my investigation, I will focus on these two sub-questions: 1. why are negative 
sentences difficult to process without-context? 2. why is the positive counterpart 
often, but not always, represented/activated? This section reviews current accounts of 
negation processing.  
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 Grammatical transformation 1.2.1
Some of the early accounts of negation processing focus on the structural complexity 
of negative sentences. This approached is influenced by Chomsky’s transformational 
grammar (Chomsky, 1957), which suggests that the majority of the sentences are 
derived from a set of basic or kernel sentences by means of transformations. 
Negation is one such transformation. For example, the sentence “the boy hasn’t 
kicked the ball” is derived by applying negation to the kernel sentence “the boy has 
kicked the ball”. It was proposed (Miller 1962; Slobin 1966) that grammatical 
transformations incur processing cost. Transformed sentences take longer to process 
than kernel sentences. Sentences that require two or more transformations take 
longer to process than those that require only one transformation. Not all 
transformations are equal; some require more processing effort than others.  
Miller (1962) suggested that passive transformation is more complex than negation. 
He tested the effect of grammatical transformation on processing cost by presenting 
participants with a set of kernel sentences such as “Jane liked the woman”, as well as 
passive and/or negative sentences transformed from these kernel sentences, such as 
“The woman was liked by Jane” (passive), “Jane doesn’t like the woman” (negative) 
and “The woman wasn’t liked by Jane” (passive and negative). The sentences are 
presented in two lists. Participants were asked to pair the sentences up if they have 
the same core structure. In the control condition, the two sentences are identical. For 
experimental sentences, Miller subtracted the time it takes to match two identical 
sentences from the time it take to match a complex sentence with a kernel sentence, 
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and called this difference “transformation time”. He found that both negation and 
passivation have a transformation time significantly longer than zero, and that 
transformation time of passivation is longer than that of negation.  
However, the time difference in this task can be caused by visual differences 
between sentences. Participants were not checked on comprehension, therefore they 
could have simply matched the sentences by their visual form. The difference 
between the form of a passive sentence and its active counterpart is bigger than the 
difference between a negative sentence and its positive counterpart. In addition, this 
result cannot determine whether the extra time is due to syntactic transformation or 
due to differences in sentence meaning and/or structure frequency. Gough (1965) 
argues syntactic complexity alone cannot account for all the extra cost associated 
with negation. The semantics of negative sentences must also play a role, since in 
verification tasks negation interacts with sentence truth value in response times. He 
also pointed out that active and positive sentences are more frequent than negative 
and passive sentences. The extra matching time could be explained in terms of 
frequency effect. Slobin (1966) argued that if syntactic complexity explains the extra 
processing time, passive sentences should take longer. However, they found that 
negative sentences take longer to verify, which suggest that negation triggered 
difficulty must have a semantic element.  
In addition to these arguments, it is clear that the syntactic account does not explain 
why context plays an important role in processing difficulty, or why the positive 
counterpart is often represented. Due to the limited explanatory power and the 
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arguments above, syntactic complexity accounts at best explain only some of the 
difficulty associated with negation. To account for the other processing effects, we 
need alternative theories.  
 Rejection accounts 1.2.2
The most popular perspective suggests that negation is difficult to process because 
we have to represent the positive counterpart first. The meaning of negation is only 
incorporated in a second step. This idea draws from the function of negation as a 
truth-function operator. A sentence such as "the door is not open" has the structure 
“not (the door is open)”. To be able to process the negative sentence, we must first 
process the positive counterpart. I will call these accounts rejection accounts.  
Rejection accounts differ in the nature of representation. Propositional models 
(Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972) suggest that negative sentences are 
represented in a propositional format by multiple constituents. The positive argument 
embeds under the negation operator. The two-step simulation account (Kaup, Zwaan, 
et al., 2007) agrees with idea of embedding the positive counterpart, but states that 
mental representations are perceptual in nature.  
1.2.2.1 Propositional models 
Propositional models (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972) were proposed 
to account for the findings in sentence – picture verification tasks. Clark and Chase 
(1972) asked participants to verify sentences such as “Star isn’t above plus” against a 
picture of a star and a plus arranged vertically. They proposed that sentences are 
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represented in a propositional format. The negative sentence A isn’t above B is 
represented as the positive proposition (A above B) embedded under the negative 
polarity marker, i.e. “Not (above [A, B])”. Pictures are represented in the same 
format, but only ever using positive propositions. During the verification process, the 
representations are compared from the inner most constituent. This process is 
motivated by Klima's (1964) analysis of the role of negation in propositional logic. 
As an operator applied to a proposition, the meaning of negation can only be 
incorporated once the embedding argument is processed. By this account, the 
representation of the positive counterpart is obligatory. The extra embedding step 
explains why negative sentences are harder to process than positive sentences. The 
details of these models and their application in sentence verification will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
A similar theory, called Model theory, is proposed by Khemlani, Orenes and  
Johnson-Laird (2012). They suggest that language comprehension involves two 
processes: the first process represents the intension of the sentence based on rules of 
compositional semantics. The second process uses the representations from the first 
process to construct the extension- the mental models of the situation. During the 
first process, the representation of a negative sentence would be similar to the 
proposal by propositional accounts
5
. In the second process, a positive sentence is 
represented as models of the possible situations it refers to. Negation is an operator 
that takes the set of models corresponding to the positive argument, and returns its 
                                                 
5 However, Khemlani et al., (2012) proposed that comprehenders have the heuristic of 
interpreting a negative sentence with a narrow rather than a wide scope. For example, in a 
sentence such as "A is not B", the narrow scope of negation is "is B", in which case it is only the 
positive VP that is embedded under negation. 
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complement set. According to this theory, negation related cost comes not only from 
the embedding step in the first process, but also from drawing inferences (calculating 
a complement set) in the second process. It thus predicts less processing load when 
the complement set contains fewer members. For example, “the cat is not dead” 
should be processed faster than “the cat is not black”, as the compliment set of 
“dead” contains only “alive”, while the compliment went of “black” contains many 
members.   
1.2.2.2 Two-step simulation account 
The two-step simulation account follows the embodied language processing view 
that language comprehension is achieved through the construction of mental 
simulations (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, & Johnson-Glenberg, 
1999; Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 2004). These simulations are perceptual in nature, i.e. 
they are similar to representations constructed in nonlinguistic cognition, using 
sensorimotor systems. Not only are concrete concepts represented perceptually, even 
abstract concepts are grounded in perception. One of the biggest hurdles for this view 
is to explain how abstract linguistic operators such as negation are represent 
perceptually. Kaup and colleagues (Kaup, Yaxley, et al., 2007; Kaup et al., 2006; 
Kaup, Zwaan, et al., 2007) propose that negation is processed by way of two-step 
simulations. First, comprehenders construct a mental simulation of the positive 
counterpart; then this simulation is rejected and replaced with one consistent with the 
sentence meaning. The meaning of the negation operator is encoded by the deviation 
of the two simulations. When a negative sentence does not specify the actual 
situation (for example, “Susan’s dress is not red”), the second stage simulation will 
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simply contain unspecified properties (in this case representing Susan with a dress of 
an unspecified colour). The authors propose that experiential simulations, unlike 
pictorial representations, are much less restricted in terms of what can be left 
unspecified.  
Like propositional models, the two-step simulation account explains the process cost 
of negation in terms of a two-step process. The representation of the positive 
counterpart is an obligatory first step. If the representation of the positive counterpart 
is available prior to encountering negation, all that’s left to do is to reject the first 
simulation and simulate the actual situation. The theory thus predicts that when the 
prior context contains the positive counterpart, negative sentences take less time to 
process.  
1.2.2.3 Criticism of rejection accounts 
Rejection accounts can explain both the extra cost of negation and why the positive 
counterpart is represented. However, they are faced with at least two challenges. 
First, many studies found that representing the positive counterpart is not mandatory, 
sometimes even when the sentences are presented without context. These findings 
are incompatible with rejection accounts. Second, rejection accounts suggest that the 
meaning of negation cannot be incrementally incorporated. This implication seems at 
odds with abundant evidence for incremental language processing. Psycholinguistic 
research has found that comprehenders activate linguistic and even pragmatic 
information as soon as cues are encountered, and use such information to form 
predictions incrementally. For example, as soon as hearing "the boy will eat…", but 
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not "the boy will move…", participants predict words for foods (Altmann & Kamide, 
1999). Recently, research has also grown in the online integration of pragmatic 
information. We can integrate common ground and speaker’s epistemic state at the 
earliest moment and use such information to predict upcoming referents (Breheny, 
Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008); we can access 
scalar implicatures on-line with little or no delay, especially with contextual support 
(Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2012; Grodner et al., 2010; but see Huang & 
Snedeker, 2009); we infer information about the speaker, using accents and cultural 
heuristics, and anticipate upcoming words in a sentence  (van Berkum, van den 
Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008). Such information interacts with linguistic 
information during online sentence processing. In light of the findings on 
incremental processing, rejection accounts must explain why negation is an 
exception.  
 Contextual approach 1.2.3
The contextual approach focuses on the importance of context for negation 
processing. Without context, negative utterances have two pragmatic drawbacks: 
infelicity and under-informativeness.  
The philosophy and psycholinguistics literature have both recognized the infelicity of 
negative utterances without context. Bertrand Russell (1948) said that "perception 
only gives rise to a negative judgment when the correlative positive judgment has 
already been made or considered". Wason (1965) argues that negative utterances are 
often used to deny or contradict a positive proposition. Negative sentences out of 
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appropriate context are often infelicitous, and therefore hard to process (in the 
majority of psycholinguistic research on negation, sentences are presented without 
context). A similar idea was voiced by Horn (1978) appealing to Gricean maxims. 
Philosopher Paul Grice introduced four maxims that govern our conversational 
behaviour: Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manner (Grice, 1975). Horn (1978) 
suggests that a negative sentence is relevant to the consideration of its positive 
counterpart. When the positive counterpart is not in the context, uttering a negative 
sentence violates the maxim of Relevance. 
A second pragmatic effect discussed by contextualists (Givón, 1978; Horn, 1989; 
Leech, 1981) is that stand-alone negative sentences are often less informative than 
their positive counterparts . The sentence "the girl's dress is red" has a determinate 
set of verifying situations. We know more precisely what the world is like for this 
sentence to be true. In this respect, "the girl's dress is not red" is less determinate. We 
cannot represent all possible worlds that make the sentence true.  In every day terms, 
a negative sentence if often less informative compared to its positive counterpart. 
Assuming that the speaker is being cooperative when uttering a negative sentence, 
the comprehender must draw an inference which justifies the apparent violation of 
the maxim "being informative". However if being under-informative is a cause for 
the extra processing cost, it shouldn't apply to negative sentences with a binary 
predicate. The sentence "the fish is not dead" is just as informative as "the fish is 
alive".  
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1.2.3.1 Criticism of the contextual approach 
Current contextual approaches explain the difficulty of negation in terms of its 
requirement for specific context. While this line of thought seems plausible, as well 
as being empirically supported, it raises a number of important questions that are yet 
to be answered. First, negation is not alone in requiring special contextual conditions 
for its appropriate use. It is widely agreed that virtually every utterance contains 
elements that require some kind of contextual completion for its full interpretation - 
for instance, anaphoric or pronominal elements, tense, quantifiers and so forth. 
Moreover, some positive sentences require a ‘context of plausible assertion’ just as 
much as negative sentences require a ‘context of plausible denial’. I.e. just as much 
as ‘The door is not closed’ is typically produced when whether the door is closed is 
at issue, ‘the door is open’ is typically produced when the state of the door is at issue. 
So the first question is, what is it about the contextual demands of negative sentences 
that make them particularly difficult to process when presented out of the blue, 
compared to their positive counterparts?  
Second, as mentioned above, the positive argument of a negative sentence is often, 
although not always, represented during early stages of negation processing. 
Following the current contextual approach, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) 
suggest that with the right contextual support, the positive argument need not be 
represented for comprehension. Similar conclusions are drawn in Dale and 
Duran(2011). However, no contextual account so far explains why when lacking 
contextual support, the positive argument IS represented in the first place. 
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1.3 Summary 
Psycholinguistic studies found that without contextual support, negative sentences 
are more difficult to process than their positive counterparts. In the early stages of 
negative sentence processing, the positive counterpart is often represented. However, 
with enough contextual support, both effects diminish or disappear. In addition, 
negation can reduced the accessibility of words under its scope.  
Current accounts of negation processing fall into three categories: grammatical, 
rejection and contextual. The grammatical transformation view suggests that the 
syntactic structure of a negative sentence is more complex than its positive 
counterpart, which is the cause for extra processing effort. This view can explain a 
very limited set of findings. Rejection accounts draw from the idea that negation is 
an external operator on a positive proposition. The extra cost of negation comes from 
the extra step of embedding. However, these accounts fall short of explaining the 
findings that the positive argument is not always represented. Also their implication 
is at odds with evidence for incremental language processing. Contextual approaches 
focus on the cost of lack of context. They argue that with appropriate contextual 
support, negation is not difficult. However, these approaches haven’t spelled out how 
contextual requirement of negation triggers more processing cost than their positive 
counterparts. They also cannot explain why it is that when we process negative 
sentences without context, we often represent the positive argument.   
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Chapter 2 Dynamic pragmatic account of negation processing 
In the previous chapter, we saw that without context, negative sentences are more 
difficult to process than positive sentences. This difficulty is reduced or eliminated 
with appropriate contextual support. In addition, in the early stages of processing, the 
positive counterpart is often represented. Current theories of negation processing can 
be divided into three categories: grammatical transformation, rejection-based and 
contextual, none of which explain all the relevant empirical findings. 
It is clear that context is important for the use negative sentences. Intuitively, an out-
of-the-blue negative sentence such as “I didn’t see Chomsky today” seems 
infelicitous, while the positive counterpart “I saw Chomsky today” is more natural. 
There is no doubt that in natural conversations, context plays an important role in 
utterance interpretation in general. The linguistically coded meaning almost always 
underdetermines the communicated meaning of an utterance (Bach, 1994; Carston, 
1988; Recanati, 1989, 1994). Current processing accounts of negation don’t deny 
this, but they assume that when participants read or hear sentences without context, 
they process only the semantic meaning. Therefore, the processing effects associated 
with negation (such as extra difficulty and the representation of the positive 
counterparts) must be caused by processing the semantic meaning of negative 
sentences.  
I will now propose a different account of negation processing; one that doesn’t 
detach sentence processing from the role of context (whether or not an explicit 
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context is provided). This view is grounded in the dynamic semantic/pragmatic 
approach to meaning, which analyzes meaning at a dialogue/discourse level (e.g. 
Ginzburg, 2012; Lewis, 1979; Roberts, 2012; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Stalnaker, 
1978). In this chapter, I will first introduce the dynamic semantic/ pragmatic 
approach by comparing language use to a game (2.1). I will then discuss what is in 
the context (2.2), and how utterance interpretation updates the context (2.3). In the 
last section (2.4), I will present the dynamic pragmatic account of negation 
processing.  
2.1 Dynamic semantic/ pragmatic approach to meaning 
Natural language use is interactive. Identifying and updating contextual information 
play a central role in communication. To understand the dynamic approach to 
meaning, it is useful to think of language use as a game, an analogy used by many 
scholars (Wittgenstein, 1953; Lewis, 1979; Roberts, 2012; Ginzburg, 2012). In a 
game, participants interact according to specific rules to achieve goals. The three key 
elements - goals, rules and interaction - can be seen in language use.  
Firstly, goals: we engage in a conversation to achieve general and specific goals. 
Stalnaker (1978) proposes that the general and primary goal is to discover and share 
with other participants information about the world. In a conversation, we often have 
specific goals or domain goals (Roberts, 2004), such as buying a train ticket or 
getting directions. In all cases, information is exchanged and our beliefs and 
knowledge about the world are updated after a “game session”. 
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Secondly, rules: broadly speaking, rules of a language game can be either 
conventional or conversational. Conventional rules come from our linguistic 
knowledge. We select tokens that have public meanings, and form utterances that 
follow the syntactic rules of the language. Conversational rules are less clearly 
defined. They are non-linguistic constraints or preferences for certain communicative 
strategies. An example is Gricean conversational maxims (Quality, Quantity, 
Relation and Manner) (Grice, 1975). For example, if I want to communicate the 
information that the shop is open, both “the shop is open” and “it is not the case that 
the shop is closed” follow conventional rules. However, the first but not the second 
version follows the conversational maxim of Manner. Relevance theory (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986) explains language users’ strategies by assuming that we choose the 
optimal interpretation, one that maximizes the cognitive payoff of any 
communicative act with the least effort. 
Lastly, interaction: language use is interactive. In a conversation, participants take 
turns to perform their moves. The moves can be linguistic utterances, such as 
questions and assertions, or non-linguistic actions, such as passing someone a salt 
grinder after hearing “can you pass me the salt?”  
The dynamic approach likens language use to a game, where utterance meaning is 
dependent on the dynamically changing context. As we are interested in sentence 
processing, we will focus on how utterances are interpreted in this framework. To do 
that, let’s take a closer look at how context and utterances interact with each other. In 
the game analogy, Lewis (1979) compared language use to a baseball game, and 
pointed out that context can be seen as the dynamically changing scoreboard. The 
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baseball scoreboard (or a box score) is a “septuple of numbers” (Lewis, 1979: 342). 
Different moves (e.g. a single hit or a homerun) result in different changes on the 
scoreboard. At any given time, the information on the scoreboard tells us the number 
of moves so far of each type and what upcoming moves are allowed. Similarly, in the 
language game, the context is a structured set of entities that dynamically change 
with each utterance. Utterance interpretation results in an update of the context. 
Some even go as far as to say that the meaning of an utterance is its context change 
potential (I Heim, 1983; Kamp, 1981). In the next section, I will discuss the elements 
in context. 
2.2 Context  
Context is the information state relative to a conversation as it is represented in the 
minds of the conversational participants. Context is frequently shared. However, the 
information state of a participant may also contain private information that affects 
language production or comprehension. Different theories propose different models 
of how context is represented. Some theories focus on just the public context (e.g. 
Roberts 1996), where all participants have the same representation of its dynamic 
content. Some (e.g. Lewis 1979) suggest that in addition to the public context, 
participants each present their own distinct private context. Information from both 
the public and private contexts can influence language use. Yet others (e.g. 
Ginzburg, 2012) argue that each participant represents their own versions of the 
public and private information. For the most part, different versions of the public 
context are identical. However, differences can arise due to the speaker/addressee 
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difference: a speaker is committed to knowing what her utterance means, while an 
addressee does not have such commitment.  For my purposes, I will ignore the 
theoretical differences in context representation, and focus on the public content of 
context. 
What then is in the context? Let’s first use an example to see what context does to 
utterance interpretation. Suppose you are in a group meeting in London when a 
colleague rushes in and says “I'm so sorry. The Jubilee line was delayed again”. 
What does she mean? Roughly, I understand that the speaker is sorry that she is late 
for the meeting. The reason she is late is because she took the Jubilee line in the 
London Underground and the line was delayed. In addition, the speaker presupposes 
two pieces of background information: 1. there has been a recent and salient occasion 
when the Jubilee line was delayed which made her late for work or a meeting, and 2. 
the hearers know what “the Jubilee line” refers to. If for example you have no 
knowledge of the speaker’s past experience or what “the Jubilee line” is, you can 
infer her assumption 1, and guess that “the Jubilee line” refers to a distinctive part of 
the London transport system. How did I get all this information from hearing her 
utterance? My knowledge of the English language allows me to understand the 
linguistically coded meaning of the strings above. The rest of the content is provided 
by the interaction between the utterance and context. What did the context do?  
Referent assignment: "I" refers to the speaker. 
Saturation (Recanati 1993): “I am sorry (for being late for the meeting)”. 
Presuppositions: the speaker assumes two pieces of background information that the 
hearers have, because of the strings “the Jubilee line” and “again”. 
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Source of Relevance: the second utterance (the Jubilee line was delayed again) is 
related to the first (I’m sorry) in that it is to explain why the speaker was late (and 
not why she was sorry). 
So context helps us determine the proposition expressed (referent assignment and 
saturation); it provides background information and the relevance of the speaker's 
utterance, so that the utterance is felicitous. What does the context contain that 
allows it to do such things? At any given point in a conversation, the context should 
contain not only information that is taken for granted, but also the likely sources of 
relevance for the most recent utterance. The content of the context can be captured 
by different theoretical frameworks. Some (e.g. Ginzburg, 2012; Lewis, 1979; 
Roberts, 2004) propose that context is a structured set of sub-elements, one of which 
is a set of un-answered questions (Questions Under Discussion) that represent the 
sources of relevance. For others, for example Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986), the likely sources of relevance are mutually manifest sets of assumptions that 
make the proposition being expressed relevant. Here I present a framework of 
context based on the first view (Ginzburg, 2012; Roberts, 2004) to discuss sources of 
relevance
6
. At any given point in a conversation, the context contains at least three 
components: the set of propositions that are taken to be true (akin to Stalnaker's 
(1974) notion of the common ground), the moves that have taken place, and the set 
                                                 
6 This is not an argument against alternative frameworks such as Relevance Theory. What is 
important is that the source of relevance for a given utterance must be part of the discourse 
context. However, the nature of the representation of the source of relevance remains a topic for 
future research.  
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of unresolved questions under discussion or the QUD stack (Ginzburg, 2012; 
Roberts, 2012)
 7
. 
2.2.1 Stalnakerean common ground 
The first element in the context is the set of propositions that are publically taken to 
be true, akin to Stalnaker’s notion of the common ground. The content may come 
from general beliefs that are already in participants’ belief boxes, or have entered the 
context by previous utterances. This element is closely linked to the notion of  
“pragmatic presuppositions”  or “speaker presuppositions” by Stalnaker (1974), 
which differentiates from the “semantic presuppositions” or “utterance 
presuppositions”. Pragmatic presuppositions are what a speaker assumes to be 
background beliefs at any given point. Stalnaker (2002) describes it as the 
“propositional attitude of the speaker”. Semantic presuppositions focus on the 
utterances
8
. They refer to the set of propositions that are taken for granted for an 
utterance to be felicitous (Karttunen, 1974; Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker, 1973, 1998; von 
Fintel, 2004 among others). Pragmatic/speaker presuppositions cannot be cancelled 
(because they are the speaker’s beliefs) while semantic/ utterance presuppositions 
can. To illustrate, look at the famous example “the King of France is not bald”. The 
utterance presupposes that a unique King of France exists. However, a speaker need 
                                                 
7 It should also contain a set of salient discourse referents, as proposed by Discourse 
Representation Theory (Kamp, 1981). In our late-for-meeting example, this element provides us 
with the salient referent for “I” and “the Jubilee line”. 
8 Note that I make no claim about whether “semantic presuppositions” in negative sentences are 
semantically or pragmatically derived. Here “semantic” presuppositions are simply 
presuppositions associated with an utterance, which are often but not always part of the 
speaker’s beliefs when she makes the utterance. 
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not presuppose that the King of France exists, as she can say “the King of France is 
not bald because there is no King of France”. 
2.2.2 Moves 
The second element of context is the set of moves made up to a given point. Unlike 
the Stalnakerean common ground, which is traditionally seen as an unordered set, the 
set of moves is ordered according to the sequence in which the moves are performed
9
 
(Roberts, 2004). Note that even if an interlocutor rejects an utterance, the fact that 
the utterance was made still enters the context. For example, if I utter “whales are a 
type of fish” and you tell me that I was wrong, the fact that I uttered this sentence 
enters the context but not the belief that whales are a type of fish.  
Moves can be functionally divided into set-up moves and pay-off moves (Carlson, 
1983; Roberts, 2012). The former are questions
10
 and the latter assertions
11
. The 
relation between questions and assertions plays an important role in the functional 
structure of a dialogue (ibid). Questions signal plans and specific goals of a dialogue, 
                                                 
9 This is a theoretical idealisation. In practice, evidence suggest that the representation of the 
linguistic forms of utterances and of their order decay quickly after an utterance is made (e.g. 
Sachs, 1967). See Fletcher (1994) for a review. Ginzburg (2012) argues for a prominent 
representation of the Latest Move. 
10 There is no consensus on what a question is semantically. Partition views believe that a 
question denotes the set of possible answers or exhaustive answers (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 
1984; Hamblin, 1973). In this view, positive and negative polar questions are semantically 
identical, i.e. the question “whether p” and “whether ¬p” both denote {p, ¬p}. On the other hand, 
propositional abstraction views (Ginzburg & Sag, 2000; Hausser, 1983) suggest that a question 
denotes an abstract of its answers. For example, the question “who solved the problem” denotes 
the function f(x) such that x solves the problem. By these views, positive and negative polar 
questions have distinct semantic denotations, as they are each abstracts of positive and negative 
propositions, i.e. “whether p” is an abstract over p, while the negative polar question “whether ¬p” 
is an abstract over ¬p. There is evidence in answer particles to positive and negative polar 
questions which supports a semantic analysis that differentiates positive and negative polar 
questions (e.g. Farkas & Bruce, 2009). For my account, I use the propositional abstraction 
analysis, and distinguish positive and negative polar questions semantically.  
11 Clearly there are types of utterances other than questions and assertions, such as imperatives, 
greetings and parting pairs. For simplicity, we will focus on just questions and assertions.  
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and assertions serve to realise these goals. When a question is accepted
12
 by the 
participants, they are committed to answering it. Very often, questions are implicit, 
and are pragmatically retrieved on the basis of linguistic or non-linguistic cues. For 
example, in the “late for meeting” example, the hearers can retrieve the implicit 
question why the speaker was late for the utterance “the Jubilee line was delayed 
again” based on an expectation about social norms in this situation.It is clear that the 
representation of questions in discourse (explicit and implicit) cannot be handled 
entirely by the Stalnakean common ground and the set of moves. Questions are not 
propositions and therefore cannot be taken to be true. The set of Moves cannot 
distinguish answered and unanswered questions, and it doesn’t relate assertions to 
questions, i.e. what question a particular assertion is relevant to. This shortfall brings 
us to the third element of context: the set of Questions Under Discussion (QUD).  
2.2.3 QUD  
The notion of Question Under Discussion was proposed by Carlson (1983) and 
elaborated by scholars such as Roberts (1996) and Ginzburg (1996, 2012). The 
underlying idea is that discourses are functionally structured by question/answer 
relations, which is also the source of discourse coherence (Kehler, 2012). At any 
given point, there is a set of unanswered questions or the QUD stack (Ginzburg, 
2012). The top item in this stack is the immediate QUD or simply the QUD. QUD 
tells you what the discourse is ‘about’ at a given point and “where the discourse is 
going” (Roberts, 2012). This is because the upcoming move has to provide at least a 
                                                 
12 Neither Roberts (2004, 2012) nor Ginzburg (2012) gave a clear definition of what it is to 
“accept” a question. Roughly, if a question is not rejected (by explicitly rejecting or changing the 
topic), it is accepted. 
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partial answer to the QUD
13
. An assertion is coherent if it provides a (partial) answer 
to the QUD. In our previous example, the utterance “the Jubilee line was delayed” 
answers the implicit QUD “why is the speaker late”?  To understand the coherence 
relations among utterances, we routinely infer and accommodate the QUD to which 
an assertion is relevant. When there is no specific domain question, the QUD is the 
general goal proposed by Stalnaker (1978): to discover “the way things are”. This 
explains why discourse-initial utterances that provide “all new” information can be 
felicitous.  
We have seen briefly what context contains in a dynamic approach. Now I will 
discuss what utterance interpretation does to the context.  
2.3 Utterance interpretation  
Just like a move in baseball changes the game scoreboard, the interpretation of a 
move in conversation updates the context. The meaning of an utterance is its context 
change potential (I Heim, 1983). What exactly gets updated by utterance 
interpretation? Roberts (2012) argues that the update of any move involves two 
aspects: its proffered content and its presupposed content
14
. The proffered content of 
an utterance is roughly its semantic meaning. The presupposed content, for Roberts, 
                                                 
13 I will not go into the details of what constitutes “answerhood”, but an answer need not be 
direct. For example, a question can be answered by another question, the conversational 
implicature of an assertion, or even “I don’t know” (see Roberts, 2012 and Ginzburg, 2012 for 
discussions).  Also, in natural conversations, interlocutors can engage in several rounds of 
clarifications before an answer is provided to the original QUD, or question the intention of the 
original QUD (e.g. why are you asking me this?). Such moves are relevant to the QUD but they 
don’t constitute answers. See Ginzburg (2010) for a detailed analysis of dialogue relevance. 
14 It is not clear where conversational implicatures go in this model. It could be argued that at 
least foregrounded implicatures that contribute heavily to speakers’ meaning are a third 
component of utterance content.   
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“constrains the types of context in which it may be felicitously uttered” (Roberts, 
2012:9). The presupposed content contains the presuppositions of the utterance, as 
well as its source of relevance or QUD. The interpretation of an utterance can update 
all three elements of the context.  
Questions are set-up moves. They indicate the speakers’ domain goals, and constrain 
the direction for the upcoming discourse. For the purpose of this story, I will not 
discuss the context update of questions. Here I assume a simplified view that a 
question, when accepted, becomes the QUD.  
Assertions are pay-off moves, so their interpretation differs from that of questions in 
that we need to know what they are paying off. The interpretation of an assertion 
updates the context not only by the proffered content, but also by its presuppositions 
and its source of relevance, i.e. QUD. We check if the presuppositions are part of the 
common ground and check if the assertion is relevant to the QUD. If so, the 
utterance is felicitous. If not, very often, we can still integrate the utterance into the 
discourse successfully. This is because we can retrieve the presuppositions and QUD 
using linguistic or non-linguistic cues, and accommodate them into the context (I 
will discuss accommodation in more detail in 2.4). I argue that presupposition 
accommodation and QUD accommodation are similar processes in terms of how 
context is updated procedurally. However they are distinct because different 
contextual elements are updated and because they affect upcoming discourse in 
different ways. In other words, I argue that distinct contextual elements are updated 
using the same “accommodation” process. 
 66 
 
Presupposition and its accommodation has been a central topic in pragmatics, which 
has been studied intensively for over forty years. On the other hand, while the 
importance of QUD has risen in popularity in the last twenty to thirty years due to 
the development of dynamic semantics and pragmatics, the attention QUD 
accommodation has received in research is minimal. In the next two sections, I will 
first discuss presupposition accommodation, and then QUD accommodation.  
2.3.1 Presupposition accommodation 
The presuppositions of an utterance are background beliefs that are taken for granted. 
We recognize the presuppositions of an utterance through certain “triggers”, such as 
aspectual verbs (e.g. stop, continue) and definite descriptions (see Levinson, 1983: 
chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of presupposition triggers) For an assertion to 
update the common ground, its presuppositions must be part of the context. For 
example, the proffered content of “my cat is sick” can be updated only if the belief 
that I have a cat is in the common ground. When this requirement is not met, you can 
accommodate the presupposition that I have cat, and interpret the assertion 
successfully.  
What then is presupposition accommodation? Following von Fintel (2008), I will 
debunk two misconceptions. First, timing: do presuppositions need to be part of the 
context prior to the utterance being made? No. If that was the case, accommodation 
would not be possible. Also it doesn’t happen before the utterance is processed. 
Presuppositions only need to be accommodated before the informational state update 
by the proffered content can take place, not before the utterance is made. Second, 
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mechanism: is accommodation pretence? The classic treatment of presupposition 
accommodation involves acting-as-if or pretence (e.g. Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker, 1978). 
If the hearer detects that the presuppositions of an utterance are not part of the 
context, and has no dispute over their truth, she can behave as if that information has 
been in the context all along. Thomason (1990: 342) points out that “acting as if we 
don’t have a flat tire won’t repair the flat; acting as if we know the way to our 
destination won’t get us there”, acting as if the presupposition has been in the context 
all along doesn’t explain how the context is updated by presupposition 
accommodation.  Gauker (2008) points out that informative presuppositions presents 
a serious problem for the pretence story. See this example, the utterance “do you 
know that John got married?” presupposes that John got married, which must be in 
the context for the utterance to be felicitous. If in fact you didn’t know that before I 
asked you, and pretend that you knew it all along due to presupposition 
accommodation, you should therefore answer me “yes”? 
So presupposition accommodation is not pretence, and it need not happen prior to an 
utterance being made. What is it then? von Fintel (2008:1) describes presupposition 
accommodation as “the process by which the context is adjusted quietly and without 
fuss to accept the utterance of a sentence that imposes certain requirements on the 
context in which it is processed”. He proposes that utterance interpretation affects the 
context in two steps: Step 1: the fact that the utterance was made enters the context. 
Participants immediately draw inferences about the contextual requirement based on 
that fact, and adjust the context accordingly. Step 2: the proffered content is added to 
the context. Presupposition accommodation happens in step 1. When hearing an 
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utterance with presupposition triggers, participants draw inferences about the 
presuppositions that must be part of the context. If they are not, participants first 
update the context with these presuppositions, and only then with the proffered 
content of the utterance. Note that these two steps are procedural only in terms of 
order the context update. It does not mean that the proffered content is only 
computed after the presupposition is accommodated. Rather, presupposition 
accommodation can and should happen incrementally. That is, certain 
presuppositions can be accommodated as soon as they are identified, and potentially 
before the utterance is finished. For example, upon hearing “my sister …”, the hearer 
can update that the speaker has a sister before the utterance is finished. 
2.3.2 QUD accommodation  
I argue that QUD accommodation happens in a similar way to presupposition 
accommodation. When the hearer interprets an assertion, she checks if there is an 
explicit QUD to which the assertion is relevant. If not, she can retrieve and 
accommodate the prominent QUD using linguistic and/or non-linguistic cues, before 
updating the proffered content of the utterance. An example of a non-linguistic cue is 
what Ginzburg (2010, 2012) calls “genre specificity”, where an assertion answers a 
QUD specific to an activity or genre type. For example, if a customer walks into a 
coffee shop and says “I’d like a flat white”, the hearer can infer that the utterance is 
relevant to the implicit question “what coffee would you like”. An example of a 
linguistic cue is prosodic focus. In English, prosodic focus in an assertion constrains 
the kinds of questions it can answer (Roberts, 2012). The constituent with focus is 
new information in the utterance, and thus it was unknown in the QUD. The 
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constituents without focus are old information, put forward by the QUD. When the 
QUD is not explicitly realised, prosodic focus acts as a cue for retrieving the 
prominent QUD. For example, on hearing "[JOHN]f invited Mary for dinner." (here 
"John" receives prosodic focus), the hearer can retrieve the QUD "who invited Mary 
for dinner?" based on the constituent in focus. The hearer will first update the QUD 
stack with the question, and then enter the proffered content into her belief box.  
2.4 Dynamic pragmatic account of negation processing 
I argue that negation is a cue for retrieving a prominent positive QUD. Without other 
cues, the most prominent QUD for a negative sentence ¬p is whether p. For example, 
the QUD for “the door is not open” is whether the positive counterpart is true, 
namely “whether the door is open”. When this question is not explicitly realised, 
negation triggers us to accommodate a positive QUD. Like presupposition 
accommodation, QUD accommodation happens before the proffered content of the 
sentence can update the context. This two-step context update captures the intuition 
that QUD or source of relevance of an assertion is background information.  
This account marries well with the contextual approach to negation, which observes 
that negative sentences often seem less felicitous out-of-the-blue than positive 
sentences. This is likely due to what negation is most frequently used for. A corpus 
study by Tottie (1991) shows that the two main functions of negation are rejection 
and denial. Rejection can be seen in negative responses to an offer and denials are 
used to reverse the truth of a proposition. Denials can be either explicit or implicit. 
Explicit denial is a response to an explicitly asserted proposition, like the previous 
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example. In case of implicit denial, the proposition to be denied is inferred from the 
context. Implicit denial is very frequent. In their sample of 427 cases of negation in 
spoken English, 286 (67%) are implicit denial (Tottie, 1991: 35).  
I argue that the accommodation of a positive QUD triggered by negation is due to its 
most frequent uses, therefore it is not hard-wired as part of the semantic property of 
negation. There is growing research on the probabilistic nature of language 
processing (cf Chater & Manning, 2006; Crocker & Brants, 2000). It is highly 
plausible that QUD retrieval is probabilistic. Language users build a frequency based 
model of the prominent QUDs associated with negative sentences, and the QUD for 
a negative sentence is probabilistically retrieved, and should thus be sensitive to 
other cues and other factors such as word frequency of the predicate. For example, 
cleft structure signals the old and new information in the sentence, and is a cue for 
QUD. “It is John who hasn’t finished his homework” has the QUD of “who hasn’t 
finished their homework”. In this case, the negative sentence has a negative QUD. In 
addition, word frequency can play a role in QUD retrieval. For example, if I want to 
answer the question “How are you feeling?” I have the choice of “I am happy”, “I 
am not happy”, “I am sad” or “I am not sad”. As “happy” (0.0129% based on British 
National Corpus) is more frequent than “sad” (0.0036% BNC), the difference in 
processing effort between “I am not happy” and “I am sad” is smaller than the 
difference between “I am happy” and “I am not sad”. So the utterance of “I am not 
sad” strongly projects the prominent QUD of “are you sad”, while “I am not happy” 
can felicitously answer both the question of “Are you happy?” or “How are you 
feeling?”.  
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Can negation triggered QUD accommodation be unified with prosodic focus 
triggered QUD accommodation? Not entirely. Hedberg & Sosa (2003) studied the 
intonation of negative sentences, and found that the negative morpheme or auxiliary 
is almost always marked with a high pitch accent, except when negation is contracted 
with the auxiliary “do”. Therefore, when negation is accented, the QUD can be 
retrieved through prosodic focus. When it is not, and when no other constituent is 
focused, negation itself acts as a QUD cue. The same thing applies to reading 
context-less negative sentences.  
2.4.1 What is accommodated is a question rather than a proposition 
It has been proposed that negation denies positive presuppositions. Wason (1959, 
1961) says that the function of negation is to “deny presuppositions rather than to 
assert new information”. Similar ideas have been proposed by Givón (1978) and 
Evans, Clibbens, & Rood (1996). Levine & Hagaman (2008) propose that whenever 
negation is encountered, "an inferential process is invoked, one that searches for a 
presupposition to cancel or deny". If the presupposition is explicit or easily inferred 
in the prior discourse, then negation is understood without much difficulty, because 
the utterance violates Gricean maxims (Grice, 1975) and comprehenders must draw a 
pragmatic inference as to why negation was used. If this is the case, then negation 
can trigger the accommodation of a positive proposition rather than the QUD. 
This account is problematic as presuppositions are what are taken to be TRUE for a 
given utterance to be felicitous. Clearly, the sentence “the door isn’t open” does 
NOT presuppose that “the door is open” is true. If negation triggers comprehenders 
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to “search for presuppositions to cancel or deny”, where does this presupposition 
come from? Not all negative sentences imply a background positive expectation. For 
example, if a friend asks me how I feel, I can say “I’m not happy”, without there 
being any expectation of me being happy.  
I argue that negation triggers the accommodation of a positive QUD, rather than a 
positive presupposition. Look at this example: 
19) (Broken vase pieces on the floor): Tommy turns and looks me in the eyes, and 
with the straightest face an eight-year-old can make, he says, "I didn't do it." "I 
didn't ask if you did, I just ask what happened," I correct him. (Internet source) 
20) A: What happens if you switch to the Twenty Eleven theme? 
B: I don’t need Twenty Eleven theme. 
A: I didn’t ask if you did. (Internet source) 
21) (Discussing fashion models) 
A: They aren’t gay lol… 
B: I didn’t ask if she is gay and even didn’t think of it. (Internet source) 
In example (19), Tommy’s utterance “I didn’t do it” allows the hearer to infer and 
accommodate the QUD “whether Tommy did it (break the vase)", illustrated by the 
response “I didn’t ask if you did”, which is only coherent if a question was 
accommodated, rather than the positive presupposition “you broke the vase”. Similar 
analysis applies to the other examples. 
 73 
 
Also, negative sentences can be used with “in case you wonder” or “before you ask”: 
22) (twitter entry) “Before you ask, I didn’t write this” (followed by a link to an 
article). 
We can rephrase this sentence as “in case you wonder, I didn’t write this”. Here “in 
case you wonder” and “before you ask” contains null complement anaphora that can 
only be satisfied by a question, and in this case, by the accommodated QUD whether 
I write this. If negation triggered the accommodation of a proposition, the above 
sentence would be ungrammatical.  
If negation triggers the accommodation of a QUD where the truth of the positive 
counterpart is at issue, why do we intuitively feel that very often there is a positive 
expectation in the background? For example, if I say “this morning my train wasn’t 
late”, you can infer that my trains are normally or often late. How do such positive 
implicatures arise? They can be inferred through the accommodated QUD. Polar 
questions are biased (Sudo, 2013). If upon seeing you, I ask “have you put on 
weight?”, you infer that I have some evidence suggesting that you have put on 
weight, but perhaps not strong enough to warrant a belief. You can question the 
evidence by asking “what make you think that?”. Stivers & Enfield (2009) report that 
among answers to polar questions, there is a bias towards confirmation. 
Confirmations are faster than rejections across many languages. Also, there is a 
greater proportion of confirmations than rejections (ranging from 70% in Danish to 
89% in Yeli-Dnye). When a polar question whether p is at issue, there is a good 
chance that that p is true and therefore relevant. For our train example, we 
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accommodate that whether your train was late is at issue. The fact that this question 
is at issue allows us to infer that the positive proposition “the speaker’s train was 
late” was expected to be true, and thus infer that normally the speaker’s train is late.  
2.4.2 Positive versus Negative assertions 
What are the differences in the context change potential of positive assertions and 
negative assertions? Ginzburg (2012) suggest that the positive assertion p can update 
the context in two ways: either add the belief of p, or give rise to the discussion of 
whether p. This is supported by a corpus study by Enfield, Brown, and de Ruiter 
(2009), who found that across languages, it is common for polar questions to have no 
linguistic marking (including intonation), i.e. an assertion can function as a polar 
question if it is clear that the speaker has a lower level of commitment to knowledge 
than the speaker. 
If a positive proposition p can give rise to the discussion of whether p, and a negative 
proposition ¬p triggers the accommodation of whether p, do positive and negative 
sentences have the same effect on context apart from their proffered content? No. 
With a positive proposition, the choice of discussion of whether p arises AFTER the 
context update of p. This effect is on the oncoming discourse. On the other hand, a 
negative proposition triggers the accommodation of whether p, which happens 
BEFORE the context update of ¬p. This effect is on the background information.  
Like a positive assertion, a negative assertion ¬p can give rise to the upcoming 
discussion of whether ¬p. This is clear in languages such as Japanese and Chinese 
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where polarity particles are only used to signal whether the response is confirmation 
or denial (relative polarity). When answering a negative polar question, the answer 
polarity particle does not match the polarity of the answer itself (Pope, 1976). For 
example, in Chinese, the question of “does John not drink” can be answered by the 
Chinese equivalents of “yes, he doesn’t”, or “no, he does”. In other languages, such 
as in English, polarity particles as answers to negative polar questions are 
ambiguous. They can either have absolute polarity (match the polarity of the answer 
proposition), or have relative polarity. After a negative assertion in Chinese, such as 
“Yuehan bu he jiu” (John doesn’t drink), if the hearer wants to contradict, she has to 
say “bu, ta he” (no, he drinks), which can only be an answer to the negative polar 
question whether ¬p, rather than the positive polar question whether p. This shows 
that a negative assertion ¬p can give rise to the upcoming discussion of whether ¬p. 
Positive assertions can give rise to QUD accommodation of whether ¬p if the 
auxiliary is accented. For example, without context, the assertion “I DID call my 
mum” triggers the accommodation of the question of if the speaker didn’t call her 
mum. Intuitively, without context, this utterance is less felicitous than “I called my 
mum”. 
2.4.3 Processing negative sentences out of context 
Negation is a cue for a positive QUD, which is accommodated if it is not explicit in 
the context. I argue that this process is automatic: it happens when we engage in a 
conversation, AND when we participate in a psycholinguistic experiment. Sentence 
comprehension can NEVER be independent from context. When participants read 
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negative sentences without context, they retrieve the prominent QUD and 
accommodate it, even when there is no explicit speaker. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, many studies found that the representation of the positive argument 
is involved in negation processing. This is not because negation is processed by first 
representing the positive argument and then rejecting it, rather, it is due to QUD 
accommodation. This process explains at least in part why negative sentences are 
more difficult to process than their positive counterparts when there is no contextual 
support. The representation of the positive QUD and the negative sentence meaning 
are incongruent with each other. Studies show that representing conflicting events is 
costly (Hindy, Solomon, Altmann, & Thompson-Schill, 2013). In comparison, a 
positive proposition (e.g. the shop is open) can answer the QUD of "is the shop 
open", "what information do you have about the shop", or the general question of 
"how things are". In any case, the representation of these QUD not incongruent with 
the sentence representation. This account predicts that if a positive sentence has a 
negative QUD, as in "I DID call my mum", they are more difficult to process than 
ones that have a positive QUD "I called my mum". 
A welcome consequence of this explanation is that the meaning of negation can be 
incorporated incrementally, rather than after the positive argument is first processed. 
This prediction fits nicely with the growing evidence for incremental sentence 
processing. Not only should negation be incorporated incrementally, I also argue that 
QUD retrieval and accommodation can happen incrementally. For example, if you 
are a waiter in a coffee shop, as soon as a customer utters "I'd like...", you can 
construct the QUD of "what would you like". Upon hearing an utterance where an 
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initial constituent is focused, such as "MARY invited ...", you know that "Mary" is 
new information and the rest of the utterance gives old information, and you can start 
constructing the QUD of "who invited...". Similarly, upon hearing a negative 
sentence such as "John hasn't ...", you can infer that the prominent QUD is "whether 
John has...". This idea fits with the findings that the representation of the positive 
counterpart happens in the early stage of negation processing. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have argued for a dynamic pragmatic account of negation 
processing. Utterance interpretation updates the context with not just the proffered 
meaning, but also pragmatically retrieved content, such as presuppositions and QUD. 
These elements determine the felicity of the utterance. Unless they are part of the 
context, the proffered content cannot be updated. When presuppositions or QUD is 
not in the context, hearers can retrieve and accommodate them using linguistic or 
non-linguistic cues. Negation is one such cue. 
Negative sentences are most frequently used when a positive QUD is at issue. When 
processing ¬p without context, participants retrieve a positive QUD of whether p. 
QUD accommodation is automatic and incremental. This account explains why the 
representation of the positive counterpart is often involved in negation processing, 
why negation is more difficult to process than their positive counterpart when 
sentences are presented out of context, and why contextual support can reduce or 
eliminate negation associated cost.  
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In the next three chapters, I present three series of experiments to test the dynamic 
pragmatic account of negation processing.  
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Chapter 3 Negation and the representation of the positive 
counterpart – a probe recognition study 
In chapter 1, we saw that processing negative sentences often involves the 
representation of the positive counterpart. Rejection accounts propose that such a 
representation is the first step of negation processing. Specifically, the two-step 
simulation account (Kaup, Zwaan, et al., 2007) proposes that negation is processed 
with two sequential simulations: first a simulation of the positive counterpart, and 
then a simulation of the actual state of affairs. In chapter 2, I argued that the positive 
counterpart is often represented, not as the first step of negation processing, but due 
to the accommodation of a positive QUD. This chapter presents three experiments 
testing the two-step simulation account and the dynamic pragmatic account.  
3.1 Introduction 
A study by Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) found that participants mentally 
represent the shapes of objects described by the sentence. In the experiment, 
participants read sentences such as “The ranger saw an eagle in the sky/nest” and 
afterwards saw a picture of the object noun (an eagle) that either matched or 
mismatched the implied shape of the item. For “eagle in the sky”, a matching picture 
would be a bird with stretched wings, and a mismatching picture would be a resting 
bird. Participants were asked to respond whether the item in the picture (eagle) was 
mentioned in the sentence. Their results showed that reaction times were faster when 
the picture matched the implied shape than when it mismatched the shape. They 
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concluded from the result that the comprehenders construct mental simulations of 
situations described in the sentence. 
Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke (2007) used this paradigm to study 
representations during negation processing. Participants were asked to read positive 
or negative sentences (e.g. The bird is /isn’t in the air), and were shown a picture that 
matched or mismatched the sentence meaning at certain inter-stimulus intervals (ISI) 
after reading. Replicating the results of Zwaan et al. (2002), participants responded 
faster to a matching picture than a mismatching picture after reading a positive 
sentence. However, for negative sentences such as, “The bird isn’t in the air”, the 
reaction time (RT) pattern reversed at 250ms ISI. Although the sentence implies that 
the bird is not flying, participants responded faster to a flying bird (mismatch) than a 
resting bird (match), as if negation was ignored. However, after a longer interval 
(1500 ISI), participants responded faster to a matching picture to a mismatching 
picture for both positive and negative sentences. This study shows that when 
processing a negative sentence, its positive counterpart is represented at an early 
stage. 
Kaup and colleagues (2006, 2007) propose that the two stages of simulations are a 
result of the mechanism of negation processing. The underlying theory is that the 
creation of non-linguistic mental simulations is a central component of language 
comprehension. These simulations are non-linguistic in nature, and are grounded in 
perception and action (Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004). During sentence processing, 
comprehenders construct simulations of situations described in the sentence, and 
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these simulations allow us to “experience the world by proxy” (Johnson-Laird, 1983: 
471, cited in Kaup, Zwaan, et al., 2007). Zwaan (2004) proposes the “Immersed 
Experiencer Framework”, which states that experiential simulation is the only 
meaning-related representation in language comprehension. All aspects of language 
interpretation are simulated, including abstract symbols and operators. Based on this 
view, Kaup and colleagues (2006; 2007) propose a “rejection mechanism” that 
allows for the experiential simulation of the content negative sentences. The negated 
content –the positive argument- is represented separately in an ‘auxiliary 
representational system’ and prior to any representation of a state of affairs 
consistent with the negated sentence (Kaup, Yaxley et al., 2007: 987; Kaup et al., 
2006: 1046). Specifically, their model states that negation is processed with a "two-
step simulation": the negated information is first simulated and then ‘rejected’, a 
process that juxtaposes a simulation of the actual state of affairs with the 
representation of the state of affairs consistent with the positive argument of 
negation. The first step is faster or omitted if the negated information has already 
been mentioned or is strongly inferred. It is proposed that this two-stage process 
occurs so that the negated content can be ‘rejected’. 
This model can explain why the positive counterpart is represented during negation 
processing, why negation takes longer to process than affirmative sentences, and that 
context affects the ease of negation processing. However, as I pointed out in Chapter 
1, it cannot explain all the empirical results. Many studies found that representing the 
positive counterpart is not mandatory (e.g. Dale & Duran, 2011 experiment 2 & 3; 
Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Tettamanti et al., 2008). In response to 
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some of these findings, Kaup et al. (2007) proposed that if the positive counterpart is 
explicitly mentioned or strongly implied by the prior discourse context, it need not be 
represented during the processing of the negative sentence. However, some contexts 
in the above mentioned studies do not mention or strongly imply the positive 
counterpart. For example, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) found that with the 
context “with proper equipment”, the false affirmative sentence “scuba-diving is 
very dangerous and often good fun” elicit a much stronger N400 than the true 
negative sentence “scuba-diving isn’t very dangerous and often good fun” (time-
locked to the critical word “dangerous”), suggesting that the positive counterpart (the 
false affirmative) was not first considered when processing the true negative 
sentence. This context (“with proper equipment”) does not strongly imply that the 
positive counterpart of the negative sentence was expected. In addition, rejection 
accounts suggest that the meaning of negation cannot be incrementally incorporated. 
This implication seems at odds with abundant evidence for incremental language 
processing. I argue that the negated information has been found to be simulated in 
these previous studies, not because it is the first step in the process of representing 
the content of the negated sentence, but because negation can trigger the 
accommodation of a positive QUD.  
3.2 Negation, QUD, and the representation of the positive counterpart 
Is the representation of the positive counterpart necessarily a result of processing the 
linguistically coded content? As argued in Chapter 2, utterance interpretation should 
not only involve accessing the linguistically coded content, but also involve inferring 
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contextual information such as sources of relevance for the utterance. Studies (e.g. 
Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008) have shown that both processes 
can and do occur in incremental processing. Thus, when we collect time-sensitive 
data from comprehension tasks, we should be aware that our results may not only be 
the product of a process of representing an interpretation of the sentence, but also a 
process of representing how the content relates to the broader discourse context. 
As argued in Chapter 2, discourse context includes not only facts that are taken for 
granted, but also the sources of relevance for a given utterance, or the Questions 
Under Discussion. Every assertion addresses one prominent QUD. Importantly, the 
relative prominence of QUDs changes as discourse unfolds and may be adjusted via 
the mechanism of accommodation, which retrospectively updates the QUD stack.  
I argue that the design of psycholinguistic experiments should take into account this 
dimension of the pragmatics of discourse comprehension. When faced with an 
experimental sentence in isolation, and no other information, the prediction is that 
participants will use cues in the linguistic input to project likely QUDs. In the case of 
negative experimental items, in the absence of any other contextual stimuli, 
participants use negation as a cue and project a positive question as the most likely 
prominent QUD. That is, given an item like, ‘The bird is not in the air’, participants 
will tend to project the positive QUD whether the bird is in the air. It follows then 
that the effect found in Kaup, Yaxley, et al.(2007) mentioned above could be an 
artefact of the task: the finding that the positive argument of negation is first 
simulated could be the result of accommodating a positive QUD rather than the 
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result of a necessary part of the process of interpreting a negative sentence. Thus, 
according to the two step simulation account, representing the positive argument is a 
necessary stage in processing negation, while on the dynamic pragmatic account, it is 
not necessary as there are possible contexts where a negative QUD is being 
addressed.  
The following three experiments are designed to differentiate these two accounts 
(two-step simulation processing versus pragmatic accommodation). In experiment 1, 
I use a similar paradigm as in Kaup et al. (2007), but tested simple negative 
sentences and cleft sentences with negative clauses. For example, “Mike didn't iron 
his shirt” and “It was Mike who didn't iron his shirt”, respectively. Participants saw 
an image of an ironed shirt or a crumpled shirt after reading either sentence, and had 
to decide if the item (shirt) has been mentioned in the preceding sentence. 
In English, the most common form of cleft sentence is “it-cleft”, which has the form, 
it + be + X + subordinate clause. For example, “it is John who didn’t iron his shirt”. 
Clefts are known to be presupposition triggers (Levinson, 1983). The above sentence 
presupposes “someone didn’t iron their shirt”. Cleft structure also constrains the 
most likely QUD. In this example, the clefted constituent (“John”) is the only 
constituent in focus, and the rest (didn’t iron one’s shirt) is old information. The 
construction thus serves as a cue for the prominent QUD who didn’t iron their shirt. 
Note that the example question is negative. I predict that when the stimulus is a 
simple negative sentence like “John didn’t iron his shirt”, participants will respond 
faster to a mismatching image (smooth shirt) than a matching image (crumpled 
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shirt). However when the stimulus is a cleft negative sentence, like “it is John who 
didn’t iron his shirt”, we will see a reversed pattern. On the other hand, the two-step 
stimulation account should predict the same pattern for both simple and cleft 
negative sentences, since both sentences express the same negative proposition. As I 
understand it, their two-step model predicts that negation is treated in the same way 
for simple and cleft sentences: in order to represent the content of the negative 
sentence, the positive argument needs to be first represented and then rejected.  
Experiment 2 serves as a follow-up to experiment 1, testing the proposed explanation 
to the difference between simple and cleft negative sentences. Experiment 3 moves 
away from negative sentences, and test QUD accommodation positive sentences 
which have a prominent negative QUD. 
3.3 Experiment 1 
 Method 3.3.1
Participants 
Forty native English speakers from the undergraduate population of University 
College London were paid to participate in the study.  
Materials and Design 
Twenty-eight experimental items were constructed, pairing a single sentence with a 
colour picture. All experimental sentences included a negative operator (e.g. didn’t) 
and could either be clefted, as in, It was [Character] who didn’t VP, or non-cleft, as 
 86 
 
in, [Character] didn’t VP. VP describes or implies the physical state of an object, 
which in this negative construct implies a shape that is at odds with that implied by 
the alternative affirmative construct. For example, “Jane didn't cook the spaghetti” 
implies that the spaghetti is uncooked, while its alternative affirmative form would 
imply that the spaghetti is cooked. Experimental pictures were available in two 
versions for each item (so fifty-six experimental pictures were used in total), with 
each version depicting the object in its different physical states (e.g. spaghetti, either 
cooked or raw), as described by the corresponding experimental sentence. Thus, one 
version shows the implied shape of the negative sentence (match), and the other the 
mismatch shape. Half the experimental sentences were paired with a picture that 
matched the described physical state of the object and half were paired with a picture 
that mismatched the described physical state of the object. Table 1 provides an 
example of such experimental sentences and the associated visual displays. 
In addition, fifty-six filler items were used. These filler items included fourteen 
negative sentences and forty-two affirmative sentences. As with the experimental 
sentences, half were clefted (e.g. “It was Alice who broke the vase”), while the other 
half were non-cleft (e.g. “David washed his car”). All negative fillers were followed 
by an unrelated picture target (requiring a ‘no’ response). For affirmative sentences, 
twenty-eight were followed by a picture depicting the mentioned object (requiring a 
‘yes’ response), and the remaining fourteen by an unrelated picture (requiring a ‘no’ 
response). 
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Table 1 Example experimental sentence and the associated visual displays, as labelled. 
 
One version of each sentence-picture pair was assigned to one of four presentation 
lists, with each list containing twenty-eight experimental items. Each list contained 
one of the four possible versions of each item (2 (clefted/ non-cleft) x 2 (match/ 
mismatch)), blocked to ensure that they were evenly distributed among the fifty-six 
fillers. Each participant only saw each item once, in one of these four lists. The 
participants’ task was to decide whether the object in the picture had been mentioned 
in the preceding sentence. All experimental trials required a ‘yes’ response. Finally, 
comprehension questions followed twenty-eight trials (9 experimental) and were 
constructed such that participants needed to understand the whole sentence rather 
than simply focussing on the meaning of the noun. 
Procedure  
The experiment was conducted on an IBM 14” laptop using E-Prime software. Each 
trial began with the presentation of a single sentence and participants were instructed 
to press the space bar as soon as they finish reading this sentence. A centrally-located 
fixation cross then appeared for 250ms, followed by an image (approx 3 inch by 3 
inch) in the centre of the screen. The participant responded to indicate whether the 
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object had been mentioned in the preceding sentence or not (“1” for yes and “0” for 
no). Comprehension questions (if applicable) appeared after the participant had 
responded to the image and again required yes/ no responses (with the same keys). 
All participants were told that response time and accuracy were measured, so they 
should make the decisions on images as quickly and correctly as possible and 
completed a short practice block at the start of the experiment. The entire experiment 
took approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 Results  3.3.2
Analyses were performed on image response times. Prior to analysis all response 
times longer than 3000ms or shorter than 300ms were eliminated. After converting to 
Z scores, outliers were detected and eliminated using a Z score cut-off of 3.29 (p < 
0.001). This eliminated 2.1% of the data. Mean reaction times are presented in 
Figure 1
15
. All participants scored at or above 80% accuracy on the comprehension 
questions. 
We performed a 2 (cleft/ non-cleft) x 2 (match/ mismatch) x 4 (lists) ANOVA with 
Clefting and Match as the repeated measures factors and List as a between factor. 
Analyses were performed both by participant (F1) and by item (F2). The mean image 
response accuracy was 95.5%, SD=0.21, meaning that participants accurately 
responded to the sentence-picture pairs. Results from the ANOVA showed no main 
effects of Clefting [Fs < 0.55] or Match [Fs < 1.88]. Also List did not interact 
significantly with any other variables [All Fs < 1.81].  
                                                 
15 All error bars figures in this thesis represent standard errors. 
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However, the results did reveal a significant interaction between Clefting and Match: 
F1(1,36) = 6.04, p < 0.02; F2(1,27) = 7.54, p = 0.01. Analysis of the simple main 
effects revealed that following non-cleft sentences, responses were significantly 
faster when the image mismatched (  = 992) the implied visual image in the negative 
sentence than when it matched (  = 1054): F1(1,39) = 4.02, p < 0.05; F2(1,27) = 5.05, 
p < 0.03. This result replicates Kaup and Zwaan (2007)’s findings. However, 
following cleft sentences, the pattern was reversed. Responses showed a trend 
(significant by participants) where responses were slower when the image 
mismatched (  = 1074) the implied shape in the negative sentence than when it 
matched (  = 1007): F1(1,39) = 4.33, p < 0.04; F2(1,27) = 0.1, p = 0.76.  
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Figure 1 Reaction times for the four experimental conditions (Note: data for a follow-
up study testing affirmative versions of these items are presented alongside). Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
Taken together, the results suggest that 250ms after a cleft negative sentence, a 
mental image implied by the negated sentence is more active than the image implied 
by the alternative affirmative sentence. There is a reverse pattern for non-cleft 
sentence. This means that when processing a cleft negative sentence, participants 
didn’t first mentally picture the shape which is to be negated (rejected). This result is 
not predicted by the two-step model for negation processing. Based on this theory, 
there should be no interaction between cleft/non-cleft and match/mismatch. 
In the cleft condition, the faster response to the matching images suggests that 
participants accommodated the negative QUD, as predicted by the dynamic 
pragmatic account. However, it has been suggested to us that, due to the fact that 
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cleft sentences do not focus on the negative predicate, participants might not really 
process the negation in this condition. In that case, the faster response to the match 
images may have arisen due to properties of the images, for example the match 
images may have simply been easier to recognise.  
In order to control for the potential effects of image, we ran a follow-up control study 
testing a new set of forty participants, but this time we replaced the negative 
sentences with affirmative ones (e.g. “Jane cooked the spaghetti” and “It was Jane 
who cooked the spaghetti”). Fillers were also adjusted accordingly to balance the 
negative and positive sentences of the two types. Mean reaction times are presented 
in Figure 1. Outliers were detected and removed as described in the main 
experiment. The results showed a main effect of Match, where participants were 
significantly faster to respond to images when they matched the sentence’s 
affirmative meaning (e.g. “[Jane/ It was Jane who] cooked the spaghetti”, followed 
by an image of cooked spaghetti) compared to when they mismatched [F1(1,36) = 
14.51, p < 0.01, pη² = 0.29; F2(1,27) = 6.08, p = 0.02, pη² = 0.18]. Importantly, there 
was no main effect of Clefting [All Fs < 0.69] or a significant Match*Clefting 
interaction [All Fs < 0.07] in this affirmative version of the experiment. Thus we can 
conclude that there is no inherent difficulty in recognising either type of image and 
that in the main experiment, participants were processing negation in the cleft 
condition.  
 92 
 
 Discussion 3.3.3
Experiment 1 tested whether representing the positive counterpart is the mandatory 
first step of negation processing, as predicted by the two-step simulation account, or 
it is due to representing the prominent QUD, as predicted by the dynamic pragmatic 
account. We presented participants with simple or cleft negative sentences, followed 
by pictures that matched or mismatched the state of affairs indicated by the sentence. 
Results suggest that participants only represent the positive counterpart in the simple 
negative condition, but not in the cleft negative condition. This result supports the 
dynamic pragmatic account: negation and cleft construction are cues for the 
prominent QUD. When participants read sentences without supporting context, they 
use these cues to infer and accommodate relevant QUDs, which are represented in 
part as mental simulations of the state of affairs at issue. Participants will only 
represent the positive counterpart of a negative sentence if the QUD is positive. 
When the QUD is negative, as in the cleft condition, participants no longer represent 
the positive counterpart.  
An implication of this explanation is that if the negative QUD associated with cleft 
negative sentences are shown directly, e.g. “who didn’t iron their shirt?”, participants  
will not first represent the positive counterpart (ironed shirt). Experiment 2 tests this 
prediction.  
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3.4 Experiment 2 
This experiment tests the proposed explanation for experiment 1, specifically that in 
the cleft negative condition, participants did not respond faster to pictures consistent 
with the positive counterpart because a negative QUD was accommodated. The 
design of experiment 2 is identical to experiment 1, except that cleft negative 
sentences (e.g. It is John who didn’t iron his shirt) are replaced by negative questions 
(e.g. who didn’t iron their shirt?). This “question” condition is compared with simple 
negative condition (e.g. John didn’t iron his shirt).  
 Method 3.4.1
Participants: 
Forty-five English native speakers were recruited from Middlesex University in 
London. They are undergraduate students participating for course credits.  
Design, materials and procedure:  
The design and materials of experiment 2 is identical to experiment 1, apart from 
replacing cleft negative sentences with their QUDs. The same pictures and filler 
items were used.  
Results 
Data from five participants were discarded due to low accuracy. For data from the 
remaining forty participants, outliers were identified and eliminated in the same way 
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as experiment 1. Response times longer than 3000ms or shorter than 300ms were 
eliminated. After results had been converted to z scores, outliers were detected and 
eliminated using a z score cut-off of 3.29 (p<0.001). Incorrect responses were 
eliminated for RT analysis. In total 5.98% of data were eliminated.  All participants 
scored at or above 75% accuracy on comprehension questions.  
Reaction Time in ms Simple Question 
Match 982 932 
Mismatch 919 999 
Table 2 Average RT per condition: experiment 2 
 
 
Figure 2 Average RT per condition: experiment 2 
2(Question/simple) x 2(match/mismatch) x4(lists) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was performed. Analyses were performed both by participant (F1) and by item (F2).  
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The mean image response accuracy was 97.3%, mean comprehension question 
accuracy was 83.4%. There was no main effects of Question/simple (Fs>0.31), or 
match /mismatch (Fs>0.42).  
The interaction between Question/Simple was significant by item F2(1,27) >6.30, 
p<0.02. Analysis by participant revealed that the interaction is not significant at 95% 
but showed a strong trend.  F1(1,39)>3.86, p<0.06. Analysis of the simple main 
effects revealed that following simple negative sentences, responses to mismatched 
images were faster by trend: t1(39)=1.54, p=0.06. t2(27)=1.31, p=0.10. However, 
following negative questions, the patterned reversed numerically. Responses to 
MATCHED images were faster. The effect was not significant but trending: t1(39)=-
1.55, p=0.06; t2(27)=-1.04, p=0.15. 
 Discussion:  3.4.2
Experiment 2 sets out to test the explanation proposed for the RT pattern for cleft 
items in experiment 1, which shows that shortly after reading a cleft negative 
sentence, participants respond faster to pictures that match the negative sentence 
meaning, contrary to the results of simple negative sentences. I proposed that the 
polarity of the accommodated QUD is what accounts for this effect. Cleft negative 
sentences project a negative QUD, which is why in this case participants did not 
represent the positive counterpart. Experiment 2 presented negative questions 
directly as stimuli in the same probe recognition paradigm, and found responses to 
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negative questions were like responses to negative clefts. This result supports the 
proposed explanation of the dynamic pragmatic account
16
.  
If the accommodation of positive QUDs during negative sentence processing gives 
rise to a mental simulations of state of affairs implied by both the positive 
counterpart and the negative sentence, will we see the same effects in processing 
positive sentences with prominent negative QUDs? Experiment 3 investigates this 
question. 
3.5 Experiment 3 
Results from experiment 1 and 2 show that the positive counterpart is not always 
represented when processing negative sentences. My explanation is that it is the 
polarity accommodated QUD that determines whether the positive counterpart is 
represented. In the cleft condition, the negative sentences project a prominent 
negative QUD, e.g. “who didn’t iron his shirt”, which is why the positive counterpart 
was not first represented.   
If QUD accommodation affects the representations formed during sentence 
processing, what happens with a positive sentence that projects a prominent negative 
QUD? In Chapter 2 I suggested that a positive sentence with an accented auxiliary 
projects a prominent negative QUD. For example, “I DID call my mum” answers the 
QUD “did you not call your mum?”. If participants read positive sentences that have 
                                                 
16 It is also possible that the effect were due to the representation of the negative 
presuppositions (e.g. “someone didn’t iron their shirt”) associated with the negative questions 
(e.g. “who didn’t iron their shirt?”). 
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prominent negative QUD, will they represent a state of affairs that is consistent with 
the negative counterpart?  
To test this, we need a structure or a particle that is used in positive sentences that 
answer a negative QUD. In order to test this hypothesis using the picture probe 
recognition paradigm. I turned to the Dutch particle “wel”, which is a particle used 
only in positive sentences. Hogeweg (2009) studied the use of “wel” in corpus, and 
found that positive sentences with “wel” are used to deny explicit negative 
statements, implicit negative expectations, or to show contrast, illustrated in the 
examples below (Hogeweg, 2009: 520): 
23) Jij heet                echt  geen    Jan-Peter! 
you name + have really no   Jan-Peter.  
‘Your name isn’t Jan-Peter!’ 
Ik heet                wel     Jan-Peter! 
I name + have WEL Jan-Peter.  
‘My name is Jan-Peter!’  
24) Jij     zag  me niet,  maar Peter wel. 
You saw me not,    but   Peter WEL  
“You didn’t see me, but Peter did.” 
All different uses of “wel” share the property that “they are a denial of a denial in the 
context. (ibid: 538).  The original denial might be explicitly stated or inferred from 
the linguistic or non-linguistic context. When used alone, “wel” a response to a 
negative question or claim. This is clear when we look at Dutch answer particles to 
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polar questions. In Dutch, positive polar questions are answered with “ya” (yes) or 
“nee” (no). Negative polar questions on the other hand, require different answer 
particles for “yes”. If the answer is a denial, the particle is “yawel”, which is “yes” 
plus “wel”. 
25) Ging Jan naar het feest?     -Ja / Nee 
Did John go to the party?  - Yes /No 
26) Ging Jan niet naar het feest?  -Jawel / Nee 
Did John not go to the party?  - Yes (John did go to the party) /No (he didn’t go) 
This shows that “wel” is used in positive sentences only when the QUD is negative. 
Experiment 3 uses the same methods as experiment 1 and 2, and manipulates 
whether positive sentences contain “wel”. If QUDs give rise to simulations, we 
should expect that after reading positive sentences with “wel”, participants respond 
faster to situations consistent with the negative state of affairs, namely a picture that 
mismatches the situation described by the positive sentence. Positive “wel” sentences 
should give rise to a mirrored RT pattern of simple negative sentences: 
27) Experiment 1: 
Sentence: John didn’t iron his shirt. (negative) 
QUD: Did John iron his shirt? (positive) 
28) Experiment 3: 
Sentence: John “wel” ironed his shirt. (positive) 
QUD: Did John not iron his shirt? (negative) 
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 Method 3.5.1
Participants 
Forty six native Dutch speakers participated in the experiment. Twenty-five were 
recruited from Belgium, and twenty-one were recruited from Radboud University 
Nijmegen. They were undergraduate students participating for course credits.  
Materials and Procedure 
Like experiment 1 and 2, we used a picture probe recognition task. All experimental 
sentences were positive, and the main manipulation was whether the sentence 
contained the particle “wel” or not. For example,  
29) Bob heeft de banaan gepeld. / Bob heeft de banaan wel gepeld.  
     Bob has peeled the banana. / Bob really has peeled the banana.  
30) Wout heeft spaghetti gekookt. / Wout heeft wel spaghetti gekookt. 
     Wout has cooked the spaghetti. / Wout really has cooked the spaghetti. 
The verb phrase of all experimental sentences describes the physical state of an 
object. 28 experimental items were constructed, generating 28*2 = 56 experimental 
sentences (every item appears in both the plain form and the “wel” form). Like 
experiment 1 and 2, each sentence is paired with a picture depicting the noun (e.g. 
banana, spaghetti) that matches or mismatches the physical state of the object. Every 
participant sees 28 experimental sentences, half of which are paired with a picture 
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that matched the described physical state of the object. In addition, 28 filler items 
were used. In order to conceal the purpose of the study, various types of sentences 
are used. There are eight positive sentences with “wel” and eight simple positive 
sentences, all of which are paired with pictures of items that are not mentioned in the 
sentence. There are twelve negative sentences (e.g. Piet heeft zijn soep niet 
opgegeten. English translation: Piet didn’t finish his soup), eight of which are paired 
with pictures of items not mentioned. Altogether, every participants sees 56 
sentence-picture pairs, 32 of which require a “yes” response, and the remaining 26 
require a “no” response”. Finally, comprehension questions followed twenty-two 
trials (eleven after experimental item). They were constructed such that participants 
needed to understand the whole sentence rather than simply focussing on the 
meaning of the noun. 
The procedure is the same as experiment 1 and 2. All instructions were given in 
Dutch. The whole experiment takes around 15 minutes.  
Results and Discussion   
Data analysis follow the same procedure as experiment 1 and 2. Six participants were 
excluded because their overall accuracy is lower than 80%. Two items were removed 
due to errors in Dutch sentences. Prior to analysis all response times longer than 
3000ms or shorter than 300ms were eliminated. After converting to Z scores, outliers 
were detected and eliminated using a Z score cut-off of 3.29 (p < 0.001). This 
eliminated 2.8% of the data. The overall accuracy for comprehension questions is 
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78%, all participants scored over 70% in comprehension questions. The mean image 
response accuracy was 94.7%. 
In terms of accuracy, 2 (wel/simple) x 2 (match/ mismatch) ANOVA shows that 
there is no significant interaction in accuracy (Fs < 1.72, Ps >0.2). Instead, 
match/mismatch has a significant main effect: F1(1,39)= 10.225, p1 = 0.003. F2(1, 
25)= 9.62, p2 = 0.005. Wel/simple has no main effect. 
Average accuracy Match Mismatch 
Simple 0.96 0.92 
Wel 0.98 0.91 
Table 3 Mean accuracy per condition, experiment 3 
Mean reaction times per condition are shown in Table 4. The difference between 
match and mismatch in the simple condition is numerically bigger than that the 
“Wel” condition, which matches our prediction. However, a 2 (wel/simple) x 2 
(match/ mismatch) ANOVA revealed no significant match by wel interaction: 
F1(1,39 )= 0.39, p1 = 0.54; F2(1, 25)= 0.11, p2 = 0.74. There are no significant main 
effects of “wel”: F1(1,29)= 1.91, p1=0.1; F2 (1,25) =2.72, p2=0.11, and no main effect 
of “match”: F1(1,39) = 1.91, p1=0.175; F2 (1,25) =1.84, p2=0.19. These tests figures 
are surprising given the results of experiment 1 and 2. Paired-sample t-tests also 
failed to show a significant difference between simple match and mismatch: t1(39)= -
1.43, p1 (two-tailed) =0.16; t2(25)= -1.05, p2=0.30, and between “wel” match and 
mismatch: t1(39)= 0.60, p1(two-tailed) = 0.55; t2(25) = -0.70, p2=0.49. 
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The overall average RT for simple condition is 759.98ms, and for “wel” condition is 
789.17ms. Paired-sampled t-test shows that the difference is not significant but 
trending. If we hypothesize that simple condition should be faster than “wel” 
condition, and thus conduct a one-tailed t-test, the difference is significant by item: 
t1(39) = -1.48, p1(one-tailed) = 0.07; t2(25) = -1.89,  p2(one-tailed) = 0.035.  
The overall average RT for “match” is 760.98ms, and for “mismatch” 789.08ms. 
Paired-sampled t-tests show that the difference is not significant even if we 
hypothesize a one-tailed distribution: t1(39) = -1.24, p1(one-tailed) = 0.11; t2(25) = -
1.27,  p2(one-tailed) = 0.11. 
RT in ms Match Mismatch Total 
Simple 738.42 782.53 759.98 
Wel 783.11 795.77 789.17 
Total 760.98 789.08  
Table 4 Mean RT per condition, experiment 3 
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Figure 3 RT per condition: experiment 3 
 
 Discussion 3.5.2
Experiment 3 was conducted to test whether processing positive sentences with a 
negative QUD involve a simulation of the negative state of affairs shortly after 
reading the sentence. However the results did not yield any statistically significant 
results, and thus is non-indicative for the current hypothesis. What is surprising is 
that we failed to replicate the findings of Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002, the 
positive condition in Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007, as well as the 
positive control study in experiment 1, even though the direction and the scale of the 
numerical difference is similar to the positive control study in experiment 1. The lack 
of statistically significant differences is likely due to the high variability among 
participants. It is possible that some of the participants did not process the sentence 
fully, but focused only on the noun (the average response time in experiment 3 is 
faster than that of the positive control study in experiment 1).  
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Given that we failed to obtain a statistically significant difference between simple 
match and mismatch conditions, little can be confidently inferred from the results of 
“wel” match and mismatch results. With this in mind, I will discuss the numerical 
results with caution, aiming only to guide future studies. We predicted that the 
response time pattern of “wel” condition should resemble the mirror image of the 
simple negative condition in experiment 1. This prediction was not borne out. 
However, the numerical pattern shows that the difference between “wel” match and 
mismatch is smaller than that of simple match and mismatch. This suggests that the 
QUDs for “wel” sentences may have influenced the mental simulations. We didn’t 
see a mirror image pattern of simple negatives. This could be because some 
participants in this experiment didn’t process the sentences fully. In addition, it could 
be that simulating the state of affairs consistent with the negative QUD requires more 
time, and thus the effect is not shown at 250ms ISI. While a positive QUD (e.g. 
whether John ironed his shirt) directly described the state of affairs at issue (ironed 
shirt), a negative QUD (e.g. whether John didn’t iron his shirt) only indirectly 
implies the state of affairs at issue. Therefore, mentally simulating a negative QUD 
may take longer than simulating a positive QUD. 
3.6 General Discussion 
The purpose of the study was to find out whether a simulation of the positive 
counterpart of negation is necessary to represent negation in comprehension or 
whether such simulations are triggered as a by-product of the pragmatics of discourse 
interpretation. The results indicate that the effect of negation on response latencies of 
matched or mismatched images is not due to a mandatory two-step processing 
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mechanism for negation. As predicted by the dynamic pragmatic account, we only 
find evidence of positive simulations after reading a simple negative sentence. In 
contrary, after cleft negative sentences or negative questions, we find the opposite 
pattern. One might have thought that a cleft sentence with a negative clause should 
take longer to process than a simple negative sentence, due to the need to 
accommodate the presupposition triggered by the clefting. However, participants 
here were faster at recognizing pictures that matched the described situation after 
reading cleft sentences. This is explained on the dynamic pragmatic account where 
simple negative items trigger their own accommodation process. 
While our results pose problems for the two-step simulation model for negation 
found in Kaup et al (2006, 2007), these results do not contradict the broader 
simulationist programme (Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004)  insofar that programme 
explores the nature of semantic representations for language comprehension. There is 
a rich tradition in semantics beginning with David Hume and found in contemporary 
situation-theoretic research (Barwise & Perry, 1983). In that tradition, situation 
semantics has long grappled with the meaning of operators such as negation 
(Barwise, 1989; Cooper, 1998). One important insight that distinguishes situation 
semantics from traditional possible worlds semantics is that the assertion of a 
negative sentence should strongly imply that there is a situation which supports this 
(Cooper, 1998). The findings in the present chapter supports this implication (i.e. for 
“the bird isn’t in the air”, people represent a scene that provides support for the claim 
– like a nesting bird). However, there is nothing in the meaning of negation from a 
situation theoretic point of view that would mandate a two-step process for 
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representing an interpretation of an utterance containing negation. While it is an 
empirical question whether people in fact process negation in two-steps, the results 
of the study presented here suggest that they need not.  
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Chapter 4 Negation and sentence verification  
4.1 Introduction 
There is a long tradition of research into how negative (as compared to positive) 
sentences are verified. This research is widely regarded as being significant for the 
nature of representational states involved in language processing. The rising interest 
in sentence verification in the 1960s was sparked partly by the rising popularity of 
information-processing research which studies how humans and machines process 
information, form concepts, construct and test hypotheses (cf. Hunt, Marin, & Stone, 
1966; Levine, 1966). Human information processing is closely linked to and partially 
depends on language comprehension. The general assumption among 
psycholinguists was that sentence verification is integral to language comprehension. 
Studying verification would be highly informative for language comprehension. This 
interest has in turn generated interest in the research in negative sentence 
comprehension, due to the inseparable relation between negation and truth value.  
Studies in sentence verification usually participants to verify sentences either against 
given evidence (often a picture) or against world knowledge. In sentence-picture 
verification studies, participants are asked to judge the truth value of an affirmative 
or a negative sentence against a picture. These studies were either interested in the 
nature of sentence verification itself, or they used this paradigm to study the 
processing of linguistic features, especially negation. For example, in Clark and 
Chase (1972), participants were shown a sentence such as (13) to (16) alongside a 
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+ 
picture that makes the sentence true or false. Sentence polarity (affirmative
17
 or 
negative) and truth value (true or false) categorize the items into four types (TA, FA, 
TN, FN). Reaction times and error rates are measured and compared among these 
four types. 
31) The plus is above the star. (True Affirmative, TA here after) 
32) The star is above the plus. (False Affirmative, FA here after) 
33) The star isn’t above the plus. (True Negative, TN here after) 
34) The plus isn’t above the star.(False Negative, FN here after)  
 
Picture:  
Across different studies, results consistently show a main effect of polarity: verifying 
negative sentences causes more errors and takes longer than verifying affirmative 
sentences. This has been seen as evidence that negative sentences are harder to 
process than affirmatives. When verifying an affirmative sentence, true ones are 
easier than false ones (TA<FA). This is where the consistency in results ends. With 
negative sentences, results point in different directions. Many studies found that true 
negatives are in fact harder than false negatives, thus reporting a polarity by truth 
value interaction (TA<FA<FN<TN). Some studies found that true and false 
negatives are equally difficult: TA<FA<FN=TN. Yet others found that true negatives 
are easier than false ones, thus reporting a main effect of polarity and a main effect 
of truth value: TA<FA<TN<FN. Table 5 surveys the paradigms used in some 
                                                 
17 In this chapter, “affirmative” and “positive” are used interchangeably.  
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verification studies based on reaction time (RT) differences between TN and FN.  In 
Table 5, “type of predicate” refers to whether the predicate is binary (e.g. dead/alive, 
where the negation of one entails a unique contrastive alternate), binary only in the 
experiment (when only two properties can appear in the experiment, for example a 
shape can be either white or black; in such a context, “not white” means “black”, 
even though normally being white is not a binary predicate), or unary (when the 
negation of the predicate is compatible with two or more possibilities, such as “being 
red” when at least three colours may appear).   
The survey in Table 5 is in no way comprehensive, yet it is clear that the differences 
in reaction times between TN and FN are not consistent across studies: verifying TN 
may take less, equal amount or more time than FN. This inconsistency suggests that 
negation may bring certain complications to sentence verification: while RT 
associated with negative sentences seem to be affected by various factors, the same 
factors don’t affect the RT pattern for affirmative sentences, as TA<FA is found 
across all paradigms.  
Despite the fact that different patterns between TN and FN have been reported, 
current models on sentence verification generally explain only one pattern. The 
polarity by truth value interaction pattern is the most reported and perhaps interesting 
pattern, and thus has received the most amount of attention.  
Grammatical transformation theory (Gough, 1965, 1966) focuses on the extra 
difficulty of negative sentences compared to affirmative sentences, and suggests that 
this is because negative sentences require grammatical transformation from their 
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positive “kernels”. This account, however, remains silent on why sometimes polarity 
interacts with truth value. Due to its limited explanatory power, I will not discuss this 
account.  
The conversion model (Trabasso & Rollins, 1971) explains the main effect only 
result (TN<FN). They propose that negative sentences are converted into a positive 
sentences by default whenever possible. Therefore, verifying true sentences should 
take less time than verifying false ones, regardless of their surface polarity.  
Rejection accounts (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Kaup, Zwaan, & 
Lüdtke, 2005) are by far the most dominant accounts in sentence-picture verification, 
and they focus on the interactive pattern TA<FA<FN<TN. Although different 
accounts differ in the nature of representation (propositional or experiential/ image-
like), they share the idea that negative sentences are represented as a positive 
argument or core embedded in a negation operator. For example, “the star isn’t 
above the plus” is represented as “not (the star is above the plus)”. In a verification 
task, the truth value of a negative sentence is the opposite of its positive core, i.e. the 
core of TN is FA, and the core of FN is TA. This is why the RT for a negative 
sentence patterns with an affirmative sentence with the opposite truth value, resulting 
in a polarity by truth value interaction. 
Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) propose that both the conversion model and 
rejection accounts are used to represent negative sentences:  those with a unipolar 
predicate are represented by a positive core embedded in a negation operator, while 
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those with a binary predicate are transformed into a positive sentence. This account 
predicts TN > FN with unipolar items and TN < FN with binary items.  
In this chapter, I first review current models in more detail, and discuss their merits 
and disadvantages. I then present an explanation for the empirical findings using the 
dynamic pragmatic perspective. Lastly, I present five experiments testing these 
accounts.  
  
  
Type of 
study 
Reaction 
time: 
TN vs. FN 
Reference 
Example of negative 
sentence 
Type of 
predicate 
Evidence Presentation 
Total no. of 
trials 
(prac+ exp) 
Sentence-
picture  
TN > FN 
Carpenter & 
Just, 1975 
It is true that the 
dots aren't red. 
unary    coloured dots sentence first 288 
Just & 
Carpenter, 
1976 
The plus isn't north. unary 
four symbols in four locations 
(north, south, east, west): a plus 
in one location and a star each in 
the other three 
simultaneous 111 
Lüdtke, 
Friedrich, De 
Filippis, & 
Kaup, 2008 
In front of the tower 
there is no ghost. 
binary in 
context 
Picture of a tower with a lion or a 
ghost in front 
sentence first 344 
Clark & Chase, 
1972 
The plus isn't above 
the plus. 
binary in 
context 
a plus and a star vertically 
arranged 
simultaneous 176 
Trabasso & 
Rollins, 1971 
Not green 
binary in 
context 
coloured shapes picture first 192 
TN = FN 
Gough, 1965, 
1966 
The boy did not hit 
the girl. 
unary    
picture of a boy and a girl, one 
hitting or kicking the other 
sentence first 144 
Trabasso & 
Rollins, 1971 
Not green 
binary in 
context 
coloured shapes picture first 192 
TN < FN 
Trabasso & 
Rollins, 1971 
Not green 
binary in 
context 
coloured shapes sentence first 192 
Young & 
Chase, 1971 
The plus isn't above  
binary in 
context 
a plus and a star vertically 
arranged 
simultaneous unknown 
1
1
2
 
  
Type of 
study 
Reaction 
time: 
TN vs. FN 
Reference 
Example of negative 
sentence 
Type of 
predicate 
Evidence Presentation 
Total no. of 
trials 
(prac+ exp) 
sentence-
sentence  
TN < FN 
Mayo, Schul, 
& Burnstein, 
2004 
Tom's clothes are 
folded neatly in this 
basket. 
binary  Tom is not a tidy person. Evidence first  43  
TN = FN 
Mayo et al., 
2004 
(unknown) unary Tom is not a creative person. Evidence first   43 
sentence-
world 
knowledge 
TN < FN Arroyo, 1982 
Paris is not an 
American city. 
unary N/A 
A context set is 
given 
beforehand, e.g. 
“Miami, Paris, 
Dallas, Chicago”, 
where the odd-
one-out item is 
the subject of the 
following 
sentence 
64 
TN > FN Arroyo, 1982 
Paris is not an 
American city. 
unary N/A 
No context set 
given 
64 
TN = FN Wason, 1961 
Sixty-four isn't an 
odd number. 
binary   N/A Sentence only 24 
TA > FN 
Fischler, 
Bloom, 
Childers, 
Roucos, & 
Perry, 1983 
A robin is not a tree/ 
bird. 
unary  N/A 
Sentence word by 
word  
288 
Table 5 Survey of sentence verification studies
1
1
3
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4.2 Current models of sentence verification 
 Conversion code matching model 4.2.1
Trabasso and Rollins (1971) conducted a series of experiments to investigate the 
process of verifying hypotheses against evidence. In one of these experiments, 
participants were shown a description (in the form of a phrase rather than a 
sentence), and an image of a geometric figure whose property either matched or 
mismatched the description. Participants answered whether the description was true 
or false according to the image by pressing a button. Only two colours could appear 
in the pictures, and thus the descriptions are binary in this experiment. For example, 
the colour of the geometric figure could either be orange or green, and the 
description could be “(not) orange” or “(not) green”.   
When the participants read the descriptions before seeing the figures, RT showed 
main effects of polarity and truth value: affirmative descriptions were judged faster 
than negative ones; true descriptions were judged faster than false ones: 
TA<FA<TN<FN. However, when the description was shown after the image, there 
was an interaction between polarity and truth value: for affirmative descriptions, true 
ones were judged faster than false ones. For negative descriptions, false ones were 
faster than true ones: TA<FA<FN<TN.  
Trabasso and Rollins explained these results with the code-matching model. They 
suggest that participants code the two inputs (description and picture) in sequence in 
the positive form whenever possible. If a sentence is negative, negation is removed 
by incorporating it with the predicate to infer a positive state of affairs. For example, 
“not orange” would be converted to “green” if the participants learned that being 
  115 
orange and green are the only two possible attributes.  After the coding stage, the 
participant matches the codes from the two inputs and set the response. The default 
response is “TRUE” or “SAME”. Whenever a mismatch is detected, the response is 
flipped (for example from “TRUE” to “FALSE”). Each flip adds a certain amount of 
time to RT. When descriptions are presented first, TA has no mismatches and FA has 
one, thus FA is slower than TA. Negative descriptions are transformed which adds to 
response time. After the transformation, there is 0 and 1 mismatch respectively for 
TN and FN, thus FN is slower than TN. When descriptions are presented after the 
image, negative descriptions are no longer transformed. In this case, there are 2 and 1 
mismatches respectively for TN and FN, so FN is faster than TN. While the 
conversion model explains the results of Trabasso and Rollins (1971), it is 
incompatible with several studies in Table 5 where a polarity by truth value 
interactive RT pattern was reported with sentence first presentations. 
 Rejection models 4.2.2
While the conversion model assumes that negation is removed from the sentence 
representation by default via conversion, rejection models propose that negation is 
represented as an operator. Different rejection models disagree in terms of the nature 
of representation. 
4.2.2.1 Constituent comparison model 
Constituent comparison models, notably proposed by Clark and Chase (1972) and 
Carpenter and Just (1975), assume that the content of both the sentence and picture 
are represented in a propositional format. Negative sentences are represented by a 
positive constituent embedded under a negation marker, rather than being converted 
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to positive sentences by default.  It is best illustrated by studies by Clark and Chase 
(1972) and Carpenter and Just (1975). 
Clark and Chase (1972) conducted an experiment in which participants were shown 
an image containing two objects such as a star and a plus (one above the other) 
alongside a sentence which described their spatial relation. Participants decided 
whether the sentence was true or false according to the image. The sentence and the 
image were shown on the same screen. Participants were asked to either read the 
sentence first, or look at the picture first. In both cases, response times show a 
polarity by truth value interaction: TA<FA<FN<TN. Carpenter and Just (1975) 
found a similar effect. Participants read sentences which describe the colour of some 
dots (e.g. “It is true that the dots are red”), and then saw an image of some dots in 
red, green, or black. Notice that in this setup, the value of the predicate is not binary. 
Their results also showed a TA<FA<FN<TN pattern in response time.  
Clark and Chase propose that both sentence and picture are coded in a propositional 
format. Specifically, sentences are coded in a form that is consistent with their 
linguistic “deep structure”. They assume that sentential negation takes the scope of 
the entire embedding proposition. A sentence like “plus is not above star” would be 
coded as “false (plus above star)”. Coding a sentence with “below” would take 
longer than “above” due to the frequency difference between “above” and “below”; 
coding a negative sentence would take longer than a positive one due to an 
embedding process. Pictures are always coded in an affirmative format such as 
“above [star, plus]”. If participants read the sentence before the picture, they will 
tend to use the same relative position predicate (e.g. above) that appeared in the 
sentence to code the picture. If pictures are processed first, “above” is used by 
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default in the picture representation. After both inputs are coded, the two 
representations are compared constituent by constituent from the “inside out”, 
starting from the innermost constituent. The original truth index is set as “true”. 
Every time a mismatch is detected, the response index switches. Comparison time 
reflects the total number of switches. According to this model, TA triggers no 
mismatch, FA and FN each triggers 1 mismatch, while TN triggers 2 mismatches 
(see Table 6 for a summary of sentence and picture representations). Note that both 
FA and FN involve 1 mismatch, and yet FN has been shown to take longer than FA. 
To explain this difference, Clark and Chase named the time it takes to detect a 
mismatch in the embedding string the “falsification time”, while the extra time 
caused by negation (including extra time in coding and detecting a mismatch in the 
polarity operator) “negation time”. They assume that a mismatch in the polarity 
marker can add more time than a mismatch in the embedding positive core. 
Type Sentence Representation Picture Mis
matc
hes 
TA The plus is above the 
star. 
(plus above star)sen 
(plus above 
star)Pic 
0 
FA The star is above the 
plus. 
(star above plus)sen 1 
FN The plus isn’t above 
the star. 
False (plus above star)sen 1 
TN The star isn’t above 
the plus. 
False (star above plus)sen 2 
Table 6 Sentence and picture representations (Clark & Chase, 1972) 
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This model is inconsistent with the finding that sometimes a main effect of polarity 
only pattern is observed (TA<FA<TN<FN). To account for this, Clark and Chase 
propose that participants have two strategies to choose from: they can either follow 
the process mentioned above: code the content of the sentence with a negation 
operator over a positive argument and use the truth function of negation to switch the 
truth index (the truth functional strategy), or they make an inference about the states 
of affairs that makes the negative sentence true, thus “converting” the negative 
sentence into a positive one (the conversion strategy, following Trabasso & Rollins, 
1971). The participants’ choice of strategy is influenced by the manner of stimulus 
presentation (picture first or sentence first), type of predicates (binary or unary), 
instructions and participants’ preference. If pictures are presented first, participants 
are more likely to choose the truth functional strategy than the conversion strategy. If 
the predicates are unary (when the negation of a predicate is less specific than itself, 
e.g. the dots are not red), participants are more likely to choose the truth function 
strategy. Participants can also be explicitly instructed to convert the negative 
sentences into positives during a verification task (Young & Chase, 1971). In 
addition, Clark (1974) suggests that subjects can “spontaneously” adopt one or the 
other strategy. A similar claim has been made by Carpenter & Just (1975). However, 
they do not specify when participants would invoke a particular strategy or why. 
Carpenter & Just (1975) subsequently proposed a similar model which also assumes 
that negative sentences are represented by a positive argument embedded under a 
negation marker. The representations of sentences and pictures are compared inside 
out, where a mismatch flips the response index. It differs from Clark and Chase’s 
model in the assumptions that (1) a mismatch reinitiates the entire comparison 
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process, with the mismatched constituents being tagged and treated as a match in 
subsequent comparisons; (2) a comparison between the two constituents consumes a 
fixed amount of time. The total comparison time is determined by the value of a 
parameter k, which is an index of the number of comparisons involved to verify TA. 
Unlike Clark and Chase’s model, the time consumed in switching the truth index is 
practically negligible in Carpenter and Just’s model. Because a mismatch causes the 
entire comparison process to start again from the inner most position, a mismatch 
further away from the core incurs more cost. They propose that if a TA requires k 
comparisons, then FA requires k+1 comparisons as the mismatch is in the innermost 
constituent; FN requires k+2 comparisons, and TN requires k+3 comparisons. This 
assumption explains why FN takes longer than FA, i.e. why “negation time” is 
longer than “falsification time”: a mismatch in the polarity marker is further away 
from the core than a mismatch in the positive argument. Therefore, a difference in 
polarity marker causes more loops of comparisons than a difference in the positive 
core, and thus consumes more time. Carpenter and Chase differentiate sentential 
denials such as “it isn’t true that the dots are red” from predicate negatives such as 
“It’s true that the dots aren’t red”. The former is represented as {NEG [AFF] (RED, 
DOTS)} while the latter is represented as {NEG (RED, DOTS)}
18
. A picture of red 
dots is represented as {RED, DOTS}. As the mismatch in the polarity operator in 
sentential denials is further away from the core than predicate negatives, verifying 
sentential denials take longer than predicate negatives.  
                                                 
18
 Tanenhaus, Carroll and Bever (1976) pointed out that there are discrepancies in the notations of 
representations. For example, it is unclear why “it is true that the dots are red” are represented as 
“{NEG (RED, DOTS)} rather than {AFF [NEG (RED, DOTS)]}. For both sentence and picture 
representations, affirmative operators are eliminated inconsistently and without good justification. 
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4.2.2.2  Two-step simulation account 
The two-step simulation account (Kaup et al., 2005) is also based on the idea that a 
negative sentence is a rejection of a positive argument, but it disagrees with the 
assumption that sentence and picture are represented in propositional format. Rather, 
they propose that sentences are represented with experiential, image-like simulations 
(Kaup, Zwaan, et al., 2007). Negative sentences are processed with two stages: first a 
simulation of the positive argument, then this is discarded and replaced with a 
simulation consistent with sentence meaning (if possible). In sentence-picture 
verification tasks, the RT pattern is determined by whether the sentence 
representation is in the first or the second stage, when it is compared with the picture. 
If the picture is presented alongside or immediately after the sentence, the 
comparison happens when the participants are still focusing on the first stage of 
negation processing – the positive argument. In this stage, the representation of FN 
matches the picture, and TN mismatches the picture. They assume the responses are 
faster when two representations match then when they mismatch, predicting FN<TN 
and thus a polarity by truth value interaction. However, if the picture is presented 
with a longer delay after the sentence, participants will have shifted their attention to 
the second stage representation – the actual situation. At that time, the representation 
of FN mismatches the picture, and TN matches the picture, thus predicting FN>TN 
and no interaction between polarity and truth value.    
To test their prediction, Kaup et al. (2005) conducted a probe-recognition experiment 
using similar materials as Clark and Chase (1972), such as the sentence “the 
pineapple is not above the rooster”, and a picture of a pineapple and a rooster whose 
spatial relation match or mismatch the sentence. The picture appeared either at 0ms 
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or 1500ms after participants finished reading the sentence. The task however was not 
to verify the sentences, but to indicate whether both items in the picture have been 
mentioned in the sentence. They found that with 0ms delay, there was an interaction 
in RT (TA<FA, FN<TN). With 1500ms delay, reaction times to true and false 
negative sentences were the same (TA<FA, TN=FN). With this result, they 
suggested that the difference in reaction times in previous sentence-picture 
verification tasks studies “differences in the degree to which the picture is primed by 
the representations that are available from processing the sentence” (Kaup et al., 
2005:5). Their reasoning is that when picture are presented soon after the sentence, 
participants are still in the first stage of processing the negative sentences 
(representing the positive argument). The first stage representation is compared with 
the picture, where a match results in a faster response. The question is, how does this 
comparison allow truth value judgment? If participants have not finished processing 
the meaning of the negative sentence, it is unclear how they can identify its truth 
value against the picture.  
 Predicate dependent coding model 4.2.3
Mayo et al. (2004) pointed out that the models discussed above do not take into 
consideration the types of predicates in the negative sentences and the different 
levels of inferences that can be drawn. A negative sentence with a binary predicate 
(e.g. the shop is not open) allows us to infer specific state of affairs (the shop is 
closed) whereas a negative sentence with a unary predicate (e.g. the dress is not red) 
is consistent with many possible states of affairs. Mayo et al. suggest that both the 
conversion model and rejection model can be used to form representations of 
sentences. The choice between the two depends on the type of predicates. If the 
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predicate is binary, negation should be incorporated or “fused” with the predicate, in 
which case the negative sentence will be represented in a positive format. On the 
other hand, when the predicate is binary, no specific positive situation can be 
inferred. In this case, the negative sentence is represented with a “schema-plus-tag”, 
i.e. a positive argument embedded under a negative operator.  
Their experiment (Mayo et al., 2004) tested this idea using a sentence-sentence 
verification task. Participants first read a description of a character (e.g. Tom is not a 
tidy person), and then were asked to judge whether a description is congruent or 
incongruent (e.g. “Tom’s clothes are folded neatly in his closet” / “Tom forgets 
where he left his car keys”). Their results showed a main effect of polarity and of 
truth value when the predicates are binary (TA<FA<TN<FN), but a polarity by truth 
value interaction when the predicates are unary, suggesting that the types of 
predicates determine the type of representation. In a post-hoc memory test, 
participants made more errors when reporting the meaning of negative sentences 
with unary predicates than those with binary predicates. A common mistake with 
unary predicated sentences was that participants forgot that there was a negation 
marker and remembered only the meaning of the positive core (e.g. remembering 
“not responsible” as “responsible”). 
Note that in the study of Mayo et al. (2004), the unary or binary status of a predicate 
does not depend on the experiment context. For unary predicates (e.g. adventurous), 
over 80% of the pre-test participants could not think of an opposite descriptor or had 
to use negation to construct an opposite, while for binary predicates (e.g. warm), 
over 80% of the participants gave a consistent opposite descriptor (cold). It is unclear 
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whether a predicate that is only binary in an experiment (e.g. “being red” when only 
red and black can appear) triggers conversion.  
4.3 Discussion and criticism of current models 
The immediate shortfall of all models is their limited explanatory power when 
confronted with the diverse findings in the RT patterns of TN and FN. The 
conversion model cannot account for findings of TN>FN when sentences are 
presented first. The two-step simulation model has no way to explain main effect 
only patterns when pictures are presented alongside or immediately after the 
sentences. Propositional representation models (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & 
Chase, 1972) acknowledge the possibility of two available strategies, however they 
do not explain when and why a particular strategy is adopted. The predicate 
dependent model (Mayo et al., 2004) does make explicit predications on the choice 
of strategy based on the type of sentence predicate. However, it is unclear whether 
this distinction applies to predicates that is binary only in the experimental context. If 
it does, then the prediction is inconsistent with previous findings (e.g. Clark & 
Chase, 1972; Kaup et al., 2005). 
In addition, current models rely on several assumptions. I will discuss four general 
assumptions and whether they are justified. 
(1) Does sentence-picture verification require a “common language”?  
A basic assumption of all models of sentence-picture verification is that both inputs 
must be represented in a “common language” before they can be compared. This is 
an intuitive idea, but is it theoretically necessary that the verification of information 
of two modalities require a common language?  
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Tanenhaus, Carroll, & Bever (1976) argues that this need not be the case. Following 
Bever (1975), they argue that inputs of two faculties, say faculty A and B, can have 
functional equivalence as long as there is a mapping mechanism that maps inputs of 
A to the domain of B, and a mapping mechanism that maps the inputs of B to the 
domain of A, but the two mapping systems can be distinct. In this case, A and B can 
be functionally equivalent without there being representations in a “common 
language”. They used the example of a typewriter to illustrate this point. A 
typewriter translates the kinetic motions of the fingers into letters. This mapping 
mechanism is unidirectional. Letters on a piece of paper cannot be mapped back into 
kinetic motions of the fingers using a typewriter. However we can imagine a system 
that detects the letters on a piece of paper, and maps the letters into kinetic motions 
of robotic fingers. With these two distinct mapping mechanisms, the kinetic motions 
of fingers and letters on paper are functionally equivalent.  
In terms of sentence-picture verification, the idea is that if there is a mechanism (or a 
series of mechanisms) that maps a sentence onto an actual picture and a different 
mechanism that maps a picture onto a full sentence, the two inputs can be 
functionally equivalent without being represented using a “common language”. 
However, simply mapping a sentence onto a picture does not result in verification. 
We do still need to compare the picture mapped from the sentence with the picture 
we are presented with to detect sameness or differences. Likewise, if a picture is 
mapped onto a fully fledge sentence, we still need to compare two sentences. In this 
sense, sentence-picture verification does require a "common language" for 
comparison, be it sentences, pictures or representations in a third format.  
(2) Can we assume that identifying a match is easier than a mismatch? 
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A consistent finding in the verification of positive sentences is that verification is 
faster than falsification (TA<FA). This finding is “explained” by the assumption that 
when we compare two representations, it is easier to identify a match than a 
mismatch. However, is this assumption justified? Of course we cannot answer the 
question unless we know the nature of mental representations of sentences and 
pictures. For models that propose a propositional representation, this assumption 
does not hold intuitively. Consider this example, are these two letter strings identical: 
“abcde” and “abcde”? How about these two: “abcde” and “mbcde”? Deciding that 
the first two strings match should take longer than deciding that the second two 
strings mismatch, because in the latter case, you do not need to compare all the 
letters. I tested this idea by asking participants to compare letter strings with the 
length of one, three or five. Results show that at the length of one, detecting a match 
is faster than a mismatch. However, at the length of three or five, detecting a match 
is slower than a mismatch. Although we cannot equate the comparison of letter 
strings with the comparisons of propositional representations, the assumption that it 
is faster to identify a match than a mismatch certainly merits future investigations. 
This result suggests at the very least that the comparison of the representations of 
sentences and picture is NOT like the comparison of two letter strings. It adds 
pressure to models that assume a comparison is performed on propositional 
representations. 
(3) Why do negative sentences take longer to verify than positives? 
Studies show that negative sentences in general are slower to verify than 
affirmatives. This finding is consistent across studies, and yet no model provides a 
satisfactory explanation. In Clark and Chase’s model, RT reflects the number of 
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switches of the truth index, and therefore it reflects the total number of mismatches. 
For example, the picture of a star on top of a cross is represented as (star above 
plus)pic. Against this picture, both FA condition (plus above star)sen and FN condition 
False(star above plus)sen involve one mismatch, yet FA is faster than FN. Clark and 
Chase’s model thus claims that detecting a mismatch in the positive cores is faster 
than detecting a mismatch in the polarity operator. As discussed in the previous 
point, it is unclear why this should be the case. If anything, comparing the core “star 
above plus” and “plus above star” seems more complicated than comparing the 
negation operator false and the lack of one.  
In Carpenter and Just’s model, the difference between FA and FN is explained by the 
assumption that a mismatch reinitiates the entire comparison process. For example, if 
the picture is red dots, represented as {RED, DOTS}, a FA sentence can be “the dots 
are green”, represented as {GREEN, DOTS}; a FN sentence can be “the dots are not 
red”, represented as {NEG (RED, DOTS)}. The idea is that when comparing the two 
inputs from inside out, a mismatch between the cores {RED, DOTS} and {GREEN, 
DOTS} involves only one more comparison than TA, while a mismatch between the 
lack of polarity marker in {RED, DOTS} and the negation marker “NEG” in {NEG 
(RED, DOTS)} reinitiates the comparison and thus triggers two extra comparisons. 
This explanation relies completely on the notation of these representations, the 
motivation of which is unaccounted for (see Tanenhaus et al., 1976 for a criticism on 
the notation system in Carpenter and Just's model). In addition, it claims that the core 
is compared twice when verifying an FN, and three times when verifying a TN. Not 
only does this process seem highly uneconomical, it should also predict that the core 
of a negative sentence is more activated than the core of a positive sentence as a 
result of the verification process. This implication is incompatible with findings of 
  127 
worse memory of negative sentences relative to affirmative sentences (e.g. Cornish 
& Wason, 1970). Further, why should each comparison take exactly the same 
amount of time? If the same comparison is repeated, shouldn’t subsequent 
comparisons be faster? 
The two-step simulation account does not explain why negative sentences take 
longer to verify than affirmative ones. The study in Kaup et al. (2005) used a probe 
recognition task rather than sentence verification. In their result, reaction times to FA 
and FN are roughly the same. They assume that similar processes are involved in 
their probe recognition task and a sentence-picture verification task. However, the 
results from their probe recognition study didn’t show slower responses to negative 
sentences in general than to affirmative sentences (FN=FA), yet this pattern is 
present in all sentence-picture verification studies. Therefore, the factors that induce 
longer RTs in the verification of negatives compared to affirmatives are clearly 
absent in the probe recognition process. Therefore, the two-step simulation account 
does not explain why negative sentences in general take longer to verify than 
positives.  
Overall, although studies consistently found that verifying negative sentences is 
harder than verifying affirmatives, no current account provides a satisfactory 
explanation.  
(4) General-purpose versus particular-purpose representations: 
Tanenhaus et al. (1976) pointed out that the main aim of most sentence-picture 
verification studies is to understand language comprehension and information 
processing in natural situations. However, in sentence-picture verification tasks, 
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participants seem to be adopting strategies that are task-specific, which tell us little 
about the natural language comprehension process.  
If the task or context in general can influence the kind of representations that we 
construct, and that we have flexibility in the choice of representations for a single 
stimulus, how do we decide which representation model to use before assigning a 
representation? The only possible answer is to assume that we first process and 
understand a sentence and then select a model to develop a contextually appropriate 
representation for the sentence. Thus, “normal sentence comprehension must be prior 
to the first stage of these [representation] models” (Tanenhaus et al.1976: 314). In 
sentence-picture verification, the repetitive trials and small set of sentence and 
picture stimuli can allow the participants to develop a task specific representations 
and verification processes. After a large number of trials, participants may begin to 
encode the sentence and pictures immediately, partially by-passing the normal 
comprehension and perception processes. As training proceeds, the initial general-
purpose representational processes can be replaced by special-purpose strategies 
specific to the task circumstances. Note that it is the initial general-purpose 
representation processes that are more likely to be adopted in language 
comprehension in natural settings. However this has largely been ignored by 
investigators, as many studies (e.g. Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 
1972)have large numbers of practice trials or pilot trials, and the data from these 
initial trials are generally discarded.  
Taking stock, current models have limited explanatory power in the face of varying 
RT patterns of TN and FN from previous verification studies. With the patterns they 
do address, their explanations rely on the assumption that verification is faster than 
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falsification, and that “negation time” is longer than “falsification time”. In addition, 
their models are unlikely to have addressed general purpose strategies adopted early 
in the experiments, which are the strategies that tell us more about natural language 
comprehension. 
4.4 Introducing the dynamic pragmatic account 
It seems likely that two different strategies can be used and are used in sentence-
picture verification tasks. The truth-functional strategy proposed by rejection 
accounts can explain the polarity by truth value interaction pattern in verification 
tasks, but models based on this strategy lack a broader applicability in language 
comprehension. Generally, language is processed on the assumption that a statement 
is true, or at least relevant. Thus, comprehension processes are geared towards 
representing what is the case according to what is asserted, or what follows from 
what is asserted in the context. Verification is a metalinguistic task that normally 
requires establishing what would be the case if the sentence were true, and 
comparing that to evidence. The same process should be followed for both positive 
and negative statements. To verify a negative sentence, we will compute what the 
world should be like given what is asserted in the negative sentence, and comparing 
it with evidence. For example, if we want to verify the sentence “the clothes aren’t 
clean”, we will infer that for the sentence to be true, the clothes must be dirty. We 
then look for evidence that indicates dirty clothes, such as stains or odour. Based on 
this idea, we should not expect a polarity by truth value interaction in reaction time. 
Rather, we should expect that true statements, whether positive or negative, take less 
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time to verify than false statements
19
. This process should be the default strategy if 
participants apply their normal comprehension processes while performing truth-
value judgement tasks, as Tanenhaus et al. (1976) suggest. This strategy can explain 
findings where main effects of polarity and truth value are reported. In comparison, 
the truth-functional strategy, proposed by rejection accounts, focuses precisely on 
what is not the case according to the assertion. It deviates from the natural 
comprehension process. Yet it is likely that this strategy can also be used, judging by 
the polarity by truth-value interaction that is frequently for these studies. Why and 
when do participants adopt the truth function strategy? I propose that the pragmatic 
effect of negation is the trigger.  
According to the dynamic pragmatic account, when we process a negative sentence 
out of context, we use the fact that negation is being used as a cue that the utterance 
is addressing a positive QUD about the positive argument. For a sentence such as 
“the star is not above the plus”, its prominent QUD is whether the star is above the 
plus. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the accommodation of a positive QUD incurs an 
extra cost. In a verification task, QUD accommodation can interfere with the 
verification process. The verification task poses the question of whether the sentence 
is true: in the case of the example the task QUD is therefore, whether it is true that 
the star is not above the plus. By the default strategy, participants infer what should 
follow from what is asserted in “the star is not above the plus” – i.e. the plus is above 
the star
20
 - and compare this representation with the picture. However, during this 
                                                 
19Here we assume verification is easier than falsification. The reason for this is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but is discussed briefly in the “general discussions” of this chapter. 
20 Drawing this inference also requires learning and expecting that in the context of the 
experiment, the mentioned items can only be positioned vertically, one above the other. This 
information tended to be giving in the instructions in previous studies, and participants have 
been exposed to pictures like this in practice. However, it is likely that drawing an inference for 
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process, participants also accommodate the positive QUD whether star is above plus, 
the representation of which is in conflict with the sentence truth condition (plus 
above star).
21
 Previous studies (Hindy et al., 2013) have shown that representing 
competing events simultaneously is costly. The extra cost induced by conflicting 
representations of questions can encourage the participants to adopt the truth 
functional strategy: instead of representing what should follow from what is asserted, 
participants can use the information from the picture to answer the accommodated 
positive QUD, and switch the answer afterwards. In the current example, after 
reading “the star is not above the plus”, participants accommodate the utterance 
QUD, whether the star is above the plus as part of the normal comprehension 
procedure. They answer this question using evidence from the picture, and then 
switch the polarity of the answer to respond to the task question. Echoing Tanenhaus 
et al., (1976), I argue that the truth functional strategy is a special purpose process 
developed specifically for the task of verifying negative sentences against pictures.   
The idea that the truth functional strategy is related to a contextual effect of negation 
has in fact been proposed by Clark (1976). He suggests that the pragmatic notion of 
“supposition” can explain the way a picture is coded and compared to a negative 
sentence. Since negative sentences are often used to deny a positive supposition, it 
would make sense to code the picture as the positive supposition, and compare the 
sentence against that supposition. Although this proposal tries to use the pragmatic 
effects of negation to explain the truth functional strategy, it suggests that it is the 
coding of the picture rather than the utterance that is influenced by the supposition of 
                                                                                                                                          
sentences containing such “context-dependent” binary predicates is more difficult than for 
sentences with natural binary predicates, such as “the door isn’t open”.  
21 As was proposed in Chapter 3, QUD accommodation corresponds to some kind of mental 
representation of the source of relevance for the utterance. I assume in this thesis that such 
representation is of situational content. This means, representing the QUD whether p can lead to 
the representation of properties consistent with the truth condition of p. 
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negation. Thus it cannot explain why two strategies are used in negative sentence-
picture verification. 
The dynamic account proposes that the default strategy for verifying negative 
sentences is to make inferences about what is asserted and comparing/verifying these 
against the picture. This is similar to the “conversion model”. It thus predicts that at 
least at the beginning of a sentence-picture verification task, a main effect only RT 
pattern (TA<FA<TN<FN) is likely to occur. As the experiment proceeds, 
participants may adopt the truth functional strategy, which will give rise to a polarity 
by truth value interaction pattern (TA<FA<FN<TN). In other words, I argue that the 
often reported interaction in sentence-picture verification is the product of a training 
effect
22
. Importantly, I propose that it is the pragmatic effect of negation – the 
accommodation of a positive QUD – that encourages the truth functional strategy. 
Therefore, if we can manipulate the QUD cue or the context so that a prominent 
negative QUD is projected for negative sentence, the truth functional strategy should 
no longer develop. The following experiments test two hypotheses based on the 
dynamic pragmatic account of negative sentence-picture verification: 
Hypothesis 1 (the training effect hypothesis): the default strategy gives rise to an 
initial main effect only RT pattern, and only later does the interactive RT pattern 
start to emerge, due to the development of the truth-functional strategy.  
Hypothesis 2 (the QUD dependence hypothesis): a prominent positive QUD 
encourages the development of the truth-functional strategy, while a prominent 
                                                 
22 Whether and when participants develop the truth functional strategy can be influenced by 
many factors and are subject to individual variations. I will discuss this matter in sections 4.6 – 
4.8.  
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negative QUD doesn’t. The former gives rise to an interactive RT pattern after some 
training while the latter gives rise to a main effect only pattern throughout the 
experiment.  
4.5 Experiment 1:  Short experiment with natural binary predicates 
In this experiment, sentences such as “the banana is/isn’t peeled” are used, where the 
affirmative and the negative versions of the sentence imply two distinctive physical 
states of the subject noun. This type of predicate is different from previous sentence-
picture verification studies in that they are naturally binary, i.e. the sentences 
themselves allow participants to infer the situations that make the sentences true, 
whereas previous studies either used unary predicates (e.g. the dots aren’t red, 
Carpenter & Just, 1975) or predicates that are only binary in the context of the 
experiment (e.g. the star is not above the plus, Clark & Chase, 1972). 
Part 1 of experiment 1 tests the training effect hypothesis. The prediction on RT of 
negative sentences is TN<FN initially and TN=/> FN later on. Part 2 tests the QUD 
dependence hypothesis. The picture context is manipulated in order to make a 
positive or a negative QUD more prominent. The prediction is that whether an 
interactive RT pattern develops depends on the polarity of the accommodated QUD. 
 Part 1: one picture context, short experiment 4.5.1
Method 
Participants: 45 native English speakers recruited from a subject pool of University 
College London. Participants did not suffer from dyslexia and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Materials 
28 negative sentences were constructed, all of which are in the form of “the P isn’t 
Q”. All the negative sentences describe a binary property of the subject. Examples 
are “the door isn’t shut”, “the banana isn’t peeled” or “the envelope isn’t sealed” 
(Table 7). In addition, 28 positive sentences were constructed, using separate 
predicates from the negative sentences. Some of the affirmative control sentences 
have binary predicates (e.g. the truck is dirty), and others have unary predicates (e.g. 
the dog is eating). Every sentence is paired with one of two pictures which either 
matches or mismatches the meaning of the sentence. For example, “the door isn’t 
shut” could be paired with a picture of an open door or a closed door. In total, 112 
pictures are constructed (56*2). The pictures measure 300 pixels by 300 pixels. In 
addition, 6 sentences (3 affirmative 3 negative) and 6 pictures were constructed for 
practice. Half of these sentences were true against the picture.  
 
 
 
 
Sentence Picture Correct response 
  135 
The banana isn’t peeled.  
 
False 
The banana isn’t peeled. 
 
True 
Table 7 Example sentences and pictures: Experiment 1, one-picture context 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted on a 14” laptop using E-Prime. The participants first 
see a sentence in the centre of the screen. They pressed the space bar once they 
finished reading the sentence, and a centrally located fixation cross appeared for 
250ms, followed by a picture. The participants press either the “1” or “0” key to 
answer whether the sentence was true or false. The answer keys were 
counterbalanced (half the participants pressed “1” for “true” while the other half 
pressed “0” for true). The keys had stickers on them which says “true” or “false”. 
The participants were told that the response accuracy and reaction time were 
measured, so they should make decisions as quickly and accurately as possible. 
There was one short break after the first 28 trials. Each participant went through 62 
trials (6 for practice).  
Results  
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As the affirmative and negative sentences do not have the same items, the results of 
affirmative and negative sentences are not compared directly. Instead, I focus on the 
results of TN and FN. Results of affirmative sentences are reported for reference. 
Data from 5 participants were discarded as their accuracy rate was lower than 80%. 
Accuracy 
The overall accuracy for all sentences (negative experimental items and affirmative 
controls) is 88%. The overall accuracy for negative experimental sentences is 88%. 
Table 8 summarizes accuracy for each condition (accuracy for affirmative controls 
are reported for reference). Accuracy for TN is significantly lower than FN: t(39) = -
2.14, p(2-tailed) = 0.04. Accuracy rate did not vary significantly between the first 
and second half:  
Accuracy True False 
Negative experimental 0.86 0.91 
Affirmative controls 0.86 0.88 
Table 8  Accuracy per condition: experiment 1, one-picture context 
Reaction times analysis 
Reaction times were converted to Z score for each participant, and outliers were 
identified and eliminated using a cut-off point of 3.29 (p<0.001). In addition, 
reaction times smaller than 300ms or longer than 4500ms were discarded. This 
procedure removed 3.6% of the data. Only reaction times from correct responses 
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were analyzed (this further removed 8.3% of the data). Table 9 presents the overall 
reaction time for each condition. RTs for affirmative controls are reported for 
reference. Paired sampled t-test shows that RT for FN is longer than for TN 
(significant by participant): t1(39) = - 3.10, p = 0.004; t2(27) = -1.99, p = 0.057
23
. 
RT (ms)
 24
 True False 
Negative experimental 1559 1680 
Affirmative controls 1163 1303 
Table 9: RT summary: one-picture context, experiment 1 
Dividing responses into two halves (each with 28 trials), we can see that the 
difference between TN and FN is bigger in the first half than the second half (see 
Table 10, charted in Figure 4). To compare the difference between TN and FN in the 
first half with the difference in the second half, a half by truth value ANOVA 
showed that the interaction is not significant: F(1,38) = 1.02, p = 0.3. However, 
planned paired-sample t-tests show that in the first half, TN is significant faster than 
FN: t(39) = -2.47, p = 0.018. In the second half, TN and FN are not significantly 
different: t(39)= - 0.90, p = 0.374. Overall, part 1 of experiment 1 suggests that when 
verifying negative sentences with natural binary predicates against pictures, TN is 
initially faster than FN, but the difference diminishes in the second half of the 
                                                 
23 Statistical tests on RT are done by participants (1) and by items (2) if possible. Generally, it is 
possible for overall averages, but not for RT by time intervals.  
24 Note that in the table here and in the rest of the chapters, the overall mean RT does 
necessarily the simple average of averages by halves, quarters or other time bins, as different 
numbers of incorrect responses may have been taken out in different time bins. 
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experiment. The lack of significant half by truth value interaction could be due to the 
short intervals (28 trials per half). 
RT in ms TN FN FN-TN 
1
st
 half 1564 1758 194 
2
nd
 half 1554 1633 79 
Table 10: RT by 1st and 2nd halves: one-picture context, experiment 1 
 
Figure 4 RT for TN and FN by halves: one-picture context, experiment 1. In this graph 
and in the rest of the thesis, bars indicate standard errors and asterisks indicate 
statistical significance (p<0.05 - *; p<0.01 - **; p<0.001 - ***).  
 
 Part 2: two picture condition, short experiment 4.5.2
In part 1 of experiment 1, we saw that in a “standard” sentence-picture verification 
task, participants TN was initially faster than FN, and later on TN and FN were not 
significantly different in reaction time. I proposed that that the main reason for this 
* 
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“learning effect” is the conflict between task question and accommodated QUD for 
negative sentence. If we can manipulate the QUD cue or context so that the 
accommodated QUD is congruent with the question posed by the task, the training 
effect should disappear. Part 2 tests the QUD dependence hypothesis. 
In Chapter 3, we saw that the cleft construction is a QUD cue. For example, a 
sentence “It is the banana that isn’t peeled” projects the negative QUD which one 
isn’t peeled. Thus, when participants verify cleft negative sentences, we should 
expect no training effect. To create a felicitous picture context for cleft sentences, I 
used visual display with two objects instead of one (see Table 11). In each display 
the objects were in opposite states (e.g. peeled and unpeeled).  
What if participants verify simple negative sentences against these two-object 
pictures? There are two possibilities: 1) if sentential negation semantically projects a 
positive QUD, participants should accommodate positive QUDs based on the 
sentence form, in which case we should expect a training effect similar to part 1; 2) if 
sentential negation being a QUD cue is not hard-wired in the semantics of negation, 
but is sensitive to the probabilities of potential QUDs, participants may incorporate 
the picture context, and accommodate a negative QUD just like for cleft negatives, 
i.e. which one isn’t peeled. In this case we should see that against two-object 
pictures, there is no training effect for either simple or cleft negative sentences.  
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Sentence: simple / 
cleft 
Picture Correct 
response 
Simple: 
The banana isn’t 
peeled.  
 
Cleft:  
It is the banana that 
isn’t peeled. 
 
False 
 
True 
Table 11 Example sentences and pictures: Experiment 1, two-picture context 
Participants   
50 English native speakers recruited from a subject pool of University College 
London. They are non-dyslexic and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Materials and Procedure 
The same 28 negative sentences and 28 positive controls from one picture context 
experiment were used. Further, a cleft version of these 56 sentences were constructed 
(It is P that is/isn’t Q). Each sentence is paired with an image which contains a 
picture of the target item (e.g. banana) and an irrelevant item (e.g. apple) which can 
have the same property (being peeled). Only one of these two pictures matches the 
described property. Each experimental item generates four sentence-picture pairs 
(2(simple/cleft) * 2 (true/false)). In total, each participant goes through 56 trials, half 
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of which are negative experimental items, and half are affirmative controls. For each 
sentence polarity, half of the sentences are in the simple construction and half are 
cleft. In addition, there are 6 practice trials. The procedure is the same as part 1. 
Results 
Accuracy 
Data from 5 participants were discarded as their accuracy rate was lower than 80%. 
The overall accuracy for all sentences is 90.47%, and for negative experimental 
sentences is 85.32%. Again, accuracy figures for affirmative controls are reported for 
reference. Accuracies for TN and FN are not significantly different for either simple 
condition: t(44) = 0.39, p(2-tailed) = 0.70, or cleft condition: t(44) = 0.64, p(2-tailed) 
= 0.53. Accuracies did not change significantly over the course of the experiment.  
Accuracy True False 
Negative experimental   
Simple 0.84 0.88 
Cleft 0.83 0.86 
Affirmative controls   
Simple 0.96 0.96 
Cleft 0.97 0.94 
Table 12 Average accuracy per condition: two-picture context, experiment 1 
Reaction time analysis 
Outliers are identified using the same procedure as part 1. Reaction times were 
converted to Z score for each participant, and outliers were identified and eliminated 
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using a cut-off point of 3.29 (p<0.001). In addition, reaction times smaller than 
300ms or longer than 4500ms were discarded. RT from incorrect responses are 
discarded. In total, 11.15% of responses are discarded for RT analysis. Table 13 
summarizes reaction times for each condition. RT for affirmative controls are 
reported for reference. Figure 5 plots the RT for TN and FN in simple and cleft 
conditions, which shows that TN is faster than FN in both simple and cleft 
conditions. Paired sampled t-tests show a significant difference between TN and FN 
in the simple condition: t1(44) = -2.85, p1(2-tailed) = 0.007; t2(27) = -2.27, p2(2-
tailed) = 0.03, and in the cleft condition: t1(44) = -3.14, p1(2-tailed) = 0.003; t2(27) = 
-2.27, p2(2-tailed) = 0.004. There is no cleft by truth value interaction (Fs < 0.006, ps 
> 0.94). 
RT in ms True False 
Simple 
Neg experimental 1789 1997 
Affirmative controls 1456 1583 
Cleft 
Neg experimental 1898 2168 
Affirmative controls 1467 1574 
Table 13 RT per condition: two-picture context, experiment 1 
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Figure 5 RT for TN and FN in simple and cleft conditions: two-picture context, 
experiment 1. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (p<0.05 - *; p<0.01 - **; p<0.001 
- ***) 
RT analysis by halves: 
Table 14 summaries RT for TN and FN for the first and second halves of the 
experiment. Figure 6 plots these figures. Statistical analysis on RT by halves are 
done by participants only and not done by item (as one item can only appear in one 
time bin). In the simple condition, 2 (half) by 2 (truth value) ANOVA shows that 
there is no half by polarity interaction: F(1,43) = 1.72, p = 0.20. There is a trending 
main effect of half: F(1,44) = 3.67, p = 0.06, and a significant main effect of truth 
value: F(1,44) = 3.67, p < 0.05. Paired sampled t-tests between TN and FN in each 
half shows that TN is not significantly faster than FN in the first half: t(43) = -0.84, p 
(2-tailed) = 0.41; but the difference is significant in the second half: t(43) = -3.37, p 
(2-tailed) = 0.002. In the cleft condition, 2 (half) by 2 (truth value) ANOVA shows 
that there is no half by polarity interaction: F(1,41) = 1.19, p = 0.28. There is a 
significant main effect of half: F(1,41) = 8.35, p = 0.006, and a significant main 
effect of truth value: F(1,41) = 10.06, p = 0.003. Interestingly, cleft RT in the second 
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half is slower than in the first half. Paired sampled t-tests between TN and FN shows 
that the difference between TN and FN is trending in the first half: t(43) = -0.1.95, p 
(2-tailed) = 0.058; in the second half, TN is significantly faster than FN: t(43) = -
2.77, p (2-tailed) = 0.008. There is no clefting x half x truth-value three way 
interaction (F<0.001, p = 0.97). 
Overall, results in part 2 shows that when verifying simple AND cleft negative 
sentences against two-object pictures, TN is faster than FN, and this difference does 
not diminish over the course of the experiment. This result supports the QUD 
dependence hypothesis: whether the truth-functional strategy is developed depends 
on the polarity of the accommodated QUD. Interestingly, there is no difference 
between simple and cleft conditions, suggesting that participants incorporated the 
picture context and accommodated negative QUDs for simple negative sentences.  
RT in ms TN FN 
1st half   
Simple 1888 1963 
Cleft 1822 2084 
2nd half   
Simple 1693 2022 
Cleft 1977 2235 
Table 14 RT for TN and FN by halves: two-context condition, experiment 1 
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Figure 6 RT for TN and FN by halves: two-picture context, experiment 1 
Discussion – Experiment 1 
Part 1 tested the training effect hypothesis. The results show that when verifying 
negative sentences with natural binary predicates against single pictures, TN is 
initially faster than FN. However, this difference diminishes as the experiment 
proceeds. It suggests that the frequently reported polarity by truth value RT 
interaction is likely a result of training effect. Part 2 tested the QUD dependence 
hypothesis. The results show that when verifying simple and cleft negative sentences 
against two-object pictures, TN is faster than FN. Importantly, their RT differences 
do not diminish over the course of the experiment. Interestingly, there is no 
difference between simple and cleft conditions. This suggests that sentential negation 
does not mandatorily project a positive QUD, rather, the form and polarity of the 
accommodated QUD is sensitive to other factors (in this case, the picture context and 
simple salience of negative QUDs engendered by the cleft items).  
Comparing part 1 with classic sentence-picture verification studies (Carpenter & 
Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972), a main difference in the results is that in this 
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study, TN is not slower than FN even in the second half. A major difference in the 
methodology is the length of the experiment. The current study has only 58 
experimental trials, while both Carpenter and Just, (1975) and Clark & Chase (1972) 
had over 150 trials. The difference in TN and FN results could be due to the 
difference in experiment length. Other factors that could contribute to a difference 
are the type of predicates (naturally binary vs. contextually binary (in Clark & Chase 
1972) vs. unary (Carpenter & Just 1975)) and the presentation of stimuli (sequential 
vs. simultaneous presentation of sentence and image). To test whether the number of 
trials affects the manifestation of the training effect, experiment 2 repeated 
experiment 1 but with twice as many trials.  
4.6 Experiment 2: long experiment 
 Part 1: one-picture long experiment 4.6.1
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
44 English native speakers recruited from a subject pool of University College 
London. The same design as experiment 1 part 1 is used, the main difference being 
the number of trials in this study (56 trials versus 140 trials).  A total of 56 simple 
negative experimental sentences and 56 simple positive control sentences were 
constructed. Like experiment 1 part 1, all negative experimental sentences have 
natural binary predicates. In addition, 28 filler sentences are added. The filler 
sentences have the same form as experimental sentences, half of which are negative. 
Each of the 140 sentences are paired with one of two single-object pictures that 
makes the sentence true or false, thus a total of 280 coloured pictures were 
constructed. After 28 sentences, there is a comprehension question. These questions 
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were either about the subject of the sentence (e.g. sentence: “the tennis racket is 
broken”, question: “is the sentence about golf?” or about the predicate (e.g. “is the 
tennis racket broken?”). Note that comprehension questions and filler items are 
added so that the set-up is consistent with the two-object picture condition in part 2 
Experiment 2. Data from the 29 filler items are not analysed. The procedure is the 
same as experiment 1.The entire experiment takes around 20 minutes to complete.  
Results 
Accuracy 
Data from 4 participants were discarded as their accuracy rate was lower than 80%. 
The overall accuracy is 91.54%. Table 15 summaries the accuracy for each 
condition. Like experiment 1, accuracies for positive controls are reported for 
reference. There is no significant difference in the accuracy for TN and FN: t1(39) = 
0.92, p1 = 0.37; t2(55) = 0.90, p2 = 0.37. Accuracy rate stayed stable over the trials. 
Accuracy True False 
Negative experimental  0.89 0.88 
Affirmative controls 0.94 0.94 
Table 15 Accuracy per condition: one-picture condition, experiment 2 
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Reaction time analysis 
Outlier elimination is done in the same way as experiment 1. Overall reaction times 
for negative experimental sentences and affirmative controls are summarized in 
Table 16. Despite the fact that this experiment is considerably longer than part1 
experiment 1, overall TN is still faster than FN: t1(39) = -5.34, p1 < 0.001; t2(55) = -
3.90, p2 < 0.001. 
RT in ms True False 
Negative experimental 1354 1505 
Affirmative controls 958 1091 
Table 16 RT - one-picture condition, long experiment 2 
To analyze RT pattern changes by time lapses, I divided the trials into four quarters 
(35 trials per quarter), so that the length of each training interval is comparable with 
the “halves” in Experiment 1. Table 17 shows how RT for TN and FN changes over 
time. Specifically, FN – TN numerically drops in each quarter of the trials. 
Interestingly, comparing RT in the 4
th
 quarter and the 1
st
 quarter, TN barely dropped 
(1323 in the 1
st
 and 1294 in the 4
th
) while FN dropped by 261ms (1607 in the 1
st
 and 
1346 in the 4
th
). Paired-sampled t-tests on TN and FN for each of the quarter shows 
that TN is faster than FN in the first three quarters but in not in the last quarter. Both 
the t-values and significance drop gradually over four quarters. ANOVA with 2(1
st
 
vs. 4
th
 quarter) by 2 (truth value) on between the first and fourth quarter shows a 
significant quarter by truth-value interaction: F(1,39) = 2.0, p = 0.049.  This result 
fits our prediction that a polarity by truth interaction is a result of training effect. 
  149 
However, the evolving RT pattern could also be due to a ceiling of improvement in 
RT, i.e. initially TN is much faster than FN. As training progresses, there is more 
room for RT improvement in FN than TN. However, if this is the reason why the 
main effect of truth value diminished over time, we should see a similar progression 
pattern in positive sentences (this is not the case as we will see in experiment 3)  
RT in ms by 
quarters 
TN FN FN-TN 
t-test statistics 
t value 
(df=39) 
p 
value 
1st 1323 1607 285 -3.45 *** 0.001 
2nd 1454 1616 162 -2.74 ** 0.009 
3rd 1345 1435 90 -2.15 * 0.038 
4th 1294 1346 52 -1.45 0.155 
Table 17 RT for TN and FN over four quarters: one-picture condition, long experiment 
2 
 
 
Figure 7 RT of TN and FN in four quarters - one-picture condition, experiment 2 
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 Part 2: two-picture long experiment 4.6.2
Experiment 2 part 2 uses two-object pictures. Unlike the two-object condition in 
experiment 1 where cleft/ simple is an experimental variable, here only simple 
negatives are tested so that the results can be compared directed with the long one-
object picture condition (experiment 2 part 1).  
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
42 native English speakers recruited from a subject pool of University College 
London. The design and experimental sentences are identical to part 1 experiment 2. 
The differences are in the pictures, filler sentences and comprehension questions. 
280 coloured pictures were constructed, two for each sentence. Each picture contains 
two items, one of which is consistent with the property described in the predicate, 
while the other one isn’t. The 28 filler sentences were in cleft form, half of them 
were affirmative and half were negative (e.g. ‘It is the CD that is scratched.’, ‘It is 
the bat that isn’t flying.’). 28 comprehension questions were constructed. These 
questions are consistent with the context which focuses on determining the item that 
does or doesn’t have the described property. For example (Is it the bat that isn’t 
flying?).  
Results 
Accuracy 
Data from 2 participants were discarded as their accuracy rate was lower than 80%. 
The overall accuracy for all sentences is 90%. Surprisingly, accuracy for TN is 
significantly lower than FN: t1(39) = -4.79, p1(2-tailed) < 0.001; t2(55) = -4.51, p2(2-
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tailed) < 0.001. This difference was not found in the short two-object condition 
(experiment 1 part 2). Accuracies did not change significantly over the trials.  
Accuracy True False 
Negative experimental  0.82 0.90 
Affirmative controls 0.95 0.93 
Table 18 Accuracy per condition: two-picture condition, long experiment 2 
Reaction times analysis: 
Outliers were eliminated in the same way as experiment 1. Overall RT and RT by 
quarters are summarized in Table 19. Overall, TN is significantly faster than FN. 
Over four quarters TN is significantly faster than FN in the 1
st
, 3
rd
 and the 4
th
 
quarters. Comparing the one-picture and two-picture long study (part 1 and 2 in 
experiment 2), results show the difference in picture context alone can influence 
whether the truth-functional strategy is developed. In both the one-picture and two-
picture conditions, TN is initially faster than FN. This difference diminishes over the 
four quarters of the experiment in the one-picture condition but not in the two-picture 
condition. 
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RT in ms by 
quarters 
TN FN FN-TN 
t-test statistics 
t value 
(df=39) 
p 
value 
1st 1603 1760 157 -2.23 * 0.03 
2nd 1624 1628 4 -1.09  0.28 
3rd 1563 1654 91 -2.10 * 0.04 
4th 1432 1583 151 -2.71 ** 0.01 
Total Negative 1548 1651 106 -3.01 ** 0.005 
Total Affirmative 
controls  1214 (TA) 1390 (FA) 
 
 
Table 19 RT over four quarters: two-picture condition, long experiment 2 
 
 
Figure 8 RT for TN and FN over four quarters: two-picture condition, long experiment 
2 
 
Before discussing the results of experiment 1 and 2, I present the last study in the 
current series (verifying sentences with binary predicates). Experiments 1 and 2 used 
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studied the verification of negative sentences only. To better compare this study and 
classic ones and to compare reaction times for affirmative versus negative sentences, 
experiment 3 tests the verification of simple affirmative and negative sentences 
against one-object picture (part 1) or two-object picture (part 2).  
4.7 Experiment 3: Comparing affirmative and negative sentence verification  
Experiment 3 is similar to experiment 2, except that the same experimental items 
appear in both affirmative and negative condition. This setup allows us to compare 
the verification of affirmative and negative sentences. Like experiment 1 and 2, part 
1 uses one-object pictures and part 2 uses two-object pictures.  
 Part 1: one-picture condition 4.7.1
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
32 English native speakers recruited from a subject pool of University College 
London. Compared to experiment 2, the main difference in materials being that the 
same experimental items appeared in both affirmative and negative conditions. 92 
items with binary predicates are created, each generates four sentence-picture pairs 
(2 polarities* 2 truth values). In total, each participant sees 92 experimental trials and 
28 fillers (the fillers are identical to experiment 2), the polarity and truth value are 
counterbalanced. 
Results 
Accuracy 
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The overall accuracy is 92%. See Table 20 for average accuracies per condition. 
Accuracies for affirmative sentences are significantly higher than for negative 
sentences: t1(35) = 5.04, p1(2-tailed) < 0.001; t2(95) = 5.39, p2(2-tailed) <0.001. 
There is no significant difference between TN and FN (ps > 0.29), or between TA 
and FA (ps > 0.17). Accuracies did not change significantly throughout the 
experiment. 
Accuracy True False 
Negative  0.88 0.89 
Affirmative  0.96 0.94 
Table 20 Accuracy per condition: one-picture condition, experiment 3 
Reaction times analysis 
Overall reaction times is summarized in Table 21. There is no polarity by truth value 
interaction: F1(1,35) = 1.09, p=0.30; F2(1,107) = 0.46, p = 0.50. There is a main 
effect of polarity: F1(1,35) = 160.14, p1<0.0001; F2(1,107) = 232.41, p2<0.0001, and 
a main effect of truth value: F1(1,35) = 24.09, p1<0.001; F2(1,107) = 11.84, p2=0.001. 
Accuracy False True 
Affm 1251.44 1106.78 
Neg 1644.35 1552.98 
Table 21 RT for TA, TN, FA, FN - one-picture condition, experiment 3 
RT analysis by quarters: 
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Reaction times for four quarters are summarized in Table 22. Changes in RT pattern 
for TN and FN resembles experiment 1 part 1: TN is initially faster than FN, but this 
difference shrank over the course of the experiment. On the other hand, the 
difference between TA and FA is stable throughout four quarters. 2(polarity) by 
2(truth value) ANOVA was performed for all four quarters, which revealed no 
significant interaction for any of the quarters (Fs < 4.1, ps > 0.06). This result is 
surprising, as we expected a polarity by truth value interaction later in the 
experiment.  
RT per 
quarter 
TA FA TN FN 
1st 993 1191 1520 1608 
2nd 1009 1108 1368 1574 
3rd 982 1106 1393 1475 
4th 1034 1167 1493 1516 
Table 22 RT per quarter: one-picture condition, experiment 3 
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Figure 9 RT per quarter: one-picture condition, experiment 3 
Given that the development of the truth functional strategy is subject to individual 
differences, is there a measurement that can predict whether the truth functional 
strategy is likely to be developed? One such predictor could be the changes in 
sentence reading times between early and late phases. My hypotheses states that the 
default strategy for verifying negative sentences is to infer what situation makes the 
sentence true before comparing the situation with the picture. Such an inference 
process should lead to a much longer sentence reading/ processing time for negative 
sentences compared to affirmative sentences at the beginning of the experiment. If 
participants develop the later developed truth conditional strategy, they should 
abandon the inference drawing process for negative sentences, and directly compare 
the picture with the accommodated affirmative QUD. Thus, if a participant develops 
the truth-conditional strategy, we should see a bigger drop in the sentence reading 
/processing times for negative sentences compared to affirmative sentences.  
Based on this idea, I calculated a predictor called “N-A relative drop in reading 
time”, which is the difference between negative and affirmative conditions in reading 
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time drops. Reading time drops are calculated as the average sentence reading time 
in the first half minus that in the second half of the experiment. I predict that 
participants with a large relative reading time drop are more likely to have developed 
the truth conditional strategy, while those with a small drop are less likely to have 
developed this strategy. Of course, this measurement is not a perfect predictor, as a 
small relative drop could be due to low reading times at the beginning of the 
experiment. In this case, participants might have adopted the truth functional strategy 
very early in the experiment. I split the participants by the median in “N-A relative 
drop in reading time”. In the small-drop group, reading times for negative sentences 
sped up by 20ms relative to affirmative sentences, while in the large-drop group, the 
speed up was 241ms relative to affirmative sentences
25
. The reaction times for the 
small drop and large drop groups are summarized in Table 23, and charted in Figure 
10 and Figure 11 respectively. We can see that in the last quarter, in the small-drop 
group TN is still faster than FN, whereas in the large-drop group, TN is slower than 
FN. 2(polarity) by 2(truth value) ANOVA was performed for each quarter in both the 
small-drop and the large-drop group (see Table 23 for F values and p values). The 
only significant polarity by truth value interaction occurred in the fourth quarter in 
the large-drop group. This result supports the idea that the change in reading times in 
negative sentences relative to affirmative sentences can predict whether participants 
developed the truth-conditional strategy for verifying negative sentences.  
 
 
                                                 
25 The average in the small drop group is very low (20ms) because some participants actually 
had an increase in reading times between the first and second half.  
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Reaction Times 
split by N-A 
relative drop in 
reading time 
TA FA TN FN ANOVA statistics 
df = 15 
Small drop F value P value 
1
st
 939 1122 1385 1307 4.55 0.05 
2
nd
 1002 1067 1338 1563 2.66 0.12 
3
rd
 945 1155 1309 1384 0.90 0.36 
4
th
 1065 1093 1358 1508 0.74 0.40 
Large drop   
1
st
 1042 1260 1671 1899 0.27 0.62 
2
nd
 1016 1151 1401 1585 1.46 0.25 
3
rd
 1029 1059 1462 1574 0.30 0.59 
4
th
 1007 1249 1633 1523 7.11 * 0.02 
Table 23 RT split by N-A relative drop in reading time: one-picture condition, 
experiment 1 
 
Figure 10 RT over quarters - small N-A reading time drop, experiment 3 
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Figure 11 RT over quarters- large N-A time drop, experiment 3 
 
 Part 2: two-picture condition 4.7.2
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
36 English native speakers recruited from a subject pool of University College 
London. The design, materials and procedure is the same as experiment 3 part 1, 
except that two-object pictures were used.  
Results  
The overall accuracy is 89%. The accuracies per condition is summarized in Table 
24. The accuracies for affirmative sentences are significant higher than for negative 
sentences: t1(35) = 5.43, p1(2-tailed) < 0.001; t2(89) = 7.05, p2(2-tailed) < 0.001There 
is a significant polarity by truth value interaction: F1(1,35) = 13.78, p1 = 0.001; F2(1, 
89) = 12.98, p2 < 0.001.  
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Accuracy True False 
Affm 0.95 0.91 
Neg 0.82 0.88 
Table 24 Accuracy per condition: two-picture condition, experiment 3 
Reaction time analysis: 
See Table 26 and Figure 12 for details. Overall, there is no significant (although 
trending) polarity by truth value interaction in reaction times, F1(1,35) = 3.28, 
p1=0.08; F2(1,107) = 3.19, p2=0.08. Instead, affirmative sentences are faster to verify 
than negative ones: F1(1,35) = 99.62, p1 < 0.0001; F2(1,107) =154.81, p2 < 0.0001, 
true sentences are faster than false sentences: F1(1,35) = 41.93, p1 < 0.001; F2(1,107) 
=26.61, p2 < 0.001.  
RT True False 
Affm 1198 1368 
Neg 1599 1697 
Table 25 RT: two-picture condition, experiment 3 
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Figure 12 RT: two-picture condition, experiment 3 
 
RT analysis by quarters: 
Reaction times for four quarters (summarized in Table 26) is charted in Figure 13. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the changes in TN and FN is not stable over the four 
quarters, differing from the results of experiment 2. 2(polarity) by 2(truth value) 
ANOVA was performed for all four quarters, which revealed a significant interaction 
in the first and fourth quarters (see Table 26 for ANOVA statistics). The results 
suggest that some participants might have adopted the truth-conditional strategy by 
ignoring the un-mentioned object in the pictures.  
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RT per 
quarter 
TA FA TN FN ANOVA  
Statistics, df = 35 
F value P value 
1st 1265 1419 1632 1631 7.41 * 0.01 
2nd 1177 1354 1651 1852 0.64 0.43 
3rd 1194 1297 1553 1667 0.41 0.53 
4th 1156 1427 1589 1650 8.97 * 0.01 
Table 26 RT per quarter: two-picture condition, experiment 3 
 
Figure 13 RT over four quarters: two-picture condition, experiment 3 
 
4.8 Discussion experiment 1, 2 and 3 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 tested the training effect hypothesis and the QUD 
dependence hypothesis using sentences with natural binary predicates. In Part 1 of 
these three experiments, simple negative sentences were verified against one-object 
pictures (as in part 1 of the three experiments). In this condition, TN is initially faster 
than FN. As the experiment proceeds, the difference between TN and FN diminishes. 
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This result supports the training effect hypothesis: with the default strategy, true 
sentences are faster to verify than false ones regardless of their polarity. However, 
the truth-conditional strategy is developed that can lead to a polarity by truth value 
interaction in RT.  
Part 2 of the three experiments test the hypothesis that developing the truth-
functional strategy can be encouraged by the accommodation of a positive but not a 
negative QUD. I first manipulated both sentence forms and the picture context. 
Results from experiment 1 part 2 show that when verifying cleft negative sentences 
against two-object pictures, TN is consistently faster than FN throughout the 
experiment. Interestingly, verifying simple negative sentences against two-object 
pictures gave rise to the same result, suggesting that being a cue for positive QUD is 
not hard-wired in the semantics of sentential negation. Rather, the type and polarity 
of accommodated QUD is sensitive to contextual factors. In this case, participants 
incorporated the picture context, and projected negative QUDs (e.g. which one isn’t 
peeled) just like cleft negatives. In part 2 of experiments 2 and 3, the cleft condition 
is removed, but cleft fillers were added to encourage participants to think about the 
visual images in terms of which one is different. Results continue to show that 
verifying simple negative sentences against two-object pictures leads to a different 
RT pattern from the one-object picture condition. However, participants seem to vary 
between accommodating a positive or negative QUD in the two-object condition, as 
seen in the FN-TN fluctuations in experiment 3 part 2.  
Comparing negatives with positives (experiment 3 only), our results show that 
verifying negative sentence takes longer and incurs more errors than verifying 
positive sentences, which has been found in previous studies. Why do verifying 
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negative sentences involve more effort? I argue that the extra effort involved in the 
default strategy and the truth-functional strategy are contributed by different sources. 
With the default strategy, representing the situation that makes the sentence true 
requires more inferential effort for negative sentences. For example when processing  
a positive  sentence like “the banana is peeled” we can assume that bottom-up 
comprehension processes activate conceptual representations for the predicates 
(‘banana peeled’) and this makes inferring the state of affairs (a peeled banana) 
easier than the process involved for negatives. For negatives, one must draw on extra 
world knowledge to infer what kind of situation might support the truth of the 
utterance. Drawing these kinds of inferences is one source of negative-specific cost. 
In addition, with this strategy, the accommodated positive QUD (e.g. whether the 
banana is peeled) is incongruent with the question posed by the task (e.g. whether it 
is true that the banana is not peeled). Participants must suppress the positive QUD 
(or inferences related to that) which is another source of cost. On the other hand, 
with the truth-functional strategy, participants do not draw inferences from negative 
sentences, and the positive QUD no longer needs to be suppressed. In this case, the 
extra effort comes from switching the response index, as suggested by the rejection 
models. We can see supporting evidence in the reading time changes. In experiment 
3 part 1 (one-object condition), participants who have a bigger drop in reading time 
of negative sentences also have a more pronounced TN < / = FN pattern in the last 
quarter of the experiment, suggesting that when switching from the default strategy 
to the truth-functional strategy, participants save more time in the sentence 
reading/processing stage compared to the positive sentences by opting out from 
inference drawing.   
  165 
Overall, the observed training effect and QUD dependence effect are incompatible 
with current sentence verification models. However, I also failed to replicate the 
classic polarity by truth value RT interaction, which suggests that how quickly 
participants develop the new strategy is likely to be influenced by many factors. First 
of all, in my experiments, natural binary predicates were used (the door isn’t open -> 
the door is closed). Making an inference for such negative sentences should be easier 
than for context-dependent binary predicates (e.g. the star isn’t above the plus -> the 
plus is above the star) or unary predicates. In the latter cases, inference drawing is 
not a frequent procedure and can take more effort than when the predicate is 
naturally binary. Secondly, in Clark and Chase (1972) and Carpenter and Just (1975), 
sentences were shown together with images (although participants may be instructed 
to read the sentence before or after looking at the image). This setup might 
encourage participants to develop the truth functional strategy. Studies (e.g. Hasson 
& Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2006) have found that when 
processing negative sentences, the positive counterpart is initially represented and 
then deactivated.  The deactivation of the positive counterpart coincides with the 
representation of the negation-consistent state of affairs. This deactivation process 
may facilitate the representation of the truth condition of the negative sentence, as 
the two representations are incongruent with each other. Thus, in the case of FN, if 
participants view the sentence (e.g. the banana isn’t peeled) alongside the picture 
representing its positive counterpart (the banana is peeled), it is difficult to deactivate 
this representation, and this promotes the development of the truth functional 
strategy. This could explain the observation in previous studies that a sentence-first 
paradigm tends to get main effect only RT pattern. Experiment 4 tries to replicate 
Clark and Chase (1972) and tests whether the same screen display (as opposed to 
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sequential, sentence first display) and context dependent binary predicates encourage 
the development of the truth functional strategy. Experiment 5 tries to replicate 
Carpenter & Just (1975) to see how strategies develop when the sentence predicates 
are unary. 
4.9 Experiment 4:  Verifying sentences with context-dependent binary 
predicates 
This experiment uses sentences and images like those in (Clark & Chase, 1972). 
Compared to experiment 1, 2 and 3, there are two differences: firstly, in experiment 
4, sentences are presented alongside the image on the same screen, although 
participants were instructed to read the sentence first.  As in Clark & Chase (1972), 
the main RT includes both sentence reading time and picture response time. 
Secondly, instead of natural binary predicates like “open” or “turn on”, experiment 4 
uses “above” and “below” in sentences which denote the relative location of two 
objects. This experiment is done in Chinese
26
.  
Method 
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
40 native Chinese speakers recruited from a Chinese college. All experimental 
sentences were in the form of “A is/isn’t above /below B”, with A and B denoting 
concrete objects such as triangle and circle. In Chinese, such sentence has a slightly 
different word order than in English:  
35) “A (bu)zai B de shangfang/ xiamian”. 
                                                 
26 It is not the aim to compare sentence verification between Chinese and English in this study. 
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36) A (not) locate B particle above/below. 
10 pairs of experimental items were constructed, such as “triangle, circle”. Each pair 
generated 8 experimental sentences (order of items (2) x polarity (2) x “above”/ 
“below” (2)). Accordingly, 10 pairs of experimental pictures were constructed. Each 
pair of pictures presented difference spatial relation between the two objects. All 
together there are 160 sentence-picture combinations. Each participant goes through 
these combinations twice (320 experimental trials in total). The trials are presented 
randomly.  
The procedure is similar to experiment 1, 2 and 3. Participants are shown a sentence 
and a picture containing two items on the same screen. They were instructed to read 
the sentence first. Two keys (counterbalanced among participants) on the keyboard 
have a sticker each saying “yes” (“shi”) or “no” (“fou”). They press one of two keys 
to indicate whether the sentence is true with regard to the picture. Feedback was 
given after each trial (correct or incorrect). There was one short break after every 32 
trials. Each participant went through 326 trials (6 for practice) in total 
Results 
Accuracy 
All participants had an accuracy rate higher than 80%. The overall accuracy was 
93.33%. There is a significant polarity by truth interaction: F(1,39)=6.38, p=0.016. 
In addition, there is a significant main effect of polarity: F(1,39)=48.85, p<0.001. 
Accuracy rate stayed stable over the trials. 
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Accuracy True False 
Affirmative 0.96 0.95 
Negative 0.90 0.93 
Table 27: Accuracy summary: experiment 3 
Reaction time analysis 
Reaction times were converted to Z score for each participant, and outliers were 
identified and eliminated using a cut-off point of 3.29 (p<0.001). In addition, 
reaction times smaller than 1500ms or longer than 7000ms were discarded. This 
procedure removed 6.3% of the data. Only reaction times from correct responses 
were analyzed (this further removed 6.4% of the data). Below is a summary of 
average RT by polarity and truth value. 
RT (ms) True False 
Affirmative 2979 3167 
Negative 3503 3513 
Table 28 RT summary: experiment 4 
Responses are then divided into eight time bins, each containing 40 trails 
(comparable to the length of “quarters” in experiment 2 and 3), summarized and 
charted below: 
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RT in 
8 bins 
TA FA TN FN 
ANOVA polarity by truth, df = 39 
F p 
(uncorrected) 
P (Šidák 
corrected) 
1
st
 3218 3432 3781 3882 2.92 0.10 0.80 
2
nd
 3073 3185 3683 3661 2.68 0.11 0.88 
3
rd
 2987 3271 3578 3539 9.24* 0.004 0.03 
4
th
 2898 3122 3569 3549 1.96 0.17 1 
5
th
 2965 3057 3510 3292 5.29 0.03 0.24 
6
th
 2881 3083 3337 3540 0.99 0.33 1 
7
th
 2960 3082 3263 3366 1.07 0.31 1 
8
th
 2830 3136 3330 3319 7.00 0.01 0.08 
Total 2979 3167 3503 3513 17.9** <0.001 <0.01 
Table 29 RT by time series: experiment 4 
 
Figure 14 RT by time series: experiment 4 
Over the 8 time bins, the RT patterns for TA and FA are consistent (the red line with 
hollow dots is always above the blue line with hollow dots). In comparison, TN and 
FN fluctuated greatly over time. Overall RT for TN is roughly the same as for FN. 
  170 
2(polarity) x 2(truth value) ANOVA tests are performed on the overall RT and RT in 
8 bins. Tests results are summarized in Table 29. We can see that there is a 
significant polarity by truth interaction overall. In the course of 8 time bins, initially 
there is no polarity by truth value interaction. In the first bin, TN is numerically 
faster than TN. However, this is not to say that the patterns show a neat main effect 
to interaction training effect. Rather, there were no consistent polarity by truth value 
patterns in the late phase of the experiment.  
Discussion – experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was designed to incorporate properties of the study in Clark & Chase 
(1972) that Experiments 1, 2 and 3 in this chapter lacked. Compared to the one 
picture conditions in Experiment 1 2 and 3, Experiment 4 presented the sentence and 
image on the same screen rather than sequential presentations. We used only one pair 
of prepositions in the predicates (above/below), which are only binary in the picture 
context. Also the sessions were much longer than experiments 1, 2 and 3. The results 
showed an overall polarity by truth value interaction, although TN was not slower 
than FN. For affirmative sentences, TA was consistently faster than FA. For negative 
sentences, the RT patterns fluctuated greatly. The results haven’t shown a neat 
default strategy to truth functional strategy training effect. In the early phases, there 
was no polarity by truth interaction. In the mid-to-late phases, the interactive pattern 
was not stable.  
The results suggest that participants vary in how quickly the truth functional strategy 
is developed. After the truth functional strategy is development, participants may 
come back to the default strategy. The greater fluctuations in negative sentences 
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compared to affirmative sentences are inconsistent with rejection models or 
conversion model. Rejection models should predict an interactive pattern throughout 
the experiment, while the conversion model should predict a consistent main effect 
only pattern throughout. The data supports the hypothesis that two strategies are and 
can be used in sentence-picture verification.  
Comparing the experiment 4 with experiment 1, 2 and 3, the main difference is the 
overall pattern. Here TN and FN take roughly the same amount of time, while in 
experiment 1, 2 and 3, TN is overall faster than FN. The difference suggest that 
predicates that are not naturally binary (e.g. “A isn’t above B”) encourage the truth 
functional strategy more than natural binary predicates (e.g. the banana isn’t 
peeled”). However, even with the current design, we failed to get a TN<FN RT 
pattern, which seems to favour the proposal that the truth functional strategy is NOT 
the default strategy. Rather, our proposed “default strategy” really IS the default. 
4.10 Experiment 5: verifying negative sentences with unary predicates 
The last experiment in this chapter uses the same materials as Carpenter & Just 
(1975) to investigate the development of the truth-functional strategy when verifying 
negative sentences with unary predicates. According to the training effect hypothesis, 
the default strategy involves inferring the situation that makes a negative sentence 
true. While this is relatively easy to do when the predicate is binary (not open => 
closed), it is difficult or impractical when the predicate is unary (not red => ??). 
Carpenter & Just (1975) used sentences such as “the dots aren’t red” and pictures of 
dots that may be red, green or black. In this case, to infer what the dots should look 
like when they are not red involves deducing the complement set and representing 
two possible situations (dots being either green or black). Thus the default strategy 
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for negative sentences with unary predicates is extremely costly, and therefore the 
truth functional strategy is likely to develop rapidly. Experiment 4 tests this idea by 
looking at the RT pattern over the time course.  
Methods: 
Participants, Materials and Procedure 
40 English native speakers were recruited from the University College London 
subject pool. We used sentences in the form of “The dots are /aren’t colour”, and the 
colour word can be red, black or green. Three pictures of 16 dots covering 600 x 600 
pixels were constructed. All dots in the picture appeared in one colour, which could 
be red, green or black. The background was white. There were 144 trials in total, 
counter balancing sentence polarity, truth value and frequency of the colour term. 
The procedure was the same as experiment 1, 2 and 3. Sentences were shown first, 
followed by a picture on the subsequent screen. The responses to the picture were 
recorded. 
Results 
The overall average accuracy is 93%. ANOVA shows that there is a significant 
polarity by truth value interaction in accuracy: F(1,39) = 12.16, p< 0.001. Paired-
sampled t-tests show that for affirmative items, accuracies for TA and FA do not 
differ (p > 0.53); for negative items, accuracy for TN is significantly lower than for 
FN: t(39) = -3.42, p=0.001. The responses into four time quarters each with 36 trials, 
so that it is comparable to the length of time bins in previous experiments. we can 
see that accuracies for TA, FA and FN stay constant, the accuracy for TN dropped 
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over the four quarters, resulting in a significant difference between accuracies for TN 
and FN in the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 quarters  (see Table 30).  
Accuracy by 
quarter 
TA FA TN FN t-test between TN 
and FN 
t value 
df = 39 
p value 
1 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.93 -0.84 0.41 
2 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.93 -1.35 0.19 
3 0.97 0.96 0.87 0.94 -3.17 0.003 
4 0.96 0.95 0.88 0.93 -2.78 0.008 
Grand Total 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.93   
Table 30 Accuracy by quarters - experiment 5 
RT analysis: 
Mean RTs in each quarter and overall RT per condition are summarized in Table 31 
and charted in Figure 15. ANOVA on overall RT shows that there is a significant 
polarity by truth-value interaction. In addition, ANOVA on each quarter shows that 
the polarity by truth-value interaction is significant in all four quarters (see Table 31 
for ANOVA statistics). This shows that the truth functional strategy is adopted early 
on in the experiment. 
Paired-sampled t-tests on TA and FA shows that TA is highly significantly faster 
than FA across all four quarters. In comparison, although TN is overall significantly 
slower than FN, in the first quarter and surprisingly in the last quarter, TN is not 
significantly slower than FN (see Table 31 for t-test statistics). The contrast between 
a stable TA vs. FA pattern and unstable TN vs. FN pattern suggests that even for 
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negative sentences with unary predicates, the truth-functional strategy can take some 
time to develop and it might not be the only strategy used. 
RT by 
quarte
rs 
TA FA 
Paired t-test  
TA vs. FA, 2 tailed TN FN 
Paired t-test  
TN vs. FN, 2 
tailed 
ANOVA polarity 
by truth, df = 39 
t p t p F p 
1st 785 1023 -8.1*** <0.001 1190 1164 0.8 0.44 25.4*** <0.001 
2nd 778 939 -6.1*** <0.001 1215 1144 2.2* 0.03 25.4*** <0.001 
3rd 726 977 -7.7*** <0.001 1157 1049 2.2* 0.04 29.6*** <0.001 
4th 696 877 -5.8*** <0.001 1097 1027 1.6 0.12 20.9*** <0.001 
Total 746 954 -10.4*** <0.001 1165 1095 2.8** <0.01 65.4*** 
< 
0.0001 
Table 31 RT for four quarters: experiment 5 
 
Figure 15 RT for four quarters: experiment 5 
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Discussion: experiment 5 
Experiment 5 tested the verification of sentences with unary predicates. The results 
show that a polarity by truth-value interaction pattern in RT is present from early on 
in the experiment. While TA is faster than FA, TN is overall slower than FN, 
replicating results of Carpenter & Just (1975). However, TN is not consistently 
slower than FN over the time course. Given that the difference between TA and FA 
is stable and highly significant throughout the experiment, if the truth-functional 
strategy is the only one available, we would have seen a stable TN>FN pattern. The 
results thus suggest that verifying negative sentences with unary predicates 
encourages the development of the truth functional strategy more than verifying 
negative sentences with binary predicates, although participants could still use the 
default strategy.  
4.11 General Discussion:  
This chapter explores the effect of negation in sentence-picture verification tasks. 
Previous studies consistently found that verifying affirmative sentences is faster than 
verifying negative sentences, and that true affirmatives (TA) are faster than false 
affirmatives (FA). However, with negative sentences, findings point in different 
directions. While many reported  TN > FN in terms of response time, some reported 
TN = FN, or TN < FN.  Rejection accounts (e.g. Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & 
Chase, 1972) propose that negative sentences are represented as the rejection of their 
positive counterpart, i.e. as a positive argument embedded under the negation 
operator. For example, the sentence “the door is not open” is represented as “Not (the 
door is open)” – the rejection of “the door is open”. Therefore, when verifying a 
negative sentence, participants first verify its positive argument and then flip the 
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truth index. As a result, the RT pattern for negative sentences should resemble the 
RT for the affirmative sentence with the opposite truth value. As TA is faster than 
FA, TN should be slower than FN. On the other hand, the conversion model 
(Trabasso & Rollins, 1971) suggests that negative sentences should be converted and 
represented in a positive format whenever possible. This account predicts that true 
sentences, whether they are affirmative or negative, should be faster than false ones. 
The predicate dependence model (Mayo et al., 2004) proposes that negative 
sentences with unary predicates are represented as a positive argument plus a 
negative operator, while those with binary predicates are converted to affirmative 
sentences. This account predicates TN > FN when the predicates are unary, and TN 
< FN when the predicates are binary.  
I propose that two strategies can be used when verifying negative sentences against 
pictures: the default strategy (akin to the conversion model) and the truth functional 
strategy (akin to models proposed by the rejection accounts). I set out with two 
hypotheses on the verification of negative sentences: 
Hypothesis 1 (the training effect hypothesis): the default strategy is to infer and 
represent the situation that makes the sentence true, and compare this representation 
with the evidence. This gives rise to the pattern TN<FN. As training proceeds, 
participants may develop the task-specific truth functional strategy, which will lead 
to the RT pattern TN>FN. 
Hypothesis 2 (the QUD dependence hypothesis): the development of the truth 
functional strategy is encouraged by the accommodation of positive QUDs. A 
prominent positive QUD encourages the development of the truth-functional 
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strategy, while a prominent negative QUD doesn’t. The former triggers an interactive 
RT pattern after some training while the latter gives rise to a main effect only pattern 
throughout the experiment.  
Five experiments were done to test these hypotheses. Experiment 1 – 3 used 
sentences with natural binary predicates (e.g. the banana isn’t peeled). When the 
pictures contain a single object, TN is faster than FN in the early but not the late 
phase of the experiment. Overall, there was no polarity by truth-value interaction in 
RT; rather, we found TA<FA<TN<FN. When the pictures contain two-objects (e.g. a 
peeled banana and a whole orange), TN is faster than FN throughout the experiment, 
although in experiment 3 there were some fluctuations in the differences between TN 
and FN.  
Experiment 4 used sentences with context dependent binary predicates (e.g. the star 
is not above the plus), and presented the sentences and the pictures on the same 
screen. The results still showed a main effect only pattern in the first 40 trials 
(TA<FA<TN<FN), but very quickly an interactive pattern developed. Overall, the 
RT pattern was TN<FA<TN=FN. Experiment 5 used sentences with unary 
predicates, such as “the dots aren’t red” against dots in red, green or black, thus 
making the predicates unary. Results showed an overall polarity by truth value 
interaction (TA<FA<FN<TN), and the interaction pattern developed early on in the 
experiment, suggesting that unary predicates encourages the truth functional strategy 
more than binary predicates.  
Overall, results from these five experiments support the training effect hypothesis 
and the QUD dependence hypothesis. Contrary to reported findings in Clark and 
Chase (1972) and Carpenter and Just (1975), in our studies, the TN > FN pattern was 
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difficult to obtain (found only in experiment 5), suggesting that the default strategy 
rather than the truth functional strategy is the favored strategy for negative sentence-
picture verification.  
The findings have raised questions for future research. I discuss here two questions:  
(I) Individual variations: my results show that the dynamic pragmatic account cannot 
fully account for individual variations in strategies adopted in negative sentence 
verification. Time course analysis in long experiments (experiments 3, 4 and 5) 
shows that participants do not all first use the default strategy and then stick to the 
truth-functional strategy. Some participants seem to use the default strategy all the 
way, some develop the truth-functional strategy immediately, and some seem to be 
switching back and forth between the two. What factors influence individual 
differences in strategy development? In the two-object picture studies, while most 
participants seem to have used the default strategy throughout, some participants 
seem to have failed to incorporate the picture context and instead accommodated a 
positive QUD. What factors influence the projection of the prominent QUD?  
(II) Why are true affirmatives easier to verify than false affirmatives? This finding 
has been reported in almost all previous verification studies, and has been seen 
consistently in the current study. Perhaps due to the intuitive nature of this effect, 
few theories have been proposed. Gilbert (1991) proposed that when we comprehend 
language, we accept or believe its content by default. Rejection comes as an effortful 
second step. Gilbert discussed several pieces of evidence that support this theory. 
The denial function of negation is one of the last linguistic abilities to be mastered by 
a child (Bloom, 1970). When people are cognitively deprived, they tend to accept 
statements unconditionally. A study by Gilbert, Krull, & Malone (1990) asked 
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participants to learn fictitious vocabulary by reading sentences containing them (e.g. 
a monishna is an armadillo), followed by a word that informed them whether the 
sentence was true or false. After some trials, participants had to quickly identify a 
music tone, which temporarily increased their cognitive load. They found that 
reduced cognitive resources lead participants to believe that false statements are true, 
but did not lead them to believe that true statements were false. These findings 
suggest that rejection might involve separate cognitive processes compared to 
acceptance.  
This idea is in line with the truth-condition theory of sentence representation (Dowty, 
Wall, & Peters, 1981; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rips & Marcus, 1977). Johnson-Laird 
said that to comprehend a proposition one must “imagine how the world should be 
granted its truth” (Johnson-Laird, 1983: 110). Rips and Marcus (1977) said that 
comprehension of a sentence involves “creating a temporary context in which the 
sentence is true” (p.192). However, there is a gap between representing the sentence 
truth condition and believing that the sentence IS true. In sentence verification tasks, 
participants do have to compare the representation of the sentence against the 
pictures, and make a conscious decision about the sentence truth value. This idea 
cannot satisfactorily explain the TA<FA pattern in verification studies.    
Another potential explanation is that response particles to polar questions each refer 
to a proposition of the relative polarity. For example, when answering “whether the 
banana is peeled”, “yes” refers to the proposition “the banana is peeled” and “no” 
refers to proposition “the banana isn’t peeled”. To falsify a positive sentence, we 
need to verify its negative counterpart, which involves inferring the situations that 
makes the negative proposition true. As proposed earlier, inferring the truth 
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condition for a negative sentence is more costly than for a positive sentence. Overall, 
why verification is faster than falsification requires further research.  
4.12 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter argues that when verifying negative sentences against 
pictures, two strategies can be used. The default strategy is to infer and represent the 
situation that makes the sentence true and compare it with the evidence. In addition, 
participants may develop a task-specific truth-functional strategy, in which 
participants verify the accommodated positive QUD, and then switch the truth index. 
The default strategy leads to a TN < FN pattern in RT, while the truth functional 
strategy leads to a TN > FN pattern. The default strategy seems to be the favoured 
strategy during sentence-picture verification when the sentence predicates are binary. 
Whether the truth-functional strategy is developed depends (at least in part) on the 
polarity of the accommodated QUD. Only positive QUDs encourage the truth-
functional strategy.  
My next question is, when does QUD accommodation happen during negative 
sentence processing? At what point is the meaning of negation incorporated? Chapter 
5 investigates the time course of negative sentence processing.  
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Chapter 5 The time-course of negation processing  
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 1, we saw that in research into negative sentence processing, across a 
range of different paradigms, results very often point to the conclusion that 
participants represent the positive counterpart of negation while performing their 
task, especially in the early stages of processing. Specifically, responses in sentence 
verification tasks (Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975), probe recognition 
tasks (Hovland & Weiss, 1953), ERP studies (Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & 
Perry, 1983; Lüdtke, Friedrich, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2008) and mouse-tracking tasks 
(Dale & Duran, 2011) strongly suggest that a representation the positive counterpart 
of negation is employed in the process. For example, in probe recognition studies 
Kaup et al. (2006, 2007) found that after reading a negative sentence such as “the 
bird was not in the air”, participants responded faster to an image of a flying bird 
than one of a bird at rest at 250ms ISI but not at 1500ms ISI. A study by Hasson and 
Glucksberg, (2006) on the processing of negative metaphors found that 150ms or 
500ms after reading a negative sentence like “this lawyer is not a shark”, participants 
were faster at making a lexical decision on a probe related to the positive counterpart 
(vicious) than one that is related to the negative sentence meaning (gentle). At 
1000ms, the pattern is reversed. They conclude that negations are initially 
represented as their positive counterpart, and it takes between 500ms to 1000ms to 
arrive at the negation-consistent meaning. 
While it seems that participants do sometimes represent the positive counterpart to 
complete these tasks, many studies suggest that they do not always. In the ERP 
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literature, Nieuwland & Kuperberg (2008) show that contextually felicitous True 
Negatives do not give rise to an N400 effect compared to either True Affirmatives or 
False Negatives. Similarly, Dale & Duran (2011, Experiment 2&3) indicate that the 
more contextual support the negatives sentences have, the less the tendency to 
consider the positive counterpart. fMRI studies on negation (Tettamanti et al., 2008; 
Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010) show that while reading a positive sentence with 
action verbs (e.g. ‘grip’, ‘clasp’) activates the motor brain regions, negation 
modulates this activity. Specifically, negative sentences tend to show decreased 
activation relative to positive counterparts. Finally, I have shown in Chapter 3 that 
when we change the negative sentence form but not the propositional content, 
participants no longer respond faster to the picture consistent with the positive 
counterpart. 250ms after reading a cleft negative sentence such as “It is John who 
hasn’t ironed his shirt”, participants responded faster to a picture consistent with the 
negative sentence meaning (crumpled shirt) than a picture consistent with the 
positive counterpart (ironed shirt). I argued that the change of linguistic form to a 
cleft sentence causes a change of accommodated QUD from positive to negative.  
Why is the positive counterpart often represented during negation processing? As 
discussed in Chapter 1, there are two perspectives in the literature: rejection accounts 
and contextual views. Rejection accounts draws from the function of negation as an 
external truth-function operator. Negation reverses the truth value of its embedded 
proposition. Based on this function, rejection accounts state that a negative sentence 
is represented by multiple constituents, namely the negation operator and its positive 
argument. In the course of sentence comprehension or verification, participants first 
represent the embedded argument, and then reject it or reverse its truth value. Both 
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propositional theories (Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975) and the two-
step simulation theory (Kaup, Zwaan, et al., 2007) follow the idea of “rejection”, 
although they differ in how the constituents are represented. These theories explain 
why the positive counterpart is activated in the first place and that this is the cause of 
the extra difficulty of negation which is often reported in the psycholinguistics 
literature. They also claim that processing is initially insensitive to negation. By 
contrast, the contextual perspective, stemming from Wason (1965), suggests that 
with the right kind of contextual support, negative sentences are not difficult. In this 
tradition, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) suggest that, with the right contextual 
support, the positive counterpart need not be represented for comprehension. Similar 
conclusions are drawn in Dale & Duran (2011). Contextual views explain why the 
positive counterpart is sometimes not activated when processing a negative sentence. 
What seems to be missing from the contextual perspective is an explicit account of 
why the positive counterpart is sometimes represented when we process negative 
sentences. This is provided by the dynamic pragmatic account: the positive 
counterpart of a negative sentence is sometimes represented due to QUD 
accommodation. I argued in Chapter 2 that negation is a cue for retrieving a 
prominent positive QUD. Without other relevant cues or context, participants 
processing a negative sentence not p infer that the most likely QUD is whether p. For 
example, for a simple negative sentence such as “John hasn’t ironed his shirt”, its 
most prominent QUD is whether John has ironed his shirt. As most studies presented 
participants with sentences without context, they reported the representation of the 
positive counterpart when processing a negative sentence because of the 
accommodation of a positive QUD. However, if the linguistic form of a negative 
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sentence or some features of the context project a negative QUD, participants will no 
longer represent the positive counterpart. For example, for a cleft negative sentence 
“It is John who hasn’t ironed his shirt”, the most prominent QUD is “who hasn’t 
ironed their shirt”. In this case, comprehenders do not first activate the representation 
of an ironed shirt.  
5.2 The Current study 
The current study investigates when QUD accommodation occurs, and at what point 
the meaning of negation is incorporated. We compare the time course of 
representations during the processing of positive and negative sentences, using a 
visual world eyetracking paradigm.  
Prior studies in visual world eyetracking found that even without any metalinguistic 
task, participants shift their visual attention around the scene as the linguistic stimuli 
unfold (Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Altmann & Steedman, 1988; R.M. Cooper, 1974; 
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; for a comprehensive 
review on the visual world paradigm, see Huettig, Rommers, & Meyer, 2011). 
Altmann and colleagues (G. Altmann & Kamide, 1999, 2007) found evidence that 
language-mediated eye movements are anticipatory, and they correspond to a 
dynamically changing representation of events. Altmann et al. (2007) presented 
participants with semi-realistic visual scenes such as a man standing next to a table 
with an empty wine glass, a full beer glass and some distractors, while listening to a 
sentence such as “the man will drink all of the beer” or “the man has drunk all of the 
wine”. They found that participants shifted their visual attention to the full beer glass 
or empty wine glass before the onset of the critical noun “beer” or “wine”. Follow up 
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studies, such as in Altmann & Kamide (2007) show that eye-gaze around visual 
scenes is driven by more than low-level associations between lexical items (‘eat’) 
and images (of edible objects). In Altmann & Kamide (2007), participants hear 
sentences like, ‘The man will drink all of the wine’ or ‘The man has drunk all of the 
beer’. The visual display contains a full glass (of wine) and an empty beer glass 
among other distractors. Altmann & Kamide show that participants’ gazes favour the 
full glass in the future tense condition and the empty glass in the perfect tense 
condition. This shows that participants incrementally update their representation of 
events by composing the meaning of the tense (future vs. perfect) with the verb.   
This paradigm provides us with a tool to study the time course of the processing of 
negative sentences compared to their positive counterparts. If the negative particle 
‘not’ is processed on line by composing its meaning with the meanings of the noun 
phrases and verbs around it in the sentence, we should see evidence for this in where 
participants look around a visual scene. This paradigm should provide insight into 
whether participants first represent the positive counterpart of negation, under what 
conditions they do so, and for how long.  Specifically, we are interested in if, when, 
and for how long the representation of the positive counterpart is activated when 
hearing a simple negative such as 38b), or a cleft negative such as 39b). Also we 
want to see if the processing of simple and cleft negative sentences are delayed 
compared to their positive counterparts such as 1) and 39), and at what point is the 
meaning of negation integrated. 
38a) John has ironed his brother’s shirt. 
38b) John hasn’t ironed his brother’s shirt. 
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39a) It is John who has ironed his brother’s shirt. 
39b) It is John who hasn’t ironed his brother’s shirt. 
Positive sentences like 38a) and 39) imply that the current state of the shirt is 
smooth, while their negative versions 38b) and 39b) imply that the shirt is crumpled. 
Following Altmann and Kamide (2007), in the current study, participants hear 
sentences while looking at a visual scene containing the representation of the implied 
state (the target) and the representation of the opposite state (the competitor). 
According to rejection accounts, both 38b) and 39b) should be processed by first 
representing the positive argument (John has ironed his brother’s shirt), thus 
predicting a delayed gaze to target in 38b) relative to 1), and similarly in 39b) 
relative to 39a)39). For both 38b) and 39b), attention should first be directed to the 
representation of the positive argument (competitor), before being shifted to the 
target. However, the dynamic pragmatic account predicts a delay in 38b) relative to 
1), but reduced or no delay in 39b) relative to 39a).     
5.3 Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants between the age of 19 and 36 were recruited from University 
College London via an online psychological subject pool, 20 were female. They 
participated either for course credit or £4. All participants speak English as a native 
language. They have uncorrected or corrected to normal vision.  
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Materials 
This experiment has a two by two within participant design. The two independent 
variables are polarity and cleft-ness. These two variables generate four experimental 
conditions: simple affirmative, simple negative, cleft affirmative and cleft negative. 
40 experimental items were constructed. The predicate of an experimental sentence 
always implies that the item is in two different states before and after the event. 
Experimental sentences are in the form of “(It is) Name (who) has/hasn’t verb his/her 
someone’s noun”. For example, “Matt hasn’t shut his dad’s window” (simple) or “It 
is Matt who hasn’t shut his dad’s window” (cleft). Note that we added words such as 
“his dad’s” in between the verb and target noun, because studies (Altmann & 
Kamide, 2007 experiemnt 1; Barr, 2008) have shown that upon hearing a word, the 
semantic priming effect can temporarily interfere with the integration of linguistic 
stimuli with anticipatory event representation or contextual information. 
Each experimental item generates four sentences. Four lists were created, each 
containing 40 experimental sentences.  Each item only appears once in a list. In 
addition, there are 40 fillers, among which half were affirmative, half were negative. 
Half indicate the beginning state of an event (will and should have), while the other 
half indicate the end state of an event (shouldn’t have). After 20 sentences (10 
experimental), there was a comprehension question. The aim was to check whether 
the participants understood the content of the sentence. For example, for filler “Tom 
has fixed his uncle’s fridge”, the question was “is Tom’s uncle’s fridge still broken?”  
Each participant heard 80 sentences (see Table 32 for examples). 
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Exp./ 
Filler 
Condition Cleft 
Number 
of items 
Example 
Exp. 
 
has 
simple 
10 Anna has closed her mom's umbrella. 
hasn't 10 Matt hasn't shut his dad's window. 
has 
cleft 
10 It is James who has blown up his cousin's balloon. 
hasn't 10 It is Lilly who hasn't cracked her sister's egg. 
Filler 
 
will 
simple 5 Bob will chop his father's wood. 
cleft 5 Andrew will ride his father's horse. 
should 
have 
simple 5 Bill should have wrapped the birthday present. 
cleft 5 
It is Lucy who should have watered her Dad's 
flower. 
shouldn’t 
have 
simple 10 Eva shouldn't have scratched her brother's CD. 
cleft 10 It is Betty who shouldn't have cut her friend's rope. 
  
Total 80 
 
Table 32 Design and examples of experimental and filler sentences 
Sentences were recorded by a male speaker of Southeast British English. The 
speaker was instructed to read all sentences with a natural intonation, while putting a 
stress on "has" or "hasn't" for simple sentences, and on the name (e.g. John) for cleft 
sentences. Note that in cleft sentences, "hasn't" received a secondary stress, but "has" 
did not. This was not instructed.  
Each experimental item and each filler sentence is paired with a visual scene 
consisting of five items: a person (which matches the gender of the name), 
two critical images and two distractors (see Figure 16 for an example). The two 
critical images include a target and a competitor. The target represents the implied 
state of the item, while the competitor represents the opposite state. For example, for 
the sentence “Matt hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, the target is an open window and 
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the competitor is a shut window. The target for a negative sentence is the competitor 
for the positive counterpart. The two distractors are images of an item in two states 
(for example a plain bagel and a bagel with cream cheese), so that participants will 
not be able to predict the verb before hearing it. All pictures of the person measures 
150*250 pixels. All pictures of four items measure 250*250 pixels. The screen 
resolution is 1024 * 768 pixels. The picture of the person is always in the centre of 
the screen. Target, competitor and two distractors are located in the four corners of 
the screen but the exact location of each is random.  
 
Figure 16 Example visual scene 
Procedure:  
The experiment was conducted using E-Prime software and a Tobii X60 eye-tracker. 
Participants were calibrated at the beginning of the experiment. Head movements 
were not restricted but participants were asked to stay still as much as possible for 
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the duration of the experiment. Before each trial, there was a fixation cross in the 
centre of the screen, and participants' eye gaze had to be identified for a continuous 3 
seconds before the trial started. Then a scene with five images appeared on the 
screen. Participants had one second to preview the images, and the audio stimuli 
started after the preview. During the audio, the participants were instructed to simply 
listen and look at the images. The sentences last an average of 3.04 seconds (standard 
deviation 0.37 seconds. Minimum length 2.31 seconds, maximum length 4.35 
seconds). Eye movements were recorded for 6 seconds for each trial. For 20 out of 
80 sentences, a comprehension question appeared on the screen after the sentence, 
and participants pressed either the "yes" or "no" key to answer the question (they are 
1 and 0, with stickers which says "yes" or "no"). The whole experiment lasted 
approximately 25 minutes. 
5.4 Data Analysis and Results 
 Analysis of audio stimuli 5.4.1
The onset and offset for each word in every experimental audio stimulus is hand 
marked using phonetics analysis software Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2013), with 
a millisecond resolution. For the analysis, we are interested in the main verb, post-
verb silence, possessive pronouns ("his" or "her"), second possessive, such as 
"brother's" or "friend's", and the final noun. Table 33 shows the mean and standard 
deviation of duration for each of these words in milliseconds.  
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Average word 
length in ms 
verb 
post-verb 
silence 
his/her someone's noun 
Simple 
     
Has 504 222 169 424 546 
Hasnt 501 151 169 441 577 
Cleft 
     
Has 438 10 174 420 549 
Hasnt 467 38 175 419 578 
Table 33 Average word lengths in ms for key regions 
Between positive and negative simple sentences, there is no significant difference in 
the duration of verb (t=0.34, p=0.74), "his"/"her" (t= -0.16, p=0.87), someone's (t=-
1.96, p=0.06), or noun (t=-1.83, p=0.07). There is a significant difference in the 
duration of post-verb silence (t=2.98, p=0.02).  
Between positive and negative cleft sentences, there is no significant difference in 
the duration of "his"/"her" (t=-0.17, p=0.87), or "someone's" (t=0.22, p=0.83). 
However there is a significant difference in the duration of verb (t=-2.65, p=0.01), in 
post-verb silence (t=-0.25, p=0.02), and in noun (t=-0.25, p=0.01).  
Comparing simple and cleft sentences, there is a significant difference in the duration 
of verb. On average the verbs in simple sentences are 49 ms (t=-6.23, p<0.001) 
longer than cleft. Post-verb silence in simple sentence is 158 ms longer than in cleft 
(t= - 11.78, p<0.001). There is no significant difference in the duration of "his"/"her" 
(t= 1.35, p=0.18), someone's (t=-1.94, p=0.06), or noun (t=0.21, p=0.84). 
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  Analysis of eye-movements – main analysis 5.4.2
Fixations that landed within the coordinates of the target and competitor 
are analyzed against key time periods in the audio stimuli. Fixations that landed 
within the coordinates of two distractors and the image of the person are also 
extracted. Any fixations deemed invalid due to blinking or head movements were 
removed. Any fixations shorter than 80 ms were excluded, as extremely short 
fixations are often due to false saccade planning (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989). Table 
34 summarizes the percentages of looks to each area across different word regions.  
We are interested in the anticipatory looks to the target compared to the competitor 
after the verb. I calculated natural log ratio of percentage of looks to target over 
competitor: Ln (Ptarget/Pcompetitor). “Ln” refers to natural log, Ptarget refers to the 
percentage of looks to target image, and Pcompetitor refers to the percentage of looks to 
the competitor image. When the log ratio is 0, there is equal percentage of looks to 
target and competitor. When the log ratio is above 0, there is a bias towards target, 
and when below 0, there is a bias towards competitor.  
Figure 17 (simple) and Figure 18 (cleft) plot the log ratios in 17ms increments (the 
eye tracker runs at 60Hz), from the verb to the end of the sentence. Figure 19 
(simple) and Figure 20 (cleft) plot the percentages of looks to the target and the 
competitor. With regard to the example sentence “(It is) Matt (who) hasn’t shut this 
dad’s window”, the graphs covers before, during and after the section “shut his dad’s 
window”. The regions are named as verb, [pause], his, someone’s, and noun. The 
average onset and offset of key regions are marked with vertical lines. Note that for 
all plots and data analysis, word regions have been offset by 200ms, as it takes 
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around 200ms to launch an eye-movement (Hallett, 1986). As sentences differ in 
their onsets and offsets of words, the curves in all figures are resynchronized at the 
onset of each word, so that the graph more accurately reflects the evolving visual 
biases relative to the audio stimuli (Altmann & Kamide, 2009).  
Percentage of looks by condition verb 
[SIL] & 
“his/her” 
someone's noun 
Simple Positive 
target 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.35 
competitor 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 
target & competitor Total 0.26 0.38 0.45 0.51 
person 0.29 0.2 0.16 0.14 
distractors 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.16 
Simple Negative 
target 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.32 
competitor 0.11 0.21 0.2 0.2 
target & competitor Total 0.26 0.42 0.47 0.52 
person 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.14 
distractors 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.16 
Cleft Positive 
target 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.38 
competitor 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.16 
target & competitor Total 0.25 0.29 0.41 0.54 
person 0.3 0.28 0.23 0.14 
distractors 0.29 0.25 0.2 0.15 
Cleft Negative 
target 0.14 0.2 0.26 0.31 
competitor 0.15 0.2 0.19 0.19 
target & competitor Total 0.29 0.4 0.45 0.5 
person 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.13 
distractors 0.28 0.2 0.19 0.18 
 Table 34 Percentage of looks to target, competitor, person and distractors for all 
conditions in key regions 
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Figure 17 Log ratio of percentage of looks to target over competitor for positive and 
negative conditions - simple 
 
Figure 18 Log ratio of percentage of looks to target over competitor for positive and 
negative conditions - cleft 
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Figure 19 Percentage of looks to target and competitor for positive and negative – 
simple 
 
Figure 20 Percentage of looks to target and competitor for positive and negative - cleft 
I averaged the target over competitor log ratios in key regions both by participant and 
by item. Statistical tests are applied on these average log ratios. Note that both Ptarget 
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and Pcompetitor have a distribution over a closed interval of [0,1]. When either 
measurement is 0, it is a problem for log transformation. In this case, I transformed 0 
values using the function y = [y(N – 1) + s]/N (Mckinstry et al., 2008). y is the 
transformed value, y is the original value.  N is the sample size and s is a constant 
between 0 and 1. From a Bayesian point of view, s acts as if we are taking a prior 
into account. 0.5 is recommended as a reasonable choice for s. This function 
“squeezes” the values into an open interval (0,1).  
Let us inspect the results in the graphs. For simple sentences (Figure 17) there is a 
difference in log ratios between positive and negative from the offset of the verb to 
the offset of the noun. For positives, a bias towards target was formed immediately 
after the verb. For negatives, however, there are a roughly equal amount of looks to 
the target and the competitor after the verb, in the “post-verb silence and his” 
regions. A target bias was developed later, but nevertheless before the onset of the 
noun. We can see the patterns from a different point of view in Figure 19 which plots 
percentages of looks to the target (solid line) and the competitor (dotted line) for 
simple sentences. For positives (blue), looks to the target but not the competitor rise 
after the verb. The two blue lines diverge at around the offset of the verb. For 
negatives (red), looks to both the target and the competitor rise after the verb. This 
indicates that negation triggers an inference from the positive counterpart. However, 
participants did not first focus on the competitor and then shift their attention to the 
target. Paired sampled t-tests on log ratios show that there is a significant difference 
between positive and negative in “post-verb silence and his” region, “someone’s” 
region and noun region (see Table 35).  
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In the case of cleft sentences (Figure 18), there is no difference in log ratios between 
positive and negative from the offset of verb to the onset of noun. In this region, 
participants were paying comparable attention to the target and the competitor. 
Percentage plot for cleft (Figure 20) shows that for both positive and negative, looks 
to target and competitor diverge after the offset of “his”. Paired sampled t-tests on 
log ratios (see Table 35) show that there is no difference between positive and 
negative in “post-verb silence and his” region and “someone’s” region. In the noun 
region, the difference is significant by subject only.   
Comparing simple and cleft sentences, between the offset of verb and the onset of 
noun, there is a difference between positive and negative for simple but not cleft 
sentences. In order to test whether this interactive pattern is significant, we need to 
extract a fixed length window from the offset of verb for both simple and cleft 
sentences. This is because the post-verb silence region for cleft is shorter than that 
for simple by 160ms, thus regions defined by word boundaries are not ideal for 
comparison between simple and cleft, as different amounts of time elapsed after the 
verb. I therefore extracted a 449ms window from the offset of verb for all items. This 
is the shortest gap between the offset of verb and the onset of noun among all items. 
As before, I calculated the average natural log ratio of percentages of looks to target 
over competitor in the post-verb 449ms window. I performed a cleftness (2) by 
polarity (2) ANOVA, which shows that there is a significant cleftness by polarity 
interaction. F1(1,35)=8.19, p=0.007. F2(1,38)=6.16, p=0.018. 
Finally, in order to determine whether there are significantly more looks to the target 
than the competitor, i.e. whether the averaged log ratio is significantly bigger than 
zero, I performed one-sampled t-tests comparing log ratios with zero for key regions 
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(Table 36). We can see that for cleft sentences, positive and negative show similar 
patterns. Bias to target is significant in “someone’s” and noun regions. For simple 
sentences, positives show a significant bias to target immediately after verb. For 
negatives, bias to target only becomes significant in the “noun” region.   
In addition to comparing looks to the target versus the competitor, I also analyzed 
whether the combined percentage of looks to both the target and the competitor 
differs between positive and negative sentences. Previous studies (Fischler et al., 
1983; Lüdtke et al., 2008) suggest that negation reduces the activation level of words 
under its scope. In our paradigm, this effect might shift participants’ attention away 
from pictures of the negated concept all together, and towards the picture of the 
person and distractors. For example, we might expect less combined looks to the 
open and closed windows in negative sentences than positive sentences. However, 
this prediction is not borne out. By simply inspecting Table 34 we can see 
percentages of total looks to the target and competitor are similar among all 
conditions and across almost all regions. Repeated measure one-way ANOVA shows 
that the only region where there is a significant difference among conditions is the 
[SIL]&”his/her” region (F1(3,35) = 7.46, p1 <0.01; F2(3, 38) =4.12, p2=0.008). 
Paired-sampled t-tests in this region show that there is no difference between simple 
positive and negative: t1=-1.26, p1=0.22; t2=-0.28, p2=0.78, but there is a significant 
difference between cleft positive and negative: t1=-3.46, p1=0.001; t2=-2.52, p2=0.02. 
Note however this region is much shorter in cleft conditions (average 195ms) 
compared to simple conditions (average 355ms), due to a difference in the length of 
post-verb silence. Therefore we should not read too much into the difference 
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between cleft positive and negative in such a short region (the difference might be 
due to random fluctuations).   
 By subject  By item 
Simple df t1 p (2-tailed) 
 
df t2 p (2-tailed) 
verb 35 -0.898 0.376 
 
38 -0.749 0.459 
SIL&his 35 3.203** 0.003 
 
38 2.195* 0.034 
someone’s 35 4.518*** 6.82E-05 
 
38 2.995** 0.005 
noun 35 3.256** 0.003 
 
38 2.435* 0.020 
Cleft 
    
   
verb 35 0.715 0.479 
 
38 0.529 0.600 
SIL&his 35 0.399 0.692 
 
38 0.026 0.979 
someone’s 35 0.209 0.836 
 
38 1.226 0.228 
noun 35 3.223** 0.003 
 
38 1.738 0.090 
Table 35 paired sample t-tests on log ratio between positive and negative  
  200 
   
By subject 
   
By item 
 
Simple  df t1 
p (2-
tailed) 
 df t2 p (2-tailed) 
A verb 35 0.277 0.783  38 0.218 0.829 
 SIL & his 35 4.540
***
 6.381E-05  38 3.338
**
 0.002 
 someone's 35 7.078
***
 3.028E-08  38 6.200
***
 3.03E-07 
 noun 35 4.858
***
 2.47E-05  38 5.587
***
 2.10E-06 
N verb 35 1.617 0.115  38 1.368 0.179 
 SIL & his 35 -0.180 0.858  38 -0.576 0.568 
 someone's 35 0.919 0.364  38 1.875 0.068 
 noun 35 3.153
**
 0.003  38 3.146
**
 0.003 
Cleft         
A verb 35 -0.166 0.869 
 
38 0.143 0.887 
 
SIL & his 35 0.194 0.847 
 
38 -0.504 0.610 
 
someone's 35 2.634
*
 0.012 
 
38 2.492
*
 0.017 
 
noun 35 5.815
***
 1.35E-06 
 
38 6.171
***
 3.316E-07 
N verb 35 -1.499 0.143 
 
38 -0.674 0.505 
 
SIL & his 35 -0.368 0.715 
 
38 -0.613 0.544 
 
someone's 35 3.034
**
 0.005 
 
38 1.605 0.117 
 
noun 35 3.200
**
 0.003 
 
38 3.158
**
 0.003 
Table 36 one sample t-test comparing log ratios with zero on all conditions 
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 Timecourse analysis 5.4.3
In order to determine when exactly a target bias was established, we conducted a 
time-course analysis on a one-second time period from the offset of the verb. We 
divided this period into ten 100ms time slices, and calculated a target/competitor 
natural log ratio for each condition. Figure 21 and Figure 22 plot the averaged log 
ratios for 10 time slices from the offset of verb, for simple sentences and cleft 
sentences respectively. They show that shortly after the verb (in the first 5 slices), log 
ratios differ greatly between simple positives and negative, but are almost identical 
between cleft positive and negative. Later on (from slice 6 onwards), log ratios of 
positive and negative differ in both the simple condition and the cleft condition.  We 
performed an overall time (10) by clefting (2) by polarity (2) three-way ANOVA, 
and time (10) by polarity (2) ANOVAs for simple sentences and cleft sentences 
separately. Over 10 time slices, the time by clefting by polarity interaction is 
significant by participant: F1(9,315)= 2.8, p=0.04, ηp
2
= 0.074; F2(9,342)= 1.54, p= 
0.20, ηp
2
= 0.04. Looking at simple and cleft sentences separately, for simple 
sentences there is a significant time by polarity interaction: F1(9,315)= 2.42, p= 
0.036, ηp
2
 = 0.45; F2(9,342)=2.47, p=0.03, ηp
2
= 0.43.  For cleft sentences, the time by 
polarity interaction is not significant (but trending by participants): F1(9,315)=2.22, 
p=0.053, ηp
2
= 0.43; F2(9,342)=1.09 p=0.4, ηp
2
= 0.25.  
To determine the point at which a reliable target bias is formed, we performed one-
sampled t-tests comparing log ratios with zero for each time slice (Table 37, 
reporting both the original p values and the Šidák corrected p values). Results show 
that for simple positive sentences, the target bias was significant from 200ms after 
the offset of the verb. For simple negatives, the target bias has trending significance 
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only in the 10
th
 time slice (see Figure 21). For cleft sentences, the target bias 
becomes significant in the 6
th
 time slice for cleft positives (trending in the 5
th
). For 
cleft negatives, the target bias is significant by subject in the 6
th
 and 7
th
 slices and 
significant by item in the 9
th
 slice (see Figure 22). The results further demonstrate the 
difference in processing time between simple positive and negative, and the lack of 
difference in processing time between cleft positive and negative. Importantly, the 
target bias is formed earlier in cleft negatives than simple negatives, despite the fact 
that cleft negatives are structurally more complex.  
 
 
100ms 
slice 
post 
verb 
  
By subject  
   
By item 
 
Simple df t1 
p (2-
tailed) 
P (Šidák 
corrected) 
df t2 
p (2-
tailed) 
P (Šidák 
corrected) 
A 1 35 1.10 0.28 1  38 0.75 0.46 1 
 
2 35 3.17* 3.1E-03 0.03  38 2.69 0.01 0.10 
 
3 35 5.81*** 1.4E-06 1.3E-05  38 5.07*** 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 
 
4 35 5.87*** 1.1E-06 1.1E-05  38 5.26*** 5.5E-06 5.3E-05 
 
5 35 5.63*** 2.4E-06 2.3E-05  38 5.24*** 5.8E-06 5.7E-05 
 
6 35 5.88*** 1.1E-06 1.1E-05  38 5.04*** 1.1E-05 1.1E-04 
 
7 35 5.69*** 2.0E-06 1.9E-05  38 5.94*** 6.8E-07 6.7E-06 
 
8 35 5.89*** 1.1E-06 1.1E-05  38 6.07*** 4.6E-07 4.5E-06 
 
9 35 5.33*** 5.9E-06 5.8E-05  38 5.07*** 1.1E-05 1.0E-04 
  10 35 5.41*** 4.6E-06 4.5E-05  38 5.38*** 4.0E-06 3.9E-05 
N 1 35 0.63 0.54 1  38 -0.13 0.90 1 
 
2 35 -0.58 0.57 1  38 -1.16 0.25 1 
 
3 35 -0.98 0.33 1  38 -0.95 0.35 1 
 
4 35 -0.72 0.47 1  38 -0.65 0.52 1 
 
5 35 0.33 0.74 1  38 0.49 0.62 1 
 
6 35 1.07 0.29 1  38 1.79 0.08 0.78 
 
7 35 1.03 0.31 1  38 2.04 0.05 0.49 
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8 35 1.52 0.14 1  38 2.78 0.01 0.10 
 
9 35 2.03 0.05 0.49  38 2.44 0.02 0.2 
  10 35 2.65 0.01 0.10  38 2.85 0.007 0.07 
Cleft 
     
 
   
 
A 1 35 -0.61 0.54 1  38 -0.75 0.46 1 
 
2 35 0.84 0.40 1  38 0.05 0.96 1 
 
3 35 1.10 0.28 1  38 0.73 0.47 1 
 
4 35 1.09 0.28 1  38 0.94 0.35 1 
 
5 35 2.87 0.007 0.07 
 
38 2.80 
8.00E-
03 
0.08 
 
6 35 4.07*** 2.0E-04 0.002 
 
38 3.48* 
1.00E-
03 
0.01 
 
7 35 5.31*** 6.2E-06 6.1E-05 
 
38 4.33** 
1.06E-
04 
0.001 
 
8 35 5.57*** 2.9E-06 2.8E-05 
 
38 5.15*** 
8.26E-
06 
8.1E-05 
 
9 35 6.17*** 4.6E-07 4.5E-06  38 5.41*** 3.7E-06 3.6E-05 
  10 35 5.96*** 8.8E-07 8.6E-06 
 
38 4.86*** 
2.03E-
05 
2.0E-04 
N 1 35 -0.30 0.77 1  
 
-0.24 0.81 1 
 
2 35 -0.45 0.65 1  38 -1.07 0.29 1 
 
3 35 1.53 0.14 1  38 -0.04 0.97 1 
 
4 35 1.85 0.07 0.68  38 0.48 0.63 1 
 
5 35 2.43 0.02 0.2  38 1.43 0.16 1 
 
6 35 3.52** 1.2E-03 0.01  38 2.23 0.03 0.29 
 
7 35 3.81** 5.3E-04 0.005  38 2.08 0.04 0.39 
 
8 35 2.37 0.02 0.2  38 2.32 0.03 0.29 
 
9 35 2.41 0.02 0.2  38 3.25* 0.002 0.02 
  10 35 1.29 0.21 1  38 2.62 0.01 0.098 
Table 37 one sample t-test comparing log ratios with zero in 100ms time slices from the 
offset of verb 
  204 
 
Figure 21 Average target/competitor log ratios in 100 time slices from the offset of verb 
- Simple. As in Chapters 3 and 4, asterisks indicates that the value is significantly 
different from zero by both subject and item. 
 
Figure 22 Average target/competitor log ratios in 100 time slices from the offset of verb 
- Cleft. Asterisks indicates that the value is significantly different from zero by both 
subject and item. 
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5.5 Discussion: 
This study shows that for simple sentences, the processing of negatives is delayed 
compared to positives. Shortly after the verb in simple negative sentences like “Matt 
hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, participants paid comparable attention to both the 
representation of the positive counterpart (a shut window) and the representation 
consistent with the negative sentence meaning (an open window). This suggests that 
when processing simple negative sentences, the positive counterpart is initially 
activated. However, around 900ms after the offset of the verb (in the noun region), 
participants shifted their attention away from the positive counterpart, and focus on 
negation-consistent representation. In comparison, when hearing a simple positive 
sentence like “Matt has shut his dad’s window”, participants shift their attention to 
the target representation (shut window) immediately after the verb.  
In the case of cleft sentences, the processing of negatives is no more delayed than the 
processing of positives. When hearing either a positive or negative cleft sentence, 
participants pay comparable attention to both the target and the competitor 
representation after the verb.  For cleft positives, a target bias became significant at 
around 500ms after the offset of the verb, and for cleft negatives, it took around 
600ms. Participants’ attention shifted away from the competitor and onto the target n 
“dad’s” region (as in “his dad’s window”), before the onset of noun. The time-course 
of the processing of cleft negatives is very similar to cleft positives. Sentences of 
both polarities experienced some delay, and this is likely due to the complexity of the 
cleft construction.  
Comparing results from simple and cleft sentences, there is a difference between 
simple but not cleft sentences, as demonstrated by the significant polarity by 
  206 
cleftness interaction in a post-verb window. What’s more, a target bias is formed 
earlier in cleft negatives than simple negatives, despite the fact that cleft negatives 
are structurally more complex than simple negatives. These results suggest that the 
processing delay in simple negatives is not in fact caused by the first step of negation 
processing. Rather, it is likely due to QUD accommodation. Without context or 
further cues, the most prominent QUD for a simple negative sentence is whether the 
positive counterpart is true
27
, e.g. whether Matt has shut his dad’s window. 
Accommodating this QUD results in the representation of the positive counterpart. It 
also causes a delay in sentence processing, as the presentation of the positive 
counterpart is incongruent with the negation consistent presentation. In contrast, a 
cleft negative sentence has a negative prominent QUD, such as who hasn’t shut their 
dad’s window. The representation of this QUD is congruent with the representation 
of the sentence meaning. Similarly, a cleft positive sentence has a positive prominent 
QUD, such as who has shut their dad’s window, which is also congruent with the 
representation of the sentence meaning. Therefore, the processing of a negative cleft 
sentence is no more delayed than the processing of a positive cleft sentence.  
One might argue that our results in fact show that among simple positive, simple 
negative, cleft positive and cleft negative, only simple positive has a clear advantage 
in processing speed compared to the other three. Therefore, the slowdown in simple 
negative, cleft positive and cleft negative are all due to structural difficulty. 
Compared to our proposed explanation, this argument is weak. Remember that a 
                                                 
27 Note that in our stimuli, simple negative sentences have a stress on “hasn’t”. The 
accommodation of the positive QUDs is encouraged by the stress on “hasn’t” but it does not rely 
on it. Tian et al. (2010) shows that when simple negative sentences are presented in written 
form, participants still accommodate positive QUDs. However, if there is a prosodic focus on 
other constituents of the sentence, the accommodated QUD may not be positive. For example, 
for “[MATT]f hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, the prominent QUD is in fact negative (who hasn’t 
shut their dad’s window). 
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target advantage was formed earlier in cleft negatives than in cleft positives. 
Therefore, this argument requires the assumption that negation or clefting alone 
pushed the processing time to the ceiling. When negation and clefting are combined, 
the sentence is no more difficult to process than negation or clefting alone. Miller 
(1962) found that positive sentences take less time to process than simple negative 
sentences and simple passive sentences, both of which take less time to process than 
sentences that are both negative and passive. Based on this finding, it is unlikely that 
in our experiment, simple negatives, cleft positives and cleft negatives have all 
reached a ceiling processing time. 
 Evaluation of current results against rejection accounts 5.5.1
Our results are incompatible with rejection accounts in at least four predictions. First, 
according to rejection accounts, we should see that both simple and cleft negative 
sentences are delayed compared to their positive counterparts, given that both types 
of negative sentence express the same proposition. Instead, we saw that only simple 
negatives are delayed compared to their counterparts. Second, rejection accounts 
predict that the processing of cleft negatives is as delayed as, or more delayed than, 
simple negatives. Instead, attention to the target was formed earlier in cleft negatives 
than simple negatives. Third, rejection accounts should predict that when processing 
a negative sentence participants FIRST represent the positive counterpart and then 
represent the state of affairs consistent with sentence meaning. Instead, we saw that 
when hearing a simple negative sentence, participants paid comparable attention to 
both the representation of the positive counterpart and the negation consistent 
representation, before shifting attention away from the positive counterpart 
representation. This suggests that representation of the positive counterpart is not a 
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discrete first step, but happens in parallel with representing the sentence meaning. 
Fourth, rejection accounts predict that the meaning of negation is incorporated after 
the positive argument is processed. However, our results for cleft negatives suggest 
that the meaning of negation can be incorporated incrementally. A target bias was 
formed just 600ms after the offset of the verb, before the onset of noun. The time-
course is similar to cleft positives. This suggests that participants start combining the 
meaning of negation with the verb as soon as they hear the verb, namely “not shut” 
implies “open”. This information is then used to infer the shape/state of the target 
object, and direct their visual attention to the object that is compatible with the 
combined meaning of the negation, the verb and the noun. 
 The representation of the positive counterpart 5.5.2
Coming back to the literature on the activation of the positive counterpart during 
negative sentence processing, our results for simple negative sentences support 
previous findings that the positive counterpart can be activated in the early stage of 
negative sentence processing. The early occurrence of this representation supports 
the idea that QUD accommodation happens incrementally during sentence 
processing.  
In terms of the duration of the activation of the positive counterpart, in our visual 
world paradigm, it lasted for around 800ms - 900ms. This duration is compatible 
with the findings of Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) as well as Kaup, Lüdtke, & 
Zwaan (2006). Note that in our visual world paradigm, all potential representations 
are present on the screen from one second before the sentence starts. Therefore, the 
effort of constructing a visual representation consistent with either the positive 
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counterpart or the negative sentence is reduced compared to the visual probe 
recognition paradigm of Tettamanti et al., (2008) or Tomasino et al., (2010). Thus it 
is conceivable that outside a visual world paradigm, the positive counterpart stays 
active for longer when participants process simple negative sentences out of context.   
Our results also show that the activation of the positive counterpart is not a discrete 
first step, but happens in parallel with the activation of sentence-meaning consistent 
representation. The results from most other studies have no support for this. They 
generally found higher accessibility of the positive counterpart than the negation-
consistent representation during the early stages. How can we reconcile our results 
with these findings? Once again, in our paradigm all potential representations are 
visually present on the screen. Without such visual stimuli, it is highly likely that 
representing the state of affairs consistent with the negative sentence takes longer 
than representing the positive counterpart, as the former involves an extra inferential 
step. For example, to form a representation based on the stimulus, ‘the window is not 
open’, participants must infer that the window is closed and represent such a state, 
whereas to form a representation for, ‘the window is open’, no additional inference is 
required beyond access to the meanings of the predicates. Thus, in paradigms where 
representations are not shown in advance, participants may first arrive at the 
representation of the QUD since the positive counterpart is easier to access. Overall 
our data in simple sentences support previous findings that the positive counterpart 
can be activated during negation processing.  
However, we also found that when a negative sentence has a negative QUD (as in the 
cleft case), participants do not first represent the positive counterpart. Although 
participants looked at both the target and the competitor for 400ms-500ms after the 
verb, this does not necessarily mean that it was caused by the representation of the 
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positive counterpart. For cleft positive sentences, participants also looked at the 
competitor for a similar period. For example, when hearing “It is Matt who has shut 
his dad’s window”, participants were looking at both a shut window and an open 
window after the offset of “shut”. There is no reason to represent the negative 
counterpart when processing a positive sentence. One might argue that the positive 
cleft sentence has a negative implicature, such as “other people haven’t shut their 
dad’s window”, and participants were representing the negative implicature 
immediately after the verb. Although research on implicature processing shows that 
implicatures (especially scalar implicatures) can be accessed incrementally with little 
or no delay compared to accessing the semantic meaning of the sentence, especially 
when there is supporting context, the representation of implicatures should be long 
lasting (Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; W. H. Levine & 
Hagaman, 2008; MacDonald & Just, 1989). Therefore, it is unlikely that such an 
early and short activation is due to the representation of implicatures. A likely 
explanation for the short competitor interference is that hearing the verb (shut) and 
predicting the form of the noun (window) caused bottom-up lexical activation of the 
representations of “shut” and “window” (see Barr, 2008). Overriding the bottom-up 
activation is slower in cleft sentences than simple sentences, due to the extra 
cognitive effort required for processing the cleft construction.  
 Unpredicted results 5.5.3
What was slightly surprising was that after a target bias was formed in negative 
sentences, it was still smaller compared to positive sentences (although in the case of 
clefts, the difference is significant by subject only). In the graphs, this corresponds to 
the red lines staying below the blue lines in the later stages of the sentence. This 
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could be due to the pragmatic inferences of negative sentences. When hearing “Matt 
hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, it is plausible that shutting the window is a desirable 
event or a likely future event. Therefore participants might look at the likely future 
state of the noun. In our pilot study, I tested sentences in future tense, such as “Matt 
will shut his dad’s window”. Although the sentence indicates that currently the 
window is open, participants never establish a target bias. Instead, they continue 
looking at both the open and the shut window throughout.  
In addition, I predicted that if negation reduces the activation level of words in its 
scope, we should see less attention to pictures of the negated word (e.g. windows, 
whether open or closed) in negative sentences compared to positive sentences. 
However this prediction is not borne out. Studies ( MacDonald & Just, 1989 
experiment 3; Levine & Hagaman, 2008) suggest that negation reduces the 
accessibility of the linguistic form rather than the concept of words in its scope. If 
this is the case, it could be that attention to pictures that correspond to the negated 
word is affected by the level of representation of concepts more than the linguistic 
form. 
 Implications 5.5.4
Beyond the processing of negation, this study relates to the broader question of how 
pragmatic information is incrementally updated during sentence processing. 
Research has grown in the online integration of pragmatic information. For example, 
we can integrate common ground and speaker’s epistemic state at the earliest 
moment and use such information to predict upcoming referents (Breheny, Ferguson, 
& Katsos, 2013; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008); we can access scalar 
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implicatures on-line with little or no delay (Breheny et al., 2012; Grodner et al., 
2010); we infer information about the speaker using accents and cultural heuristics, 
and use it to anticipate upcoming words in a sentence  (Van Berkum, van den Brink, 
Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008). However, as far as I know, there have been no prior 
studies in the online accommodation of QUD. I have shown that the linguistic form 
of a sentence contains cues for how it is related to the prior context. On hearing or 
reading a sentence when there is insufficient or no context, comprehenders do not 
just process the semantic meaning of a sentence, rather, they also use cues to infer 
and accommodate a likely context, specifically a QUD. This process is automatic and 
incremental. Negation is one such cue for retrieving a prominent QUD. Without 
other cues (such as cleft construction), the most prominent QUD for a negative 
sentence is positive. This is why studies often report the representation of the 
positive counterpart in negation processing. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
I investigated why participants represent the positive counterpart when processing a 
negative sentence, and when such representation takes place. The study shows that 
the representation of the positive counterpart is not a mandatory first step of negation 
processing. Instead, it happens when a contextless negative sentence triggers the 
accommodation of a positive QUD. When a negative sentence has a negative 
prominent QUD, participants no longer represent the positive counterpart. Results 
from eye movements reveal that QUD accommodation happens soon after negation 
is encountered, and the meaning of negation can be incrementally incorporated. 
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Overall, this finding adds to the growing literature that the processing of pragmatic 
information does not happen only at constituent or clausal level, rather it can be 
processed and integrated incrementally.  
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Chapter 6 General Discussions and Future Research 
Over the course of the past five chapters I have investigated the processing of 
negative assertions: utterances that express negative propositions. In this chapter, I 
first summarize and discuss the main ideas and findings as they unfold in each 
chapter. I then discuss the methodological and theoretical implications of this thesis. 
Lastly, I present a few ideas for future research. 
6.1 Summary and discussion of main findings 
I started this inquiry with questions drawn from psycholinguistic research on the 
effect of negation on sentence processing and from linguistic research in the 
pragmatic functions of negative assertions. 
Numerous psycholinguistic studies have shown that negative sentences are more 
costly to process than their positive counterparts, even though negation is used 
frequently in natural settings. The extra cost manifests in longer reading times, 
longer response times in sentence verification tasks, higher error rates, worse 
memory of the content in negative sentences, worse performance in logical reasoning 
when negation is involved, and the late acquisition of denial by children. In addition, 
studies show that in the early stages of processing negative sentence, their positive 
counterparts are often, but not always represented. However, when there is 
contextual support, both effects - the extra cost of negation and the representation of 
the positive counterpart- are reduced or eliminated. These findings beg for a theory 
of negative sentence processing that can explain all these effects, and gave rise to the 
first questions I posed herein: 
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Question 1a: why are negative sentences difficult to process (at least in 
psycholinguistic experiments)? 
Question 1b: why is the representation of the positive counterpart often involved? 
Pragmatic research has shown (Horn, 1989) that negative sentences have richer 
pragmatic effects than positive sentences. For example, doubly negated sentences 
convey different meanings from the positive alternatives. Out of context, negative 
sentences are often less felicitous than positive sentences with roughly same 
semantic content. Also, negation allows us to infer contextual information. Consider 
this example, I came across a talk on the internet titled “30 is not the new 20”. When 
I saw this title, I thought to myself, I didn’t know that people are currently debating 
whether 30 IS the new 20. This is inferred because the title was negative. In 
comparison, if the title was “30 is the new 20”. I couldn’t have inferred such 
background information. This pragmatic effect lead to my second question: 
Question 2: how does negation allow us to infer background contextual information?  
In Chapter 1, I surveyed psychological findings and reviewed current theories against 
these findings. Current theories of negation processing come from three perspectives: 
grammatical, rejection-based or contextual. Grammatical accounts propose that 
negative sentences are harder to process because they are syntactically more complex 
than positives. This approach only addresses the extra processing cost of negation, 
and does not explain the other effects. Rejection accounts flow from the idea that 
negation functions as a truth-functional operator: it reverses the truth value of the 
embedded positive proposition. Based on this function, rejection accounts propose 
that a negative sentence is represented as the rejection of its positive argument, 
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where the positive argument is always processed and represented first. Rejection 
accounts explain the extra cost of negation in terms of the extra step of embedding. 
They also account for the early representation of the positive counterpart, as it is the 
first step of negation processing. However, this account cannot explain why the 
representation of the positive counterpart does not always occur. In addition, it 
implies that the meaning of negation is not incorporated until the positive argument 
is processed, which is at odds with the prevalent findings of incremental sentence 
processing. The contextual approach suggests that with the right kind of contextual 
support, negative sentences are not difficult to process and the positive counterpart 
need not be represented. This account remains silent when it comes to why the 
positive counterpart IS often represented when there is no contextual support. 
Overall, current theories of negation processing are unsatisfactory in the face of the 
psycholinguistic findings.  
To address the shortfalls of current theories, I proposed an alternative theory in 
Chapter 2: the dynamic pragmatic account. Starting from the observations from the 
contextual approach, it seemed clear that there are differences in how negative 
sentences interact with context compared to positive sentences. It is possible that the 
processing effects have a pragmatic cause, even though in the majority of the 
psycholinguistic studies, no context was explicitly provided. To explore how 
sentence processing interacts with context, I turned to the dynamic semantic/ 
pragmatic approach to meaning, which focuses on the interactive nature of language 
use. In this approach, utterance meaning goes beyond its linguistically coded content, 
and contains information about how the current utterance fits in the dynamically 
changing context: how it relates to prior discourse and how it constrains the 
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upcoming discourse. Different types of utterances have different effects on context. 
Questions set up the goals of a conversation while assertions pay off these goals. 
When we interpret an assertion, we not only update the context with its asserted 
content, but also with pragmatically retrieved content, such as the presuppositions 
and the source of relevance for this assertion, described in terms of the Question 
Under Discussion the assertion pays off. If the presuppositions and QUD are not part 
of the context, comprehenders may be able to use presupposition triggers and QUD 
cues to retrieve and accommodate these elements. I argued that negation is a cue for 
retrieving a prominent positive QUD. Without other cues, the most prominent QUD 
for a negative sentence ¬p is whether p. The projection of this positive QUD is due 
to the most frequent uses of negation (rejection and denial), and it is sensitive to 
other factors (e.g. frequency of the predicate and context) and other QUD cues (e.g. 
prosodic focus and cleft construction). Processing a negative sentence without 
context triggers the accommodation of a positive QUD, which happens automatically 
and incrementally. QUD accommodation contributes to the extra processing cost 
associated with negation; it explains why the positive counterpart is often 
represented; it also explains why contextual support reduces or eliminates both the 
extra cost and the positive representation.  
In Chapters 3 – 5, I tested the dynamic pragmatic account against current theories 
(especially rejection accounts) in three series of experiments. Chapter 3 used a probe 
recognition paradigm to study the representations formed after reading negative 
sentences. The results show that shortly after reading a simple negative sentence, e.g. 
“John hasn’t ironed his shirt”, participants responded faster to a picture representing 
the positive counterpart (ironed shirt); on the contrary, after reading a cleft negative 
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sentence (“It is John who hasn’t ironed his shirt”.) or a negative question (“who 
hasn’t ironed their shirt?”), participants responded faster to a picture that is 
consistent with the negative sentence meaning (crumpled shirt). This result argues 
against rejection accounts: the representation of the positive counterpart is not a 
mandatory first step of negation processing. Rather, it is likely due to QUD 
accommodation. While simple negative sentences project positive QUDs, cleft 
negative sentences project negative QUDs, which is why simple and cleft conditions 
generated different results in the probe recognition task. 
Chapter 4 investigated the verification of negative sentences against pictures. 
Previous studies reported inconsistent reaction time patterns for true and false 
negatives: many found that TN is slower to verify than FN, some found that 
verifying TN and FN take roughly the same amount of time, and others found that 
TN is faster than FN. I reviewed three models of negative sentence verification: 
rejection, conversion and predicate dependent. To explain the pattern TN > FN, 
rejection accounts propose that participants first verify the positive argument of 
negative sentences and then switch the truth index. Thus the truth effect in reaction 
times of affirmative sentences should be reversed in negative sentences: as TA is 
faster than FA, TN should be slower than FN. The conversion model explains the 
pattern TN < FN. It proposes that negative sentences are converted and represented 
in a positive format whenever possible. True sentences, whether they are affirmative 
or negative, should be faster to verify than false sentences. On the other hand, the 
predicate dependence model proposes that negative sentences with binary predicates 
are represented as a positive argument embedded under a negative operator, and 
those with unary predicates are converted and represented as positive sentences. 
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Thus, TN > FN is expected with binary predicates, while TN < FN is expected with 
unary predicates. None of the three accounts can explain the varying findings in 
sentence-picture verification studies. I proposed that two strategies- the default 
strategy and the truth functional strategy - can be used when verifying negative 
sentences against pictures; the development of the truth-functional strategy is 
triggered by the accommodation of positive QUDs. The default strategy is to infer 
the situation that makes the sentence true, and compare this situation with the 
evidence. Under this strategy, true sentences, regardless of their polarity, should be 
faster to verify than false sentences. However, the accommodated positive QUD is in 
conflict with the negative question posed by the task. The conflict may encourage 
participants to develop the truth functional strategy, where they no longer infer the 
truth condition of the negative sentence, but instead answer the positive 
accommodated QUD and then flip the truth index.  My proposal was tested in 
experiments where participants verify negative sentences against pictures of one or 
two objects. For example, the sentence “the banana isn’t peeled” against a picture of 
a peeled banana (one-object) or a picture of a peeled banana and a whole orange 
(two-object). The different picture contexts were set up to manipulate the polarity of 
the prominent QUD. With one-object pictures, the prominent QUD is positive 
(whether the banana is peeled); with two-object pictures, the prominent QUD should 
be negative (which one isn’t peeled). Results show that (1) with pictures of one 
object, TN was faster than FN in the first early phase of the experiment, however 
their difference diminished in late phase; (2) with pictures of two objects, TN was 
faster than FN throughout the experiment. Finding (1) suggests that the proposed 
default strategy is indeed the default. The truth functional strategy, on the other hand, 
is developed specifically for the task after some training. Finding (2) suggests that it 
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is the accommodation of a positive QUD that encourages the truth conditional 
strategy. When the prominent QUD is negative, participants tended to use the default 
strategy throughout the experiment. 
Chapter 5 studied the time course of negative sentence processing using a visual 
world eye-tracking paradigm. Participants listened to positive and negative sentences 
in simple and cleft forms, such as “(It is) Matt (who) hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, 
while looking at a visual scene which contained images that matched or mismatched 
the sentence meaning (an open window and a closed window). Results showed that 
for simple sentences, the processing of negative sentences was delayed compared to 
the processing of the positive sentences, due to the activation of the positive 
counterpart. In comparison, the processing of cleft negative sentences was no more 
delayed than the cleft positives. It confirms the findings from Chapters 3 and 4 that 
simple but not cleft negative sentences trigger the accommodation of positive QUDs. 
Importantly, this study showed that both QUD accommodation and the integration of 
the meaning of negation can happen incrementally. In the simple negative condition, 
attention to the picture representing the positive counterpart arose immediately after 
the verb was encountered and dropped before the end of the sentence, which echoes 
previous findings that the representation of the positive counterpart is early and 
temporary. This suggests that the QUD accommodation happens in the early stage of 
sentence processing. In both the simple and the cleft negative conditions, the 
meaning of negation was incorporated before the end of the sentence (though 
considerably earlier in the cleft condition), suggesting that the integration of the 
negation need not wait until after the positive argument is processed.  
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Based on the findings of these experiments, we can now answer the two sets of 
questions posed in the introduction. According to the dynamic pragmatic account, 
Questions 1a, 1b and 2 are all connected by positive QUD accommodation. Without 
other cues or supporting context, a negative sentence ¬p projects the prominent 
positive QUD whether p. The accommodation this QUD contributes to the 
processing cost and explains why the positive counterpart of negation is often 
represented. We can infer background contextual information from a negative 
sentence because we assume that the positive QUD is relevant. In the example of, 
“30 is not the new 20” or the example from the introduction, “This is not a hotel”, we 
assume that the positive QUDs whether 30 is the new 20 and whether the venue is a 
hotel are relevant, and infer prior discourse context or prior events that make these 
questions relevant. 
6.2 Methodological implications and theoretical implications 
This thesis has methodological and theoretical implications for future research. 
Methodologically, when we study sentence processing using psycholinguistic 
experiments, we must not overlook the pragmatic effects associated with these 
sentences. Commonly, psycholinguistics research studies the effect discourse context 
has on language processing by explicitly providing discourse contexts. If no context 
is provided, contextual effects are often ignored. I have shown in three series of 
experiments that when sentences are presented without context, participants 
automatically retrieve and accommodate relevant contextual information such as 
QUD. Sentence comprehension is NEVER independent from contextual effects. This 
finding suggests that when we design psycholinguistic experiments and interpret 
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their results, we must consider the likely pragmatic processes, and how they interact 
with the processing of the sentences’ linguistically coded meaning.   
Theoretically, the finding that QUD accommodation happens incrementally relates to 
the broader question of how pragmatic information is incrementally updated during 
sentence processing. There is growing research in the online integration of pragmatic 
information, such as the speaker’s epistemic state (Breheny et al., 2013; Heller et al., 
2008) and scalar implicatures (Breheny et al., 2012; Grodner et al., 2010). However, 
as far as I know, there has been no prior psycholinguistic study of QUD 
accommodation. I have argued that while QUD accommodation shares similar 
properties with presupposition accommodation, they are distinct processes. In the 
dynamic semantic/ pragmatic approach to meaning, many scholars (Carlson, 1983; 
Ginzburg, 2012; Kehler, 2012; Lewis, 1979; Roberts, 2012) have argued for the 
importance of QUD in discourse structure and coherence. This research provides the 
first piece of psycholinguistic evidence for the retrieval and accommodation of QUD 
during sentence processing, and gives preliminary indications of the time frame of 
QUD accommodation. Research in this thesis can serve as a precursor to the 
psycholinguistic study of QUD accommodation during language comprehension. 
6.3 Future research 
The studies in this thesis have answered some questions while raising more. 
Questions that immediately come to mind are: how can the dynamic pragmatic 
account be adapted to account for effects of implicit negation, embedded negation 
and negative quantifiers? How can we explain pragmatic effects in negative polar 
questions? More generally, how are questions represented cognitively? How do we 
mentally represent different elements in context?  In this section, I discuss just three 
ideas in more detail. 
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 Unaddressed finding: reduced accessibility of negated words 6.3.1
My research questions did not address all the findings reviewed in Chapter 1. One 
finding concerned the accessibility of negated words:  some studies (e.g. Levine & 
Hagaman, 2008; MacDonald & Just, 1989) found that the accessibility of a word is 
reduced when it is negated compared to when it is affirmed. MacDonald and Just 
(1989) found that after reading sentences such as “Almost every weekend, Elizabeth 
bakes cookies but no bread for the children”, the word “cookies” is more activated 
than “bread”, but words that are semantically related to “cookies” are not more 
activated than words related to “bread”. MacDonald and Just concluded that negation 
reduces the accessibility of the linguistic form of words in its scope, but this effect 
may not spread to associates of negated words. Their proposed explanation was that 
negated concepts are less likely to be the topic for upcoming discourse than affirmed 
concepts, and as a result, attention is shifted away from negated concepts. This 
proposal implies that if the negated concept is marked as the discourse topic (e.g. 
cleft construction, prosodic focus), its negated words should be equally, or nearly 
equally, as accessible as affirmed words. 
I tested this hypothesis in a pilot study where I compared the accessibility of negated 
words marked as discourse topics versus those not marked as topics. According to 
the discourse focus shift hypothesis proposed by MacDonald and Just (1989), 
negated words should only be less accessible than affirmed words when they are not 
discourse topics. The pilot study was done in Chinese. Chinese is a topic-prominent 
language that commonly uses fronting to mark discourse topics (Li & Thompson, 
1976). For example: sentence (40a) follows the predominant SVO word order (see 
40c). In this sentence, the object “Zhangsan” is not the topic unless it is prosodically 
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focused. However, if we want to linguistically mark that the object (Zhang-San) is 
the topic, we can move it to the front of the sentences seen in (41b), resulting in an 
OSV word order.  
40a)                                 我   已经     见过       了     张三。 
40b) Transcription:         wo  yijing    jianguo    le     Zhangsan. 
40c) Gloss:                      I     already see-EXP RES Zhang-San 
41a) English translation: I have already seen Zhang-San. 
41b)                                  张三            我  已经     见过       了。 
41c) Transcription:           Zhangsan    wo  yijing   jianguo   le. 
41d) Gloss:                       Zhang-San    I    already see-EXP RES 
1a) English translation: (As for) Zhang-San I have seen him already. 
My pilot study used a word probe recognition paradigm similar to MacDonald & Just 
(1989). Participants read short passages containing an introduction, a main sentence 
(containing the target noun) and a short coda (see Table 38). The introduction and 
coda are the same for all conditions. The main sentence contains the target noun 
(underlined in the examples) which is either fronted (thus becoming the discourse 
topic) or not. The experiment thus has a 2 (positive/ negative) by 2 (normal order/ 
fronted) design. The target noun is the grammatical object of the sentence. In the 
fronted condition, the target noun linearly precedes negation. Participants read the 
passages section by section (marked with slashes). After the sentence, a probe word 
appeared and participants answered whether the word appeared in the sentence. In 
the experimental condition, the probe word was always the target noun.  
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According to the discourse focus shift hypothesis (following McDonald and Just), we 
should see that after reading sentences in normal order, responses to the target words 
are slower when it is negated than when it is affirmed. However, after reading 
sentences in fronted order, response times to the target should be the same when it is 
negated versus when it is affirmed. Thus, we predict a word order by polarity 
interaction in RT. 
Thirty-six native Mandarin speakers read 32 experimental sentences and 48 fillers, 
word order (normal/ fronted), sentence polarity (positive/ negative) and answer 
polarity (yes/no) were all counterbalanced. 
The average reaction times per condition are charted in Figure 23. Contrary to the 
prediction, we saw that RT in the negative condition is shorter than in the positive 
condition in both word orders. This is confirmed by a 2(word order) by 2(polarity) 
ANOVA which showed no significant interaction between word order and polarity 
(Fs<0.28). Instead, there was a main effect of polarity, i.e. whether the word order 
was normal or reversed, responses to probe words in negative sentences were slower 
than affirmative sentences F1(1,35)=12.18, p1=0.001; F2(1, 31)=5.98, p2=0.02. There 
was also a trending main effect of word order (significant by participants only). RT 
in the normal order condition was shorter than RT in the reversed order condition: 
F2(1,36)=4.89, p1=0.033; F2(1,31)=1.84, p2=0.185. This effect can be explained by 
the shorter distance between the target word and the probe word in the normal order 
condition compared to the fronted condition. 
The result of this pilot study is inconsistent with the prediction of the discourse focus 
shift hypothesis. Even when the target noun is marked as discourse topic, its 
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accessibility is still reduced when it is negated rather than when it is affirmed. This 
suggests that it is not an attention shift in discourse representation that caused the 
reduced accessibility effect. A possible explanation is that negation can lead to a 
“shallower” relational integration of the semantic features of words under its scope 
compared to words that are affirmed. . Consider the sentence “I closed the door”. To 
represent the situation corresponding to this sentence, we must integrate “close” and 
“door” using our encyclopedic knowledge and generate a mental representation of a 
closed door. It is possible that with supportive context, when hearing “I didn’t close 
the door”, the negation amends the way “close” and “door” are normally combined, 
and the focus is on inferring what the situation is like when the door is not closed. 
This idea is in need of further research.  
One potential paradigm is a memory recall task. Cornish and Wason (1970) found 
that people remember positive sentences more accurately than negative ones. We can 
test whether participants have more difficulty remembering which words appeared 
under the scope of negation, or remembering the combination of those words. For 
example, after reading the sentences “John didn’t buy any pears” and “John didn’t 
cook any apples”, whether participants have more difficulty remembering that the 
words “buy”, “cook”, “apples” and “pears” appeared under negation, or that they 
find it more difficulty remembering that “buy pears” appeared rather than “cook 
pears” (and likewise “cook apples” appeared, rather than “buy apples”). Another 
potential direction is an fMRI study comparing levels of activation in the prefrontal 
cortex when processing positive and negative sentences, where the predicates require 
more encyclopaedic feature integration in the positive condition than in the negative 
condition. This difference can be achieved by pretesting the complexity of events 
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corresponding to the positive versus the negative sentence. Previous studies (Hindy 
et al., 2013) found that when participates look at pictures depicting an object before 
and after an event simultaneously (e.g. a coned ice-cream when it is frozen and when 
it has melted), the prefrontal cortex is active. This is the area that is known to be 
responsive to conflict and visual inhibitory control (e.g. in a Stroop task). The current 
hypothesis should predict that the prefrontal cortex is more active when reading 
positive sentences than negative sentences. 
Intro 小红/ 有 个/ 特点,/ 
    
(Transcription) Xiaohong/ you ge/ tedian,/ 
   
(English) Xiaohong/ has a/ trait,/ 
    
Main sentence Normal order 
  
Fronted order 
 
 
Negative 她/ 不 吃/ 草莓,/ 草莓/ 她/ 不 吃,/ 
(Transcription) ta/ bu chi/ caomei,/ caomei/ ta/ bu chi,/ 
(English) she/ doesn't  eat/ strawberry,/ 
(as for) 
strawberry/ she/ doesn't  
eat 
(it),/ 
 
Positive 她/ 爱 吃/ 草莓,/ 草莓/ 她/ 爱 吃,/ 
(Transcription) ta/ ai/ chi/ caomei,/ caomei/ ta/ ai/ chi,/ 
 
she/ 
likes 
(to) eat/ strawberry,/ 
(as for) 
strawberry/ she/ 
likes 
(to) 
eat 
(it),/ 
Coda 一向 如此。/ 
     
(Transcription) yixiang ruci./ 
      
(English) always so./ 
      Table 38 Examples sentences for pilot study on the accessibility of negated words 
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Figure 23 Reaction Times per condition: accessibility pilot study 
 
 Heim’s context change potential of negation 6.3.2
As mentioned in Chapter 2, some dynamic semanticists (e.g. Kamp and Heim) 
propose that the meaning of a sentence is its context change potential. Heim (1992) 
gave an account of the context change potential for negation (illustrated in (2), where 
“+” means context update, and “\” means set-theoretic complementation): which 
states that the context change for an assertion with negation involves two steps: you 
first temporarily update the context set with the material under the scope of negation 
(i.e. the positive argument), and then subtract the resulting context. For example: the 
sentence “it is not raining “first updates the context with “it is raining”, i.e. 
subsetting the current context by selecting only the worlds in which it is raining. 
Then the resulting context is subtracted from the original context, returning all the 
worlds in which it is not raining. This proposal follows the idea that all embedding 
atomic clauses within a complex sentence can update the context. The context 
change potential of a complex sentence is compositionally determined by the context 
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change potentials of its constituents (Irene Heim, 1992). A negative sentence ¬p is 
composed of the truth functional connective ¬ and an atomic positive proposition p. 
Thus, p is allowed to update the context.  
2) C + not φ = C \(C+φ) 
This account was proposed to account for presupposition projection in negative 
sentences. It has been observed that when a presupposition trigger is fembedded 
under the scope of negation (which is seen as an entailment-cancelling operator), the 
presupposition survives (e.g. Stalnaker, 1973). For example, “the King of France is 
bald” presupposes and entails that there exist a unique King of France”. The negative 
sentence “the King of France is not bald” also presupposes the existence of a unique 
King of France, even though the noun phrase is under the semantic scope of 
negation. Heim suggested that her account of the context change potential of 
negation can explain presupposition projection in negation. It works by assuming 
that the updates of context c+ φ is only defined when all the presuppositions of φ 
have updated the context. For “my cat isn’t sick”, first the context is updated by “my 
cat is sick”. In order for that happen, the context must entail that the speaker has a 
cat. So first the context is updated by narrowing down to worlds in which the speaker 
has a cat, then it is updated by “my cat is sick”, namely, narrowed down to worlds in 
which the speaker’s cat is sick. This context is then subtracted, not from the original 
context, but from the context immediately before the update of “my cat is sick”, after 
the update of “the speaker has a cat”.  
What does it mean to update the context in two steps? Von Fintel (2008) interpreted 
it as a “procedural”. He said  
  230 
[it is] an instruction for what procedures need to occur in sequence […]. 
Rather than computing a context change potential for the complex sentence 
and applying it to the input context, what needs to be happening is to 
compute a context change potential for the simple embedded sentence, 
apply that to the input context, let accommodation occur to make that even 
possible, and then the resulting context is subtracted from the input 
context. This is a procedural semantics, not a “declarative one” (von Fintel, 
2008: 156). 
Heim’s context change potential for negation might remind us of the rejection 
accounts of negation processing, however it is important to point out that neither 
Heim’s original proposal nor von Fintel’s interpretation of it are meant as a cognitive 
model, but only a conceptual theory. Therefore, the two steps of context updates 
need not be reflected in two mental representations. However, we should also allow 
the theoretical possibility that a two-step context updates do generate two mental 
representations. In that case, there is tension between Heim’s account and the 
dynamic pragmatic account, as the former predicts that the positive counterpart of 
negation is mandatorily represented while the latter doesn’t. To release this tension, 
we can assume that context updates do not necessarily lead to mental representation 
with perceptual properties, or I must provide another solution for presupposition 
projection in negative sentences.  
My findings suggest that contextual updates can generate mental representations 
with perceptual properties. However, whether such representations must be generated 
for contextual updates remain a question for future research. If we take a leap and 
assume that the answer is yes, can we account for presupposition projection in 
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negation? An immediate thought is maybe the accommodated positive QUD can 
preserve the presuppositions seen in negative sentences. However, this is unlikely to 
be the answer, as the form and polarity of the prominent QUD for a negative 
sentence is influenced by many factors such as other QUD cues and context. For 
example, the sentence “[THE KING OF FRANCE]f is not bald” with a prosodic 
focus on “the king of France” projects a negative QUD who is not bald. In this case, 
the accommodated QUD does not preserve the presupposition that there exist a 
unique King of France.  
One way out is to drop the assumption that presuppositions are “preserved” in 
negative sentences. Carston (1998) proposed that the semantics of negation is not 
presupposition preserving. Rather, presuppositions in negative sentences are 
pragmatically derived (see also Sperber & Wilson, 1986). With the previous example 
of  “the King of France is not bald”, Carston proposed that the the semantic content 
of this sentence is (42), which does not presupposes the existence of the King of 
France. However, this meaning is too weak and must be enriched to meet the 
criterion for optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). By default, they narrow 
the scope of negation which lead to (43), which entails the existence of the King of 
France. However, if after uttering “the King of France is not bald”, the speaker added 
“because there is no King of France”. This follow-up utterance and (43) lead to a 
contradiction: there is a King of France and there is no King of France. The 
contradiction triggers the hearer to abandon (43) and resort to (44): the echoic 
(metalinguistic) interpretation. (44) “returns” negation to its original wide-scope and 
cancels the presupposition. This account is appealing, but further assumptions may 
be required to account for presuppositions associated with triggers under the narrow 
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scope of negation. For example, “the King of France hasn’t met my cat”. Here it can 
be argued that the relevance requirement of the noun phrase “my cat” itself generates 
the implicature that the speaker has a cat. In any case, a pragmatic account of 
presupposition projection in negation is a possible solution which can spare the two 
step contextual updates account of negation.  
42) Not [the King of France is bald]. 
43) [The King of France is not-bald]. 
44) Not [“the King of France is bald”].  
 Positive and negative polar questions 6.3.3
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, according to the dynamic pragmatic account, a 
simple negative sentence gives rise to an inferred positive QUD in the absence of 
other relevant information in the utterance situation. An important assumption I have 
made in this thesis is that positive and negative polar questions have different 
semantic contents. This assumption should be studied in future research, which in 
turn will shed light on competing semantic theories on questions. Mentioned in 
Chapter 2, repeated here, semantic theories of questions fall into at least two broad 
categories: the partition view and the proposition-abstraction view. Partition views 
propose that a question denotes the set of possible answers or exhaustive answers 
(Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984; Hamblin, 1973). In this view, positive and negative 
polar questions are semantically identical, i.e. the question whether p and whether ¬p 
both denote {p, ¬p}. On the other hand, propositional abstraction views (Ginzburg & 
Sag, 2000; Hausser, 1983) suggest that a question denotes an abstract of its answers. 
For example, the question “who solved the problem” denotes the function f(x) such 
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that x solves the problem. By these views, positive and negative polar questions have 
distinct semantic denotations, as they are each abstracts of positive and negative 
propositions, i.e. whether p is an abstract over p, while the negative polar question 
whether ¬p is an abstract over ¬p.  
I propose that we can test these two competing views by comparing the cost of 
answering polar questions versus alternative questions (p or not p, e.g.  “is the door 
open or not?”).  Under the proposition abstraction view but not the partition view, 
polar questions and alternative questions have distinct semantic contents. We can test 
this using a paradigm similar to sentence-picture verification, presented in Chapter 4. 
Participants read polar or alternative questions followed by pictures that lead to a 
“yes” or “no” answer. Note that we cannot use English as alternative questions such 
as “is the door open or not” do not allow yes/no answers. Instead, we can use the 
“shi-bu-shi” (yes-not-yes) construction in Chinese, which is a common form of 
question that takes yes/no answers while explicating mentioning both p and not p 
(see (45a) as an example). The proposition abstraction view should predict that 
answer “no” to a polar question is more costly than to an alternative question. On the 
other hand, the partition view should predict no difference between answering “no” 
to polar versus alternative questions.  
45a) - 门        是    不是       开着？- 是. /不是. 
45b) - Door    yes   not yes   open? -  Yes (meaning the door is open). /No 
(meaning the door is closed). 
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6.4 Summary  
To summarize, this thesis set out to investigate why out-of-context negative 
sentences are difficult to process, why the positive counterpart is often represented, 
and why negative sentences allow us to infer richer contextual information than 
positive sentences. I proposed that negation is a cue for a prominent positive QUD. 
The accommodation of such QUDs can give satisfactory answers to all three 
questions. Three series of studies supported this account. The findings have radical 
implications for the interpretations of results from sentence processing studies, as 
well as opening new doors for the research in how pragmatic information is 
incrementally updated during comprehension.  Future research is required to expand 
the dynamic account to account for a broader range of negation related effects.  
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Conclusions 
This thesis studies how negative assertions are processed. Out of context negative 
sentences are more difficult to process than positives, and their positive counterparts 
are often represented in the early stage of processing. With contextual support, these 
effects diminish or disappear. In addition, negative utterances often lead hearers to 
infer richer background information than positive utterances. To account for both the 
processing effects and the pragmatic functions, I proposed the dynamic pragmatic 
account of negation processing. Under the dynamic pragmatic approach to meaning, 
utterance meaning goes beyond its linguistically coded content, and contains 
information about how a given utterance relates to the broader discourse. 
Specifically, when a hearer interprets an assertion, she will not only access the 
asserted content, but also the Question Under Discussion (QUD) addressed by this 
assertion, which can be retrieved using linguistic and nonlinguistic cues. Negation is 
a cue for retrieving a prominent QUD. Without contextual support or further cues, 
the most prominent QUD for a negative sentence ¬p is the positive question whether 
p. The projection of this positive QUD is due to the most frequent uses of negation, 
rejection and denial, and is sensitive to other factors (e.g. frequency of the predicate 
and context) and other QUD cues (e.g. prosodic focus and cleft construction).  
In three series of experiments, I have shown that without context, processing simple 
negative sentences (e.g. “John hasn’t ironed his shirt”) leads to the representation of 
states of affairs consistent with the positive counterpart (“John has ironed his shirt”). 
This effect is absent from the processing of cleft negative sentences (e.g. “It is John 
who hasn’t ironed his shirt”). When verifying a negative sentence against a picture 
(e.g. “the banana isn’t peeled” against a peeled or whole banana), by default, the 
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participants tend to infer and represent the situation that makes the sentence true (e.g. 
inferring that a whole banana would make the sentence true) and compare it with the 
picture. However, the accommodated positive QUD (whether the banana is peeled) 
may encourage the development of a “truth functional” strategy, where participants 
no longer infer the truth condition of the negative sentence, but instead answer the 
positive accommodated QUD and then flip the truth value. If the negative sentence 
projects a prominent negative QUD (e.g. with cleft negative sentences, and when the 
picture context encourages a negative question), the truth functional strategy is not 
developed. A visual world eye-tracking study showed that while processing simple 
negative sentences (e.g. Matt hasn’t shut his dad’s window) was delayed compared 
to processing simple positive sentences (Matt has shut his dad’s window), the 
processing of cleft negative sentences was no more delayed than the cleft positives. 
The results suggest that both QUD accommodation and the integration of the 
meaning of negation can happen incrementally.  
More broadly, research in this thesis supports the idea that pragmatic information is 
incrementally updated during sentence processing, and that there is no pragmatics-
free comprehension.  Sentences may appear to be independent entities when we read 
them in an experiment or hear them “out-of-the-blue”. However, for a comprehender, 
they are always utterances produced by a speaker and situated in a broader discourse 
context. We interpret utterances in media res: they are rarely the beginning; they are 
rarely - 
“The End”. 
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Appendices 
“Above /Below” data analysis for Chapter 4 experiment 4 
Clark & Chase (1972) compared response times to “above” and “below” sentences. 
They suggested that as “above” is “normal or neutral” and “below” is “marked”, it is 
faster to code the sentence “A is above B”, than “B is below A”. In a sentence first 
paradigm, participants will use the predicate from the sentence (“above” or “below”) 
to code the picture. Sentence and picture representations always have the same 
location relation word. The mismatches can only occur in ordered pair (e.g. (star, 
plus)) or polarity market. Therefore, in a sentence first paradigm, “above” sentences 
should be responded faster than “below” in both the positive and negative conditions 
due to the higher frequency of “above” than “below”.  
On the other hand, in a picture first paradigm, the representation and comparison 
model is more complicated. Participants will use “above” to code the picture. A 
sentence with the same polarity and truth value will be responded to faster if it has 
“above” than “below”. For example, against a picture of a plus above a star, both 
“the plus is above the star” and “the star is below the plus” are TA sentences. While 
the former has no mismatches with the picture representation. The latter has two 
mismatches (order pair of nouns and location word). However, instead of assuming 
two mismatches brings two truth index switches, Clark and Chase added the rule that 
a mismatch in the “embedded strings” result in a conversion in the picture 
representation. Confusingly, the rule is not to convert a representation with “below” 
into one with “above”, but to convert the sentence representation that have the same 
order of the embedded nouns as the picture representation. For example, if the 
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picture is represented as (A above B), the negative sentence “B is not above A” is 
first represented as “false (B above A)” and then converted to “false (A below B)” 
(see Clark & Chase, 1972: 488 for a summary of the model). This rule seem arbitrary 
and inconsistent with the sentence-first model. Why should a picture-first 
representation make participants selectively convert some features of sentence 
representation but not others (e,g. polarity marker)? With the complicated rules, 
Clark and Chase “successfully” predicted their results, summarized in Figure 24 
(copied from Clark & Chase 1972: 491).  
However, in Chapter 4 experiment 4, although our participants were instructed to 
read the sentence first, our RT pattern for “above” and “below” sentences (charted in 
Figure 25) looks very different from the “sentence first” pattern in Figure 24. For 
affirmative sentences, there is a significant truth by above/below interaction: 
F(1,39)=12.17, p=0.001. In addition, there is a significant main effect of truth: 
F(1,39)=37.85, p<0.0001, and above/below: F(1,39)=9.03, p<0.005. Although TA is 
faster than FA for both “above” and “below” sentences, the difference is bigger for 
“above” than “below”. In terms of negative sentences, there is no significant truth by 
above/below interaction (p=0.11), no main effect of truth (p=0.9), or of above/below 
(p=0.67).  
Overall, our analysis of above/below shows a very different pattern from the 
prediction or results in Clark & Chase (1972). Their prediction involved a key 
assumption that in a sentence-first paradigm, sentence form (whether it has “above” 
or “below”) influences how pictures are coded. This claim is not supported by our 
data. A sentence-graph verification study by (Feeney, Hola, & Liversedge, 2000) 
also contradicted this claim: “this effect of alignment further suggests that the graph 
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encoding process is relatively inflexible in that information contained in the sentence 
does not seem to affect how the graph is initially represented” (Feeney, Hola, & 
Liversedge, 2000:158). 
 
Figure 24: Observed (points) and predicted (lines) latencies in Clark & Chase 
(1972) Experiment II. The solid lines represent affirmative sentences, the dotted 
lines represent negative sentences.  
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Figure 25: RT by polarity, above/below and truth value - experiment 4 
(observed values only) 
 
Experimental sentences for probe recognition experiment 1 (Chapter 3) 
All experimental sentences appear in simple and cleft negative form. For example 
“James didn’t blow up his balloon” is in the simple negative condition, and “It is 
James who didn’t blow up his balloon” is in cleft negative condition. The following 
list shows only sentences in simple negative form.  
James didn't blow up his balloon. 
Tracy didn't slice the bread. 
Andrew didn't light the candle. 
Mary didn't fold her deck chair. 
Lee didn't seal the envelope. 
Tina didn't empty the jug. 
Jim didn't open the padlock. 
Bill didn't tie his shoe laces. 
Bob didn't roll up his sleeping mat. 
John didn't inflate the tyre. 
Tina didn't close her umbrella. 
Edward didn't turn on the tap. 
Nick didn't decorate his Christmas tree. 
Chris didn't fasten the zip. 
Joan didn't peeled her banana. 
Chris didn't open his book.  
Liz didn't close the drawer. 
Sam didn't crack an egg.  
William didn't melt the ice.  
Sue didn't turn off the light bulb.  
Ron didn't wash his car. 
Jill didn't pick up the phone.  
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Mal didn't fold his scarf. 
Jack didn't iron his shirt.  
Matt didn't roll up his sleeves. 
Jim didn't cook the spaghetti.  
Bob didn't turn off the TV.  
Fred didn't shut the window. 
 
Experimental sentences for sentence-picture verification experiment 3 (Chapter 
4) 
All experimental sentences appear in positive and negative format. The following list 
shows only the sentence inpositive format. Items for experiment 1 and 2 are from the 
same list (less items). When less experimental items are used (as in experiment 1 and 
2), the verbs (e.g. peel) were not repeated. 
The apple isn't peeled. The mango isn't peeled. 
The apricots aren't dried. The map isn't folded up. 
The balloon isn't blown up. The milk bottle isn't squashed. 
The banana isn't peeled. The motorbike isn't washed. 
The banana slices aren't dried. The mug isn't washed. 
The bat isn't flying. The mushrooms aren't sliced. 
The beer glass isn't full. The oil painting isn't framed. 
The bike isn't folded up. The onion isn't sliced 
The black bin isn't closed. The orange isn't peeled. 
The blackboard hasn't been wiped. The penne isn't cooked. 
The boots aren't dirty. The peppers aren't diced. 
The bread isn't sliced. The photo isn't framed. 
The British flag isn't fluttering. The picnic basket isn't open. 
The butterfly isn't flying. The pineapple isn't sliced. 
The cabinet isn't closed. The plastic box isn't closed. 
The candle hasn't been lit. The plate isn't broken. 
The car isn't washed. The potatoes aren't peeled. 
The cardboard box isn't open. The prawns aren't raw. 
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The carrots aren't diced. The rucksack isn't open. 
The CD isn't scratched. The sandals aren't muddy. 
The cheese hasn't melted. The saucepan isn't empty. 
The chicken isn't raw. The scarf isn't folded. 
The chocolate cake hasn't been cut. The shirt isn't crumpled. 
The chocolate hasn't melted. The shoe laces aren't tied. 
The coke can isn't squashed. The sink isn't dirty. 
The computer isn't on. The sleeping bag isn't rolled up. 
The cricket bat isn't broken. The small pool isn't inflated. 
The cucumber isn't sliced The sock isn't wet. 
The cup isn't full. The spaghetti isn't cooked. 
The cupcake isn't iced. The steak isn't raw. 
The deck chair isn't folded. The strawberry isn't sliced. 
The diary isn't closed. The table isn't folded. 
The dictionary isn't closed. The tennis racket isn't broken. 
The dishes haven't been washed. The tent isn't put up. 
The door isn't shut. The textbook isn't closed. 
The drawer isn't closed. The tie isn't tied. 
The eagle isn't flying. The tissue isn't screwed up. 
The egg isn't cracked. The tomatoes aren't dried. 
The envelope isn't sealed. The towel isn't folded. 
The fireplace hasn't been lit. The trainers aren't dirty. 
The football isn't blown up. The trousers aren't muddy. 
The frying pan isn't empty. The truck isn't clean. 
The garlic isn't chopped. The TV isn't on. 
The glass isn't empty. The tyre isn't inflated. 
The glove isn't wet. The umbrella isn't open. 
The ham isn't sliced. The vase isn't broken. 
The ice cream hasn't melted. The water bottle isn't open. 
The jar isn't sealed. The wellies aren't clean. 
The jeans aren't crumpled. The window isn't shut. 
The jug isn't empty. The wine glass isn't cracked. 
The lantern hasn't been lit. The wooden box isn't closed. 
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The leeks aren't chopped. The wrapping paper isn't screwed up. 
The lentils aren't raw. The yellow pages book isn't closed. 
The lorry isn't clean. The yoga mat isn't rolled up. 
 
Experimental and filler sentences for eyetracking study (Chapter 5) 
Experimental sentences:  
All experimental sentences appear in four conditions: simple positive, simple 
negative, cleft positive and cleft negative. For example: 
Simple positive: Anna has closed her mom’s umbrella. 
Simple negative: Anma hasn’t closed her mom’s umbrella.  
Cleft positive: It is Anna who has closed her mom’s umbrella. 
Cleft negative: It is Anna hasn’t closed her mom’s umbrella. 
 
The following list are shown in simple negative format. 
Anna hasn't closed her mom's umbrella. 
Daniel hasn't emptied his mum's saucepan.  
Dave hasn't cleaned his wife's wellies. 
Grant hasn't sliced his chef's cucumber.  
John hasn't ironed his father's shirt. 
John hasn't opened his friend's book. 
John hasn't turned off his uncle's TV. 
Matt hasn't shut his dad's window. 
Mike hasn't folded his wife's scarf. 
Aiden hasn't washed his dad's car. 
Edward hasn't turned on his friend's tap. 
Gavin hasn't opened his son's can.  
Jim hasn't opened his friend's padlock. 
Mary hasn't folded her friend's deck chair. 
Sophie hasn't closed her sister's drawer. 
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Tina hasn't emptied her mom's jug. 
Tracy hasn't sliced her mom's bread. 
Amy hasn't finished her cousin's jigsaw puzzle. 
Andrew hasn't lit his auntie's candle. 
Ben hasn't broken his friend's pencil.  
Bill hasn't tied his son's shoe laces. 
Chris hasn't fastened his son's zip. 
Dave hasn't peeled his sister's banana. 
Emma hasn't rolled up her son's sleeves. 
Ian hasn't cooked his sister's spaghetti. 
James hasn't blown up his cousin's balloon. 
James hasn't inflated his brother's tyre. 
Jessica hasn't picked up her husband's phone. 
Justin hasn't erased his teacher's blackboard.  
Lee hasn't sealed his boss's envelope. 
Lilly hasn't cracked her sister's egg. 
Linda hasn't iced her auntie's cupcake.  
Lucas hasn't turned off his wife's light bulb. 
Lucy hasn't framed her sister's photo.   
Nathan hasn't emptied his colleague's truck.  
Nick hasn't decorated his friend's Christmas tree. 
Paul hasn't dried his auntie's tomatoes.  
Rita hasn't screwed up her sister's wrapping paper.  
Susan hasn't mended her son's jeans.  
Susan hasn't rolled up her friend's yoga mat. 
Zoey hasn't cut her sister's cake. 
Filler sentences: 
Alice shouldn't have thrown away her ice cream.  
Alison will charge her brother's batteries.  
Andrew will ride his father's horse.  
Austin shouldn't have soaked the paint brush.  
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Bill has wrapped the birthday present. 
Bob will chop his father's wood.  
Caroline shoud have lit her dauther's lantern. 
Conner shouldn't have dropped his wife's lipstick.  
Eva shouldn't have scratched her brother's CD.  
Gina should have picked up her baby.  
Grace shouldn't have broken her boss's vase.  
It is Amy who will wear a pair of high heeled shoes. 
It is Ayden who shouldn't have painted his cousin's chair.  
It is Ben who will build a clever robot.  
It is Betty who shouldn't have cut her friend's rope.  
It is Claire who shouldn't have taken off her coat.  
It is Emily who should have fed the hungry cat 
It is Jane who shouldn't have pushed the new trolley.  
It is Jane who will catch the young rabbit.  
It is Jill who will visit the new library. 
It is Kylie who shouldn't have picked her uncle's grapes.  
It is Lily who should have baked a pie.  
It is Lucas who shouldn't have fried the fresh egg.  
It is Lucy who should have watered her Dad's flower.  
It is Luis who shouldn't have polished his shoes.  
It is Max who should have sent his mother some flowers.  
It is Molly who shouldn't have sliced her auntie’s pineapple.  
It is Ruth who shouldn't have eaten the fresh apple.  
It is Sam who will learn to play the violin.  
It is Sophie who shouldn't have drained her pasta.  
It is Sue who should have knitted a new scarf. 
Jack shouldn't have made a plain cup of coffee.  
James will throw his new frisbee.  
Kevin shouldn't have drunk his girlfriend's juice.  
Luke shouldn’t have lit his beloved smoking pipe.  
Mia shouldn't have torn her boyfriend's diary.  
Michael will melt his friend's ice cube.  
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Ryan shouldn't have shaved his poor dog.  
Tom should have fixed his uncle's fridge.  
William should have made a birthday card. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
